Request for Immediate Action on Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16), and Request for Precautionary Measures (MC-367-16)

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 18889 F Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Re:       Request for Immediate Action on Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16), and Request for Precautionary Measures (MC-367-16)

Greetings:

I filed the above pleadings more than eight months ago, (see http://isidororodriguez.com), and subsequently filed various supplemental pleadings in support for the Petition and Request for Precautionary Measures.  Given that the above pleadings have only been “Under Study,” I now write to seek a meeting to discuss my need for the immediate need for protection of my property rights and right to employment as a U.S. federal civil litigator, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Organization of American States Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration.

I advise you and attach my Statement to the Fairfax Delegation to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia given on January 7, 2017, and attach a supplemental Memorandum of Law confirming that there is no immunity form accountability for malfeasance by U.S. and Virginia government attorneys and employees, including judges.

In summary, the evidence is that in violation of the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Art. VI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Article 2(1) of the OAS Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration, Federal and Virginia Code, government attorneys in the Obama Administration under the Stewardship of Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Gov’t/Private Attorney Eric Holder, have acted outside the scope of their employment and jurisdiction to establish a policy and practice to assume away accountability for malfeasance, but rather provide absolute immunity for the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to secure accountability for malfeasance.

On the issue of the self-proclaimed doctrine of “judicial immunity,” and immunity of federal government employees generally, not only is it inconsistent with the holding I won when I argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (right to evidentiary hearing before a jury), the key point missed is that under our Constitution system and “federalism” only State Court are courts of general jurisdiction– Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. This distinction is the key to confusion, since federal courts and government views itself as having no limits on its power.   Thus, the holding of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which provides absolute judicial immunity for state court judge only is based upon the general jurisdiction of a State court judge (who are elect for terms of office). It has not incorrectly been applied to Federal court (who are appointed for life). This has been unlawfully done by both judges and attorneys, making all judges above the law and not accountable for violation of the rule of law and usurping of legislative power by the issuance of court rules. This is wrong and I have been litigating and petitioning the legislative branch to investigate and correct this.

My litigation and petitions to the U.S. Congress and the General Assembly of Virginia have been filed pursuant to the holding under Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger: “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 141-142, agreed with Chief Justice Berger on the point above: “While judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”

In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:
“This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties’ numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.”

Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:

“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstave, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.  Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”

Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.

The evidence confirms that there has been a usurping of their legislative authority of the General Assembly of Virginia (see my presentation in 2010 to NOVA member of General Assembly, https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5).  This has been allowed by the U.S. Federal Court denying me a trial by jury to secure accountability for malfeasance, a summary dismissal of my suit, and the issuance of a prior restraint enjoining any future suit seeking accountability of government employees in Obama’s Administration for their retaliatory business conspiracy to damage my business as an independent federal litigator, profession, reputation, property rights, and right to employment, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Eric Holder, and Jane/John Does Members of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA (Richmond Division) No. 12 cv 663-JAB (2010). The court orders themselves confirms a systematic denial to me of access to an impartial court and trial by jury, in total disregard of the holding I won in Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995). In summary, this litigation is based on the evidence:

first, of the simultaneous filing in 2003 of two Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (VSBDB) complaints against me in retaliation for my litigating to enforce my Virginia statutory rights:(1) by Eric Holder, seeking to punish me for litigating Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA supra., and litigating for violation of my rights as a father under VA Code, the Hague Convention, and Joint Custody Agreement (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml, and Isidoro Rodriguez v. Editor In Chief, Legal Times, Individually and In his Corporate Capacity, et al., No. 08-411, 129 S.Ct. 639 (2008); and, (2) by my client, with Eric Holder, and other Washington D.C. Oligarchy of Lawyer, Lobbyist, and Law Firms, undertaking a business conspiracy to deprive me of my property rights in my choate statutory Virginia Attorney’s Lien on my client’s claim to a 50% share to $18 Billion USD of sunken treasure trove off the coast of the Republic of Colombia; and,

second, of the VSBDB sitting as a “Kangaroo Court” in violation of Art. VI of the Virginia Constitutions and Codes, to issue in 2006 a Void Ab Initio Order disbarring me for litigating to enforce my statutory rights as a father and my choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), and the denying to me access to an impartial court and jury trial of the evidence of the business conspiracy and malfeasance to use stare decisis to affirm the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order.

Please advise when we can meet to discuss my pleadings,

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodriguez

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THE PETITION AND REQUESTS FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES FILED WITH THE INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE 5TH, 7TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND VA CODE.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On May 15, 2016, Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) a Petition (P-926-16) and Requests for Precautionary Measures (MC-367-16) (see http://isidororodriguez.com), for protection from an ongoing business conspiracy and acts of malfeasance by named and unnamed government attorneys and employees, including judges of the United States and Commonwealth of Virginia.

The Petition and Requests for Precautionary Measures were filed with evidence confirming that since 2003 government attorneys and employees, including judges of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia, have willfully obfuscated and concealed their ongoing business conspiracy and acts of malfeasance to deprive Rodriguez of his business, reputation, property, and right to employment as an independent federal civil litigator, by unlawful use of the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata to obstruct justice and conceal the unlawful promulgation and use of the Supreme Court of Virginia Court Rules.  Thus, Rodriguez has been and is still systematically denied of his fundamental right of access to an impartial court to enjoin the ongoing violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (“5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const.”), Article VI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”), the Internal Revenue Code, and Virginia Code, as well as the right to a trial by jury for monetary damages against each named defendant, all in violation of Article 2(1) of the OAS Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration.

As explained in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), a case Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court, the impartial review is a mainstay of our system of government so to be able to hold government employees accountable for an unlawful act.  As Madison wrote,

“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time… ” The Federalist No. 10, p. 79 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

On the issue of the self-proclaimed doctrine of “judicial immunity,” and immunity of federal government employees generally, not only is it inconsistent with the holding I won when I argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (right to evidentiary hearing before a jury), the key point missed is that under our Constitution system and “federalism” only State Court are courts of general jurisdiction– Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. This distinction is the key to confusion, since federal courts and government views itself as having no limits on its power.   Thus, the holding of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which provides absolute judicial immunity for state court judge only is based upon the general jurisdiction of a State court judge (who are elect for terms of office). It has not incorrectly been applied to Federal court (who are appointed for life). This has been unlawfully done by both judges and attorneys, making all judges above the law and not accountable for violation of the rule of law and usurping of legislative power by the issuance of court rules.

Under Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger: “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 141-142, agreed with Chief Justice Berger on the point above: “While judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”

In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:

“This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties’ numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.

Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:

“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstave, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.  Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”

Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; . . ..”

Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, grantees the right to a trial by jury for alleged malfeasance by any government employee, including judges.

The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”

VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly.

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 7.  Selection . . . of judges.  The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . ..  The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . ..

VIRGINIA CODE SECTIONS INVOLVED

VA Code § 54.1‑3909. The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations: . . . Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and attorneys.

VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.

VA Code 54.1‑3932. Lien for fees. A. Any person having or claiming a right of action sounding . . . liquidated or unliquidated damages on contract, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the same, and the attorney shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security for is fees for any services rendered in relation to the cause of action or claim. When any such contract is made, and written notice of the claim of such lien is given to the opposite party, his attorney or agent, any settlement or adjustment of the cause of action shall be void against the lien so created, except as proof of liability on such cause of action.

VA. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has . . .violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
  2. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court.
  3. Bar Counsel of the Virginia State Bar shall prosecute the case. . ..
  4. Upon the hearing, if the attorney is found guilty by the court, his license to practice law in this Commonwealth shall be revoked. …

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Part 6, § IV, 13-6, established the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board to hear the most, “serious cases of lawyer misconduct.  The twenty-member board appointed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is composed of sixteen attorneys and four lay members. The board issues written opinions following its hearings.”

STATEMENT OF FACTS

  • The General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935, establishing a decentralized attorney disciplinary system under the control of each county court of appeals, not under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
  • The Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia Part 6, § IV, 13-6, outside of its jurisdiciotn by establishing a centralized attorney disciplinary system under its control by the Court creating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “court,” and the Court appointing the twenty members of the VSBDB as “judges” (See https://www.vsb.org/site/about/disciplinary and http://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/bar-govt/).
  • In 2003, in retaliation for Rodriguez litigating to enforce his Virginia statutory rights, Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder entered into a business conspiracy with a client of Rodriguez, to simultaneously file two complaints with the VSBDB: first, pursuant to VA Code § 54.1-3932, to protect his property right in a Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to sunken treasure trove off the coast of the Republic of Colombia aboard the 1707 Galleon San Jose (NPR report’s on Pres. of the Republic of Colombia confirming Dec. 2, 2015, of finding treasure trove valued at $18 Billion USD); and, second, pursuant to Treaty, VA Code, and joint custody agreement, to enforce his rights as a father to protect in 2001 his 13 year-old son from being forced against his son’s express desire, from Virginia to a “zone of war” in the Republic of Colombia (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).
  • On November 27, 2006, after denying various motions challenging the VSBDB authority and jurisdiction as a court, the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order, surreally disbarring and punished Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).
  • In 2007, in violation of Rodriguez’s statutory rights, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the doctrine of stare decises, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirm VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Isidoro Rodriguez as an independent Virginia trial attorney,
  • Between 2008 and 2014, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United States Tax Court, violated Rodriguez’s statutory rights, the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. and the Art. VI of VA Const., Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the doctrine of stare decises, by their use of the VSBDB void order to disbar him and deprive Rodriguez’s interstate/international law business, reputation, profession, the right to property, and the right to employment as an independent federal litigator.

● In May 2013, the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., denied the demand for a jury trial on the evidence of an ongoing business conspiracy and malfeasance, to summarily dismissed and issued a prior restraint enjoining Rodriguez from filing future suits against government attorneys and employees, including judges, for violation of 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. VA Const. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 54-1-3935, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB.

  1. VA General Assembly Established Decentralize Attorney Disciplinary System

In response to the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia, that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835),[1] the General Assembly enacted the Acts of Assembly 1932. p. 139, to establish a decentralize  attorney disciplinary system.  The General Assembly gave to each county court of appeals the jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and giving statewide effect to the disciplining of an attorney before that particular court.[1]

Pursuant to this legislation, the Supreme Court of Virginia did promulgate rules establishing an integrated Virginia State Bar (VSB), with limited powers of investigating complaints against attorneys, to be exercised by a Council and Investigating Committee in each county. The function of the VSB Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury, as a fact-finding board.  It had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney.  Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction, was,

the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the case in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule . . .. (Emphasis added)

 

The constitutionality of this decentralized attorney disciplinary system was upheld in Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942).  There, the Court held that evident from the provisions of the statute the General Assembly merely intended to create a new tribunal with general jurisdiction to hear and determine disbarment proceedings and did not intend to delegate to the tribunal any legislative powers.   Appeal from the judgment of the three-judge court was a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Virginia.  Also, the attorney who had been disbarred had the right to apply to the Governor for reinstatement, if at the time of application for such relief, “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law.” See VA Code of 1950, 12-45.

Subsequently, VA. Code § 54.1‑3935, was enacted by the General Assembly, which again specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline an attorney directly.[2]  Also, the General Assembly limited the delegated authority to the Supreme Court of Virginia under VA. Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting under VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, the Court from prescribing, adopting, promulgating, and amending rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct, that would be inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code.

Thus, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A), to reconfirm the decentralized attorney disciplinary system’s use of the jurisdiction of each county’s Court of Appeals, and circuit courts to discipline an attorney.  Also, VA Code §54.1-3935(B), again reconfirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond.

  1. Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions on the Supreme Court of Virginia

The General Assembly rejected creating a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.  In summary, the General Assembly mandated that separation of power within the Judicial Branch serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority. . ..” D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, page 13.

As Chief Justice, John Marshall wrote more than 2000 years ago, “[We judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816) (Emphasis added).[3]  To enforce this control on the Judicial Branch both the U.S. Const. and VA Const., confirm that there exists no immunity from the absolute right of citizens to access to an impartial court and civil jury trial for malfeasance.[4] See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7, diffused the power of the Judicial Branch in Virginia to limit the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within it.  To this end, VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 prohibit the Supreme Court of Virginia from the promulgation of court rules which are in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights because courts cannot enact legislation.  In short, separation of power between and among entities in government fractures power in innumerable ways to assure independent review of any violation of either the VA Const. or VA Code.[5]

This was consistent with Thomas Jefferson writings that the violation of the limitation and prohibitions defining the separation of power would create a “despotic government.”  Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787).  As James Madison explained, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103 (Emphasis added).  These drafters of both the VA Const., and U.S. Const., understood that the clear lessons from history show that,

Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.  Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

Therefore, to protect citizens the VA Const., and U.S. Const., confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern–We the People, and are limited.  Consequently, it is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally.  As to the need of constitutional checks specifically on the Virginia and Federal Judicial Branch, Patrick Henry, wrote,

Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.

  1. Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by Establishing a Centralized Attorney Disciplinary System Under its Rules

In flagrant disregard of the General Assembly’s mandated decentralized attorney disciplinary system established under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A) and (B), and in violation of the limitation and prohibitions under VA Const. Article VI, § 1, 5, and 7, and VA Code § 54.1‑3915, the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rule Part 6, IV, &13, to establish a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control.  The Supreme Court of Virginia created the VSBDB as “court” and appointing its members as “judges,” with jurisdiction to discipline attorneys.  In short, by creating the VSBDB by unlawful court rules that usurped the exclusive constitutional power of the General Assembly and willfully obfuscated court rules to assume away the exclusive jurisdiction of each county Court of Appeals and circuit court to discipline attorneys, the Supreme Court of Virginia created the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court” whose order are void ab initio.

  1. Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by Violating the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to affirm the VSBDB disbarment of Rodriguez 

Pursuant to Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402,(2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987), the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity did not have the constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.  A void ab initio order or judgment is invalid at the moment of issuance, it is to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.  A void ab initio order may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” A void ab initio order has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments ” 44 and 45.  As explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia, “[a] void judgment is one that has been . . . entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987) (Emphasis added).

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the challenge of any void ab initio order.  There the court stated,

“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

This decision, as well as others, provides Rodriguez with thclear a right to challenge the various federal court disbarments based upon their use of stare decisis and res judicata to give effect to and not enjoin the VSBDB void ab initio order.  Because a void ab initio order cannot be affirmed by the federal court’s use of either stare decisis or res judicata.  “A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur Judgments ” 44, 45.  This because logically and legally a judgment may not be issued which in violation of the limitation and prohibitions of constitutional protections.

The validity of the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, as well as those of the Federal Courts, are affected by their failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.  See also, Restatements, Judgments 4(b). The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to the judicial branch, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

Because, the Virginia Supreme Court, “cannot act beyond the power delegated to them.  If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void [ab initio], and this even prior to reversal.”  Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).[6]

Finally, it is a fundamental doctrine of law under the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, is that Rodriguez, who is affected by a personal judgment of the VSBDB’s void ab initio order, Rodriguez must have his day in an impartial court, and an opportunity to be heard, on the evidence of the violation of the business conspiracy and malfeasance by a civil jury trial. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

No Opportunity to Be Heard

The evidence confirms that Rodriguez has yet to be heard by any impartial court and has been deprived of his right jury trial damages on his challenge to the VSBDB void ab initio order.  This is most troubling, since the judgment of the VSBDB issued without authority or jurisdiction, and the use of stare decisis by the federal courts has denied him of his right to heard and is not are not a valid judicial determination of Rodriguez’s statutory rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.  This is because “[a] void judgment does not create any binding obligation.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370 (1940); Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861. An illegal order is forever void.[7]

Court Orders Exceeding Jurisdiction

The order issued in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board,  et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB, denying Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial, dismissing the action, and enjoining future suits against government attorneys and employees, including judges, for a business conspiracy and malfeasance, based on violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine,  exceeds the jurisdiction and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed. 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed. 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L ed. 608.

This is because, “[i]f a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that ex­tent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.).  Here the VSBDB is a “kangaroo court” illegally created by court rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Article VI of the VA Const.  Thus, the VSBDB disbarment order is a void judgment without legal effect. Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)) “a court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).  Thus, the affirmance of the VSBDB void ab initio order, based on stare decisis does not create any binding decision.  Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370.

  1. Business Conspiracy to Systematically Deny Access to an Impartial court and Jury Trial

It is a fundamental doctrine of due process and the common law that a party to be affected by a void personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.  Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

However, the evidence confirms that the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order by being a “kangaroo court” and disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his Virginia statutory rights to property and employment.  The evidence confirms that on appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia “[resisted] the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[8] to conceal and obfuscate the promulgation of illegal court rules by affirming the VSBDB’s void ab initio order.  Finally, the evidence confirms a conspiracy to conceal illegal acts by systematically denying access to an impartial federal court and trial by a jury of the evidence of malfeasance and the business conspiracy to deprive Rodriguez of his business, reputation, profession, property, and right to employment.

But, under the common law right to fair trial on the issue of the scope of employment, as well as VA Const., and VA Code, the question is to be resolved by an evidentiary hearing before an impartial jury under 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  This is because as pointed out by Jefferson, the jury trial is the most important safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive governmental policies.

Conclusion

The memorandum of law is submitted to seek immediate action on the IACHR Petition and Requests for Precautionary Measures filed eight months ago, to bring public attention and to stop the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to deny Rodriguez’s right to seek damages for the ongoing use and enforcement of the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order issued in violation of the 5th and 14th Amend to the U.S. Const., Art. VI of the Virginia Constitutions and VA Codes, as a “Kangaroo Court” (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

The evidence submitted confirm that government attorneys and employees in the Obama Administration, in collusion with the judges of the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, D.C. and Federal Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United District Tax Court, willfully entered into a business conspiracy to undertake acts of malfeasance by systematically denying Rodriguez access to an impartial court so to obstruct justice by aiding and abetting the ongoing violation of Article VI of the Constitution of Virginia and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as well as to deny Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial for the business conspiracy to damage his business, reputation, profession, right to property, and right to employment as an independent federal civil litigator.

To this end, the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB, denied Rodriguez of his fundamental right to a trial by jury pursuant to Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), summarily dismissed this action, and issued a prior restraint to effectively enjoin future suit seeking accountability and damages for the promulgation and use of illegal court rules in violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the Internal Revenue Code.

But, “[c]rime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy,” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).

Consequently, because “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law,” within the United States, to protect the fundamental rights of Rodriguez and all citizen under the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the Organization of American, IACHR must take action.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez 

[1] See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

[2]The General Assembly specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline attorneys statewide, by mandating that any Supreme Court of Virginia disciplinary action was to be referred to a three-judge panel selected from the City of Richmond, VA Code §54.1-3935.

[3] VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirm that there is no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

[4] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)

[5]Fed. 47 p 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”

[6]As Virginia Circuit Judge the Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, wrote, “The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to write laws that the legislature failed to enact, or to repeal those that violate no recognizable constitutional principle, or to amend laws that are reasonably adequate but nonetheless can be improved upon. As Thomas Jefferson put it, a judiciary that pushes beyond these limits would place us all under the “despotism of an oligarchy” —one flatly at odds with the democratic principles of our republic.” VSB Journal, Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, Law & Politics: The Imperative of Judicial Self‑Restraint, (2004). at p.5.

[7] “A judgment which is void . . . is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.)

[8] Misprision of treason is defined pursuant to VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482.

[1]The Court held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, “[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).

STATEMENT TO THE FAIRFAX DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, January 7, 2017.

STATEMENT TO THE FAIRFAX DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

January 7, 2017

NOTICE OF FILING PETITION (P-926-16) AND REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES (MC-367-16) WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (IACHR) OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS), TO PROTECT MY RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT AND PROPERTY FROM ACTS OF MALFEASANCE AND A BUSINESS CONSPIRACY BY VIRGINIA GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS AND EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING JUDGES, IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ART. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7; VA CODE §§ 54-1-3915 & 3935 AND §§ 18.2‑499 AND 500

I filed on May 15, 2016, the above reference pleadings with the IACHR of the OAS (see http://www.isidororodriguez.com), in response to each of your failure to act in any manner on my petitions filed with each of you since 2009 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ).  As confirmed in the 2010 “YouTube Video” (http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), I repeatedly petitioned each of you for an investigation and impeachment of government attorneys and employees, including judges, for their willful retaliatory acts outside their scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial capacity.  This is because, since 2003, I have been systematically denied access to an impartial hearing, court and civil jury trial in Fairfax County, Virginia, thereby depriving me of my fundamental and statutory right as a citizen to hold government attorneys and employees, including judges, accountable for damages to my business, profession, and reputation (https://www.change.org/p/u-s-house-of-representatives-holding-government-attorneys-and-employees-including-judges-accountable), by their:

  • malfeasance, in aiding and abetting the Supreme Court of Virginia to usurp the exclusive power of the General Assembly in violation of VA Const. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 54-1-3935, by promulgation of Court Rules establishing the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “kangaroo court,” and appointing VSBDB members as “judges;” and,
  • civil and criminal business conspiracy in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑499 and 500, to deprive me of my statutory rights under VA Code, violate the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and to unlawfully use the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata, to block my litigation challenging the Supreme Court of Virginia’s affirmance of the void ab initio order of the VSBDB disbarring me as a Virginia trial attorney since 2006. In sum the VSBDB void ab initio order surreally punishes me for my litigating to enforce my statutory rights (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf): first, pursuant to VA Code § 54.1-3932, to protect my property right in my Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on Sea Search Armada/Armada Company’s claim to sunken treasure trove off the coast of the Republic of Colombia aboard the 1707 Galleon San Jose (NPR report’s  on  Pres. of the Republic of Colombia confirming Dec. 2, 2015, of finding treasure trove valued at $18 Billion USD); and, second, pursuant to Treaty, joint custody agreement, and VA Code, to defend my right as a father to protect my son from being taken from Virginia to a “zone of war” in 2001 in the Republic of Colombia (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

Isidoro Rodriguez

AUGUST 15, 2016 PETITION NO. P-926-16 PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 25 OF THE COMMISSION’S REGULATIONS, PETITIONER ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ SUBMIT TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS THIS SECOND REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TO PROTECT HIS BUSINESS, REPUTATION, PROFESSION, RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, PROPERTY, AND ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT AND CIVIL TRIAL BY JURY OF THE EVIDENCE OF MALFEASANCE AND BUSINESS CONSPIRACY.

Tags

  1. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure,[1] Petitioner Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez (“Mr. Rodriguez”), does file this second request for urgent intervention by this Commission in order to prevent continued unlawful acts of the United States by the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury of the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy by government attorneys and employees, including judges, to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of his business, profession, reputation, statutory property rights and fundamental rights of employment as a pro hoc vice federal litigator, [2] by the unlawful and misuse of stare decisis in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine (See Supporting Memorandum of Law).

As part of this ongoing conspiracy the court in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA, 12 cv 663 JAB (2014), unlawful used stare decisis in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to summarily dismiss the suit and to issue a prior restraint to enjoin future suit of the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy)(http://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/sea-search-armada-annandale-virginia-c477026.html.

Therefore, the evidence confirms that to date Mr. Rodriquez has been denied of his fundamental right to protect and enforce his statutory choate Virginia Attorneys Lien on Sea Search Armada and Armada Company’s claim to approximately $18 Billion USD of treasure trove sunken aboard the Galleon San Jose (confirmed by the Pres. of Colombia as located),[3] and denied of his fundamental right to employment as a federal pro hoc vice litigator before the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for 2nd, 3rd, 4th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States Tax Court.[4] (See Petition, Petitioner’s Ex. 1 through 17, and Supplemental filings).

Seldom has there been such clear and extensive evidence of violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of American States (Charter), and Article V, XIV XVII XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration):

First, the evidence confirms that the United States, its government attorneys and employees, including judges, have surreally abused the doctrine of stare decisis in violation of the void ab initio order doctrine so to affirm the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board void order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez for litigating to enforce statutory property and Hague Convention as a father (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

Second, the evidence confirms that the United States, its government attorneys and employees, including judges, have conspired to systematically deny Mr. Rodriguez of access to an impartial federal court and civil jury trial so to prevent their being held accountable for acts of malfeasance in violation of the 5th, 7th and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article IV of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and for participating in a business conspiracy to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of his business, profession, reputation, property right.

Consequently, a serious and urgent situation is present mandating precautionary measures consistent with Petition P-926-16 filed on May 15, 2016, so to protect Mr. Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession, fundamental rights to employment as a pro hoc vice federal litigator, statutory property right in his choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien, and right under Untied States domestic law to hold government attorneys and employees, including judges, accountable for bad acts in willful violation of United States and Virginia Constitutions, domestic law, Charter, and the American Declaration.

  1. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Rodriguez, is a 70-year-old citizen of the United States of America (“United States”) born in New York City of Puerto Rican decent, a Viet Nam Veteran, and domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”).[5]  Mr. Rodriguez established in 1987 in Barranquilla, Republic of Colombian (“Colombia”),[6] a unique civil pro hoc vice litigation practice in the United States[7] representing nonresident Hispanic United States/Colombian citizens and businesses before the United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, District of Colombia, and Federal Circuits, United States District Ct. for the E.D. of Virginia, the United States Tax Court, and Supreme Court of Virginia.

Mr. Rodriguez request for precautionary measures on his own behalf against the United States for the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury of the evidence of retaliatory malfeasance and business conspiracy to unlawfully disbar Mr. Rodriguez as a member of the above cited United States courts, and to injure Mr. Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession, and property rights in violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of American States (Charter), and Article V, XIV XVII XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”).

In summary, the evidence confirm a pattern and practice of retaliation against Mr. Rodriguez for his pro hoc vice litigation on behalf of nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens,[8] challenging policies by misuse of the Judicial Conference Act violating separation of power under the direction of the United States Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice and the Chief Justice the United States Supreme Court during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).  The United States has unlawfully disbarred and deprived Mr. Rodriguez of his statutory choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on his clients Search Armada and Armada Company (“SSA”) claim to 50% ownership of treasure trove aboard the Galleon San Jose, recently confirmed by the Government of Colombia (“GOC”) located and valued at $18 Billion USD on December 2, 2015,[9] his pro hoc vice civil litigation practice,[10] his business, his good reputation, his legal profession, and statutory rights by the violation of the Void and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine and abuse of the judicially created abstention doctrines, i.e. stare decisis and res judicata, see Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board,  et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12 cv 663; 4th Cir. USCA No, 13-1638 (2013); cert. denied U.S. S. Ct No. (2014) (JAB)(Petitioner’s Exhibits 8a, 8b, 8c, 13, 14a thru 14e).

  • THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ADOPTION OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
  1. The Commission has Jurisdiction and Authority to Issue Precautionary Measures.

Under Article 25(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission has the authority to receive and grant requests for precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons in connection with a pending petition. As a member state of the OAS, the U.S. is subject to an international legal obligation to comply with a request made by the Commission for such measures. [11]  Regarding the United States systematic denial to Mr. Rodriguez of access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury of the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy, the Commission since 2002 has repeatedly used its authority to issue precautionary measures in an attempt to protect petitioners from irreparable harm and human rights violations.[12]

  1. The Commission Should Issue Precautionary Measures Requiring Investigation

The Commission may issue precautionary measures where “serious and urgent situations” present risk of irreparable harm to persons in full accordance with international law and to comply with its obligation to investigate.[13]

Mr. Rodriguez does seek the urgent intervention of this Commission, in order to prevent continued unlawful acts of government attorneys and employees, including judges by their malfeasance and business conspiracy to systematically deny access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury so to conceal and prevent the holding of them accountable for willful violation of United States and Virginia domestic law.

Under Article 25 of its regulations, the Commission may intercede in “serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available … to prevent irreparable harm to persons.” This is such an urgent case.

The Commission has jurisdiction to adopt precautionary measures, based upon its press release reminding the U.S. of its obligation to adhere to the precautionary measures request.

This was issued because at the same time that the United States supports its compliance with treaties, it has since September 19, 2013, ignored a request from Commission for precautionary measures.  The U.S.’s failure to comply with the precautionary measures follows the release of the Commission’s newly amended Rules of Procedure, effective August 1, 2013.  The reforms included significant amendments to Article 25, which governs the doctrine of precautionary measures. Under its powers derived from Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure, Article 106 of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, and Article 18(b) of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights the IACHR grants precautionary measures in serious and urgent situations to prevent irreparable harm. Professor Rodríguez-Pínzon explains that the Commission considers precautionary measures to be “inherent” to their adjudicatory functions.

Article 25 now reads with more specificity, providing guidance defining and interpreting “serious situation,” “urgent situation,” and “irreparable harm.” Addressing the contested issue of States’ obligations to adhere to precautionary measures, Article 25 also outlines the relevant provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights (Convention) and OAS Charter from which the Commission derives the power to grant precautionary measures. The amendments to Subsection 10 allow for more explicit follow-up measures including “timetables for implementation, hearings, working meetings, and visits for follow-up and review.” This language allows the Commission to closely observe precautionary measures through targeted supervision.

Disregarding the above rule of international law, the U.S. has consistently stated that the orders are not legally binding, rejecting precautionary measures in many cases including Marlin Gray v. United States, Juan Raul Garza v. United States, and Detainees of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba v. United States. The U.S. argued in Marlin Gray that the Commission Rules of Procedure were approved by the Commission itself but were not adopted by the Member States, and therefore cannot be binding. Additionally, the U.S. asserted that the OAS Charter Statute refers only to precautionary measures as related to parties to the Convention, and the U.S. is not a party to the Convention. In Garza v. Lappin, the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit denied the enforcement of precautionary measures granted by the Commission in the 2001 case of Juan Raul Garza, stating that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration), to which the U.S. is a party, is “merely an aspirational document that, in itself, creates no directly enforceable rights.”

However, the fact is that neither the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) nor the Commission’s Statute restricts the exercise of the Commission’s authority to issue precautionary measures in relation to the American Declaration as extending to all OAS Member States and in respect of persons “subject to their authority and control.”[14]

In Coard v. United States, several individuals filed a petition against the United States, alleging violations of the prohibition of arbitrary detention under the American Declaration. The detentions were alleged to have taken place during the U.S. military incursion in Grenada. In its report, the Commission set forth the “authority and control test.”  Each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction.[15]  In sum, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system, as well as the case law of other jurisdictions, the key determination is whether a state has “authority and control” over the affected individuals.

Therefore, the Commission must have jurisdiction in this matter given the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy by United States and Virginia government attorneys and employees, including judges, to systematically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury so to prevent being held accountable for:

(1) malfeasance by willful violation of United States domestic law and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia to illegal usurp legislative power by the issuance and use of illegal Supreme Court of Virginia court rules replacing the decentralized attorney disciplinary system created under VA Code § 54-1-3935, with a centralized system under the Supreme Court of Virginia’s control establishing the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “kangaroo court,” and naming its members as “judges” (see https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5); and,

(2) a business conspiracy to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of his right to employment as a pro hoc vice federal litigator, his international business, profession, and property in violation VA Code §§ 18.2 499 and 500, by the affirming of the VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf): (i) for litigating to enforce his statutory choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien for fees owed for service as Legal Representative of SSA since 1988; and, (ii) for litigating to enforce his rights as a father under joint custody agreement and Hogue Treaty so to protect his then 13 year-old U.S. citizen son from being forced to a “zone of war” in 2002  (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

Therefore, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests the issuance of precautionary measures based on the evidence of the United States:

First, violated Mr. Rodriguez’s rights under Articles XVIII, XXV, and XXVI.

Second, violated Articles XVIII, and XXIII, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

Third, discriminated against Mr. Rodriguez —at least implicitly—based on his being Hispanic and having an office in the Republic of Columbia, violating Mr. Rodriguez’s rights to equality before the law protected under Article V, XIV, and XVII.

Fourth, violated Mr. Rodriguez’s right to a remedy for violation of protected rights guaranteed under Article XVIII, XXIII, and XXVI, as well as United States domestic law, through willful violation of the void ab initio order doctrine and systematic denial of access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury of the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy by the United States government attorneys and employees, including judges acting outside the scope of their authority.

Consequently, precautionary Measures are warranted here given that Mr. Rodriguez is subject to serious violation of his fundamental rights by the systematic denial of access to an impartial court to hold government attorneys and employees, including judges, accountable for malfeasance and business conspiracy.[16]  “[I]rreparable harm” may also be shown by demonstrating the existence of a serious risk to personal integrity.[17]  The evidence of the systematic denial of access to an impartial court in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to defame and unlawfully disbar Mr. Rodriguez as a pro hoc vice federal litigator by the willful violation of Untied States domestic law clearly poses an imminent and serious risk to his personal integrity if the Precautionary Measures requested are not adopted. The requested Measures are directed and narrowly tailored toward the avoidance of this harm. The facts set forth in this Request for Precautionary Measures establish prima facie violations of the Charter and the American Declaration and the risk of irreparable harm has been amply demonstrated.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

For the aforementioned reasons, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully request that the Honorable Commission:

  1. Urgently issue the necessary and appropriate precautionary measures to prevent further irreparable harm to Mr. Rodriguez fundamental rights to employment as a pro hoc vice federal litigator and to his statutory property rights.
  2. Grant this petition an expedited initial evaluation in accordance with Article 29 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure;
  3. Consider the admissibility and merits of this petition simultaneously, in accordance with Article 30(7) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case and the ongoing violations of fundamental rights;
  4. Declare the petition admissible, conduct a full hearing, and find that the United States has violated fundamental rights enshrined in Articles I, III, V, VI, XI, XVIII, XXV, and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and
  5. Order the United States to provide prompt and adequate reparations for the violations suffered by Mr. Rodriguez of his business, profession, reputation, fundamental right to employment as a pro hoc vice federal litigator, and statutory choate Virginia Attorneys Lien.

The Petitioner thanks the Commission for its careful attention to this pressing matter.

Dated: August 15, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,
Isidoro Rodriguez
2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227
Vienna, Virginia 22180
Mobil: 571-471-5350

Email: business@isidororodriguez.com

 

 

 

[1] See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Art. 25, approved by the Commission at its 137th regular period of sessions held from October 28 to November 13, 2009.

[2] Charter, Article 2, states, “in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes: (l) The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual . . . Subsequently, in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (Rehnquist dissenting) (the Court held that the practice of law is a “fundamental right,” and underscored the importance of independent pro hoc vice litigators for, “bringing claims that would be too unpopular for resident lawyers to bring (Emphasis added)

[3] See Attach Notice to President of Colombia regarding settlement discussions with Jack Harbeston et al., that would deprive Mr. Rodriguez of his property rights in his choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on Sea Search Armada and Armada Company’s claim to the treasure trove.

[4]It is alleged that the motives for these retaliatory acts of malfeasance and business conspiracy to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of his property rights and fundamental right to employment are not limited to financial interests in conflict with Mr. Rodriguez’s statutory property rights by Washington D.C. Lobbyists/Attorney Eric Holder et al., but, too to punish Mr. Rodriguez for his past 24 years of successful litigation against unlawful government policies by former Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S. Department of Justice in both the Clinton and Obama Administrations to deny nonresident U.S./Colombian citizens of their fundamental and statutory rights (see http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml), i.e. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (DOJ surreally argued that a DEA agent outside of the US was not negligent for causing a car accident while driving drunk and having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93‑6019 and 96‑6145 (interception without a warrant of all fund transfers to Colombia for more than two months); Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (Banks and DOJ liable for unlawful interception of wire communication and access to account information without a warrant); and Cooperative Multiactive de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas Coopservir Ltda. v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99‑5190, S Ct. No 99‑1893 (DOJ’s issuance of unlawful bill of attainder under War Powers Act).

[5] Mr. Rodriguez lives with his US/Colombian wife and 13-year-old son, in a rented an apartment in Virginia, and maintain their main home on the coast near Santa Veronica, Colombia.

[6] After serving from 1977 to 1983 as a White House appointee in the Carter and Reagan Administration (SES Director of Office of Civil Rights, USDA), Mr. Rodriguez went to Colombia in 1983 as Contracts Administrator/Assistant General Counsel, Morrison Knudsen International, on the $2 Billion EXXON Cerrejon Coal Mine Project, Guajira, Colombia.

[7] In 1995 the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed to the media the uniqueness of Mr. Rodriguez’s practice upon his arguing and winning against the U.S. government, Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), by stating it was “the only instance in recent memory that a lawyer with an address outside the United States has argued a case before the Court.” Tony Mauro, Legal Times,Testing the Limits of Sovereign Immunity” (1995).

[8] See Katia Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), supra (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez) (reversed USCA 4th Cir., to hold that a nonresident Hispanic had the right of access to an impartial jury evidentiary hearing of a DEA agent causing a car accident in Barranquilla, Colombia by acts outside “scope of employment,” i.e. driving while under the influence and getting oral sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93‑6019 and 96‑6145 (DOJ’s attorneys can be hold accountable for unauthorized interception of nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens’ fund transfers in violation of the Electronic Communications Act (“ECPA”)); Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (DOJ and the banks can be hold accountable for unlawful access to nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens account information and interception of wire communications); Cooperative Multiactive de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas Coopservir Ltda. v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99‑5190, S Ct. No 99‑1893 (challenging President Clinton’s issuance of a bill of attainder against nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizen).

[9] U.S. Congressmen Benjamin A. Gilman, Dan Burton, and Phil M. Crane, described SSA’s claim as the “largest private claim by citizens against a foreign state pending in the world,” and in Sea Search Armada vs. the Republic of Colombia, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (2013), the court held it valued between $2 billion to $8.5 billion USD.

[10] This contrary to the controlling precedent in, Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (Rehnquist dissenting) (holding that the practice of law is a “fundamental right” and emphasized the importance of pro hoc vice litigators, “bringing claims that would be too unpopular for resident lawyers to bring.” (Emphasis added)

[11] See Org. of American States, IACHR Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, OEASer.L/V/II.111 doc. 21 rev., paras. 71-72 (2001); Juan Raul Garza v. U.S., Case No. 12.243, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/01; Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. 2000, at ¶ 117.

[12] See Djamel Ameziane v. U.S., Petition P-900-08, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 17/12 at 99 (2012).

[13] Supra note 111, art. 25.

[14] IACHR, Request for Precautionary Measures Concerning the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (March 12, 2002) at p. 2

[15] Supra n. 22 at fn. 7.

[16] See Loayza Tamayo Case, Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (July 2, 1996).

[17] See, e.g., Loayza Tamayo Case, Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (February 3, 2001).

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA OF PETITION TO THE IACHR TO PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHOATE VIRGINIA ATTORNEY’S LIEN ON THE CONTRACT CLAIM OF SEA SEARCH ARMADA ET AL

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July 18, 2016

His Excellency Juan Manuel Santos

President of the Republic

Carrera 8 n. 7‑26

Palacio de Nariño,

Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia

Re:       SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF 5% CHOATE VIRGINIA ATTORNEY’S LIEN ON THE CONTRACT CLAIM OF SEA SEARCH ARMADA ET AL.

Dear President Santos,

Because of news reports that the Government of the Republic of Colombia has had discussions to settle claims to the treasure trove on the Galleon San Jose, I reconfirm my Notice of a Choate Virginia Attorneys Lien as Legal Representative of Sea Search Armada and Armada Company (“SSA”) since December 1988, on any claim based on the unlawful transfer of title of SSA to Mr. Jack Harbeston and/or my agent Dr. Danilo Devis. (See July 2016 Notice of Lean to Pres of CO with Sp version of IACHR Petition.docx)

In support thereof, I advise you and the Hon. Ministra de Cultura, that in support of my Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien I filed on May 15, 2016 a Petition (P-926-16) against the United States with The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights (IACHR) (See enclosed informal Spanish translation, and on line English version at http://www.isidororodriguez.com)(2. July 2016 Spanish Final IACHR Petition (2).

The petition is based on the evidence of the United States systematically denying me access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury to deprive of my property right in my Choate Virginia Attorneys Lien and right to employment as a Federal civil litigator retaliation against for successfully representing the rights of nonresident Colombian citizens in the courts of the United States from 1987 to 2000.[1]  In summary, in violation of the domestic law, the Void and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrines, the 5th and 7th Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article VI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Virginia VA Code, government attorneys and employees, including judges, undertook retaliatory acts of willful malfeasance and business conspiracy with Mr. Jack Harbeston et al.

Seldom has there been such clear and extensive evidence of violation of the OAS Charter, and the American Declaration, by the United States, its government attorneys and employees, including judges, conspiring to systematically deny access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury of the evidence of the violation of the rule of law.  The evidence of the systematic denying access to an impartial court in the United States, which concerns the rights of all citizens of Colombia and all member of the Organization of American States (“OAS”).

Respectfully,

 

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc:        Doctora Manana Garcia Cordoba

Ministra

Ministero de Cultura

Carrera 8 No. 8-55

Bogota D.C. Colombia

 

Jack Harbeston

11305 88th St.

Kirkland, WA 98033

 

Danilo Devis Pereira

Carrera 53 No. 82-86, Oficina 203

Barranquilla Colombia

[1] See Katia Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), supra (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez) (reversed USCA 4th Cir., to hold that a nonresident Hispanic had the right of access to an impartial jury evidentiary hearing of a DEA agent causing a car accident in Barranquilla, Colombia by acts outside “scope of employment,” i.e. driving while under the influence and getting oral sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93‑6019 and 96‑6145 (DOJ’s attorneys can be hold accountable for unauthorized interception of nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens’ fund transfers in violation of the Electronic Communications Act (“ECPA”)); Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (DOJ and the banks can be hold accountable for unlawful access to nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens account information and interception of wire communications.

Fourth Supplement in support of Petition: Law Review Article by Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MUST SAFEGUARD, NOT THREATEN, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION.

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Judicial Branch must be held accountable for willful violation of the limitations and prohibitions under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions.

3d. Fourth Supplement to Petition

THIRD SUPPLEMENT IN SUPPORT OF IACHR PETITION (P-926-16) MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON THE VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST., VA CONST., VA CODE, AND VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

June 8, 2016

 TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE COMMISSION’S REGULATIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ.

On May 15, 2016, Mr. Rodriguez filed the above referenced Petition P-926-16, for the willful violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of American States (Charter), and Article V, XIV XVII XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”), by the United States’ systematic denial of access to an impartial court and impartial trial by jury of the evidence of:

  • malfeasance by the violation of the limitations and prohibitions under VA Const. VI §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] & 7,[3] and violation of the decentralize attorney disciplinary system enacted by the General Assembly under VA Code § 54-1-3935,[4] by the Supreme Court of Virginia issuing unconstitutional court rules to establish a centralize attorney disciplinary system under its control, crating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “court,” naming VSBDB members as “judges,” and naming a three judge panel under its control. (see https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5); and,

 

  • participation in a business conspiracy in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑499 and 500, VA Code § 54-1-3915,[5] the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by affirming the void order of the VSBDB disbarring Mr. Rodriguez for litigating: (i) to enforce my statutory choate VA Attorney’s Lien for fees owed for managing as Legal Representative of Sea Search Armada since 1988 a contract suit to treasure trove, seeReport of  Pres. of Colombia confirming  locating the treasure trove valued at $18 Billion USD; and, (ii) to enforce my rights as a father pursuant to joint custody agreement, VA Code and Treaty, to protect my then 13 year-old U.S. citizen son from being forced from Virginia to a “zone of war” in 2002. (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

 

Thus the evidence confirms that there has been a willful violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ad Initio Order Doctrine, to conceal the violations of the rule of law and separation of power in the United States and Virginia, by abuse of stare decisis/res judicata to affirm and give effect to the VSBDB void ab initio order. Pursuant to Va. Code§ 18.2‑481(5), Supp. Addendum c, treason is, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of [the Judicial Branch’s] authority.”

  1. Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions on the Supreme Court of Virginia

Seldom has there been a case evidencing a conspiracy to violate the limitations and prohibitions under the U.S. Const., VA Const. and VA Code, and the mandates of separation of power.  History confirms that the violation of constitutional principal of separation of power has never been lost on either despots, or those who wish to undertake the sudden overthrow of a Constitutional government by a small group of persons in authority.[6]

 Separation of Power

Regarding separation of power by enforcing constitutional limitation and prohibitions, James Madison explained, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103 (Emphasis added).  Also, Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787), viewed violation of separation of power would create a “despotic government.” [7]

Specifically, regarding enforcement of constitutional limitation and prohibitions upon the Judicial Branch, Patrick Henry, wrote,

Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.

Echoing Jefferson, Madison, Mason, and Patrick Henry, another famous Virginian, Chief Justice Marshall wrote Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816),

We [judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. (Emphasis added)

 Consequently, it is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Judicial Branch specifically.  To this end they enacted constitutional limitations and prohibitions enforcing the mandate of separation of power between and among entities in government.

To protect the people in the United States and Virginia, these Founding Fathers intentionally fractured power in innumerable ways in the Virginia Constitution, which served as the benchmark to the Federal Constitution.  At the outset they confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern–We the People, and mandated that separation of power serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority. . ..” D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, at page 13.  This is because,

[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it givesUnited States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (Emphasis added).  See also, Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

Therefore, the Founding Fathers diffused the power of the courts by mandated compliance with the VA Const. and VA Code.  Furthermore, they made the judicial branch subject to the control of the legislative branch by prohibiting the promulgation of court rules in conflict with both substantive rights of the people and statutory rights (in short the courts cannot enact legislation).  Finally, they gave no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction, by establishing in both Constitutions the absolute right to civil jury trials on the issue of malfeasance, thereby limiting the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within the Judicial Branch. Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).[8]

Thus, our Founding Fathers, understood that by the violation of the mandate of separation of power the clear lessons from history show that,

Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.  Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

  1. The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine prohibits using of Stare Decisis and/or Res Judicata to affirm a void order issued outside of Jurisdiction

In Virginia, as in every other jurisdiction, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity did not have the constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.  Therefore, a void ab initio order cannot be affirmed by the use of either stare decisis or res judicataCollins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402, (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925), and may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

This is because a void ab initio order or judgment is invalid at the moment of issuance, to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. A void ab initio order has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments ” 44, 45.

  1. VA General Assembly Established Decentralize Attorney Disciplinary System

Consistent with separation of power, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, A[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.@ Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835). (Emphases added).

Exercising its exclusive constitutional power to create the jurisdiction of courts, appoint judges, the General Assembly responded by enacting VA Code ‘ 54.1‑3935 (A) and (B),[9] to establish a decentralize attorney disciplinary system utilizing each of the Court of Appeals, and county circuit courts, as well as the Supreme Court of Virginia.[10]  The General Assembly completely rejected placing the statewide attorney disciplinary system under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

  • Evidence of Malfeasance by Court Rules Unlawfully Establishing a Centralized Attorney Disciplinary System

In flagrant disregard of the limitation and prohibitions under VA Const. Article VI, § 1, 5, and 7, and VA Code §§ 54.1‑3915, and 54.1‑3935, as well as ignoring controlling precedent, the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rule Part 6, IV,13, to establish a centralize attorney disciplinary system under its control by crating the VSBDB as “court,” appointing its members as “judges,” and denying the right to a three judge panel in each county.

  1. Business Conspiracy to Systematically Deny Access to an Impartial Jury Trial

The above evidence confirms that the VSBDB was established as a “kangaroo court,” and its members appointed as “judges,” by the usurping the legislative power of the General Assembly.  Also, the evidence confirms that the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez for litigating to enforce my statutory rights.  Finally, the evidence confirms a business conspiracy to systematically deny Mr. Rodriguez access to an impartial trial by jury of the evidence of malfeasance and business conspiracy by affirming and using the VSBDB’s void ab initio order.

But, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the right to challenge any void ab initio order.  The court stated,

“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

This is because it is a fundamental doctrine of due process and the common law that a party to be affected by a void personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.  Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. [11]

As explained in a case Mr. Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court in 1995,[12] confirmed that impartial review is a mainstay of the United States system of government, in citing Madison’s statement that,

“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time…. ” The Federalist No. 10, p. 79 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

Therefore, under the common law, U.S. Const., VA Const., and VA Code, a right to a fair impartial trial by jury on the issue of scope of employment is a question to be resolved by an evidentiary hearing under 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. to the U.S. Constitution.  As explained in Martinez supra, the jury trial is the most important safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive governmental policies.

  1. Conclusion

The IACHR must immediately accept the Petition, conduct an investigation, hold a hearing, and make recommendations to the United States to comply with the rule of law, because, “[c]rime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy,” Olmstad v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).

[1] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.

[2] Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. — The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules governing the course of appeals and the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly….

[3] Article VI, § 7. Selection and qualification of judges–The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly . . .. The judges of all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  members elected to each house of the General Assembly. . ..

[4] VA Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.  A. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has . . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.

  1. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court. . ..

[5] VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations.  Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.

[6] During the Nuremberg trials, by Van Der Essen, a member of the Official Belgian Commission for War Crimes testified that upon invading Belgium the Nazis immediately went about the task of dismantling the legal framework separating government power.

M’. Edger Faure (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic)]: Can you give information on the attempts at nazification of Belgium by the German, and especially the attempt to undermine the normal and constitutional organization of the public authorities.

Van Der Essen: Certainly.  First, I think it is interesting to point out that the Germans violated one of the fundamental principles of the Belgian Constitution and institutions, which consisted the separation of power, that is to say, separation of judicial powers, of executive powers and legislative powers. . .. 6 Trial of the Major War Criminal Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946.  534-35 (Testimony of Van der Essen 4 Feb 1946).

[7]Federalist 47, “[the Virginia’s Constitution] . . . declares, ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..” Id p 109.

[8] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)

[9] See David Oscar Williams, Jr., in The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2,  which describes in detail Virginia’s decentralized attorney disciplinary system.  See also When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3(Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248.

[10] VA Code §54.1-3935(B), confirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond.

[11] See In re Murchison349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.”); Spencer v. Lapsley20 How. 264, 266 (1858) (recognizing statute accords with this maxim); see also Publius Syrus, Moral Sayings 51 (D. Lyman transl. 1856) (“No one should be judge in his own cause.”); B. Pascal, Thoughts, Letters and Opuscules 182 (0. Wight transl. 1859) (“It is not permitted to the most equitable of men to be a judge in his own cause.”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *91 (“[I]t is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel.”).

[12] See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).

 

Second Supplemental Legal Research in Support of Petition (P-926-16) Filed with The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights Against the United States

June 3, 2016

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1889 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
United States

Re:       Second Supplemental Legal Research in Support of Petition (P-926-16) Filed with The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights Against the United States Under for The Systematic Denial to nonresident U.S./Colombian citizens of Access to an Impartial Court and Civil Trial by Jury of the Evidence of Malfeasance and Business Conspiracy.

Greetings:

In support of my May 15, 2016, Petition (P-926-16) and Request for Precautionary Measures based on the evidence of an ongoing serious and urgent situation, filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), against the United States for its systematic denial of access to an impartial trial by jury of the evidence of a pattern and practice of malfeasance by government attorneys and employees, including judges by their willful violation of the United States Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Federal Code, Virginia Code, and domestic law (See http://www.isidororodriguez.com), I submit as a Second Supplemental support Justice John F. Molloy’s book: The Fraternity: Lawyers and Judges in Collusion, published by Paragon House.

In summary Justice Molloy was an attorney in Arizona who went on to serve as a judge on the Arizona Superior Court bench. He is probably best known for his time serving as Chief Justice to Court of Appeals for the State of Arizona, where he authored the famous Miranda decision that was subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and overturned, resulting in what is known today as the “Miranda Rights” which law enforcement now quotes to suspected criminals upon arrest.

Judge Molloy wrote his book that was published in 2004 a few years before he died in 2008. An excerpt from the book has been published and copied in many places on the Internet today, reprinted in accordance with the “fair use” provision of Title 17 U.S.C. § 107. It is an amazing expose on just how corrupt the United States Judicial System is today.  Because my Petition is based in part on the evidence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by disbarring me based on the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board’s Void Order for litigating to enforce my rights to property and as a father under Virginia Constitutional and Virginia Code. See The U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, Isidoro Rodriguez v. Standing Committee on Attorney Discipline, (3rd Cir. No 08-8037, (December 5, 2008), cert. denied No. 08-1121 (Closed, May 18, 2009); See also Pennsylvania Court Watch.

Photo courtesy of Paragon House

 

“THE FRATERNITY “- THE CORRUPTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM EXPOSED BY A JUDGE

 “The once honorable profession of law now fully functions as a bottom-line business, driven by greed and the pursuit of power and wealth, even shaping the laws of the United States outside the elected Congress and state legislatures.”

Justice John F. Molloy

When I began practicing law in 1946, justice was much simpler. I joined a small Tucson practice at a salary of $250 a month, excellent compensation for a beginning lawyer. There was no paralegal staff or expensive artwork on the walls. In those days, the judicial system was straightforward and efficient. Decisions were handed down by judges who applied the law as outlined by the Constitution and state legislatures. Cases went to trial in a month or two, not years. In the courtroom, the focus was on uncovering and determining truth and fact.

I charged clients by what I was able to accomplish for them. The clock did not start ticking the minute they walked through the door.

Looking back

The legal profession has evolved dramatically during my 87 years. I am a second-generation lawyer from an Irish immigrant family that settled in Yuma. My father, who passed the Bar with a fifth-grade education, ended up arguing a case before the U.S. Supreme Court during his career.

The law changed dramatically during my years in the profession. For example, when I accepted my first appointment as a Pima County judge in 1957, I saw that lawyers expected me to act more as a referee than a judge. The county court I presided over resembled a gladiator arena, with dueling lawyers jockeying for points and one-upping each other with calculated and ingenuous briefs

That was just the beginning. By the time I ended my 50-year career as a trial attorney, judge and president of southern Arizona’s largest law firm, I no longer had confidence in the legal fraternity I had participated in and, yes, profited from.

I was the ultimate insider, but as I looked back, I felt I had to write a book about serious issues in the legal profession and the implications for clients and society as a whole. The Fraternity: Lawyers and Judges in Collusion was 10 years in the making and has become my call to action for legal reform.

Disturbing evolution

Our Constitution intended that only elected lawmakers be permitted to create law. Yet judges create their own law in the judicial system based on their own opinions and rulings. It’s called case law, and it is churned out daily through the rulings of judges. When a judge hands down a ruling and that ruling survives appeal with the next tier of judges, it then becomes case law, or legal precedent. This now happens so consistently that we’ve become more subject to the case rulings of judges rather than to laws made by the lawmaking bodies outlined in our Constitution.

This case-law system is a constitutional nightmare because it continuously modifies constitutional intent. For lawyers, however, it creates endless business opportunities. That’s because case law is technically complicated and requires a lawyer’s expertise to guide and move you through the system. The judicial system may begin with enacted laws, but the variations that result from a judge’s application of case law all too often change the ultimate meaning.

Lawyer domination

When a lawyer puts on a robe and takes the bench, he or she is called a judge. But in reality, when judges look down from the bench they are lawyers looking upon fellow members of their fraternity. In any other area of the free-enterprise system, this would be seen as a conflict of interest.

When a lawyer takes an oath as a judge, it merely enhances the ruling class of lawyers and judges. First of all, in Maricopa and Pima counties, judges are not elected but nominated by committees of lawyers, along with concerned citizens. How can they be expected not to be beholden to those who elevated them to the bench?

When they leave the bench, many return to large and successful law firms that leverage their names and relationships.

Business of law

The concept of “time” has been converted into enormous revenue for lawyers. The profession has adopted elaborate systems where clients are billed for a lawyer’s time in six-minute increments. The paralegal profession is another brainchild of the fraternity, created as an additional tracking and revenue center. High powered firms have departmentalized their services into separate profit centers for probate and trusts, trial, commercial, and so forth.

The once-honorable profession of law now fully functions as a bottom-line business, driven by greed and the pursuit of power and wealth, even shaping the laws of the United States outside the elected Congress and state legislatures.

Bureaucratic design

Today the skill and gamesmanship of lawyers, not the truth, often determine the outcome of a case. And we lawyers love it. All the tools are there to obscure and confound. The system’s process of discovery and the exclusionary rule often work to keep vital information off-limits to jurors and make cases so convoluted and complex that only lawyers and judges understand them.

The net effect has been to increase our need for lawyers, create more work for them, clog the courts and ensure that most cases never go to trial and are, instead, plea-bargained and compromised. All the while the clock is ticking, and the monster is being fed.

The sullying of American law has resulted in a fountain of money for law professionals while the common people, who are increasingly affected by lawyer-driven changes and an expensive, self-serving bureaucracy, are left confused and ill-served. Today, it is estimated that 70 percent of low-to-middle-income citizens can no longer afford the cost of justice in America. What would our Founding Fathers think?

This devolution of lawmaking by the judiciary has been subtle, taking place incrementally over decades. But today, it’s engrained in our legal system, and few even question it. But the result is clear. Individuals can no longer participate in the legal system.

It has become too complex and too expensive, all the while feeding our dependency on lawyers. By complicating the law, lawyers have achieved the ultimate job security. Gone are the days when American courts functioned to serve justice simply and swiftly. It is estimated that 95 million legal actions now pass through the courts annually, and the time and expense for a plaintiff or defendant in our legal system can be absolutely overwhelming.

Surely it’s time to question what has happened to our justice system and to wonder if it is possible to return to a system that truly does protect us from wrongs.

A lawyer from Tuscon, Arizona, John Fitzgerald Molloy (b. 1917) was elected to the Superior Court bench where he served for seven years as both a juvenile court and trial bench judge. He subsequently was elected to the Court of Appeals where he authored over 300 appellate opinions, including the final Miranda decision for the Arizona Supreme Court. During that period, he also served as president of the Arizona Judge’s Association. After 12 years, Molloy returned to private practice to become president of the largest law firm in southern Arizona. His book has received widespread praise for its candor and disquieting truths.

Copyright 2004, Paragon House

I hope this additional research will facilitate and expedite the acceptance of my Petition, the conducting of an investigation, a public hearing to produce additional evidence and the witnesses, and the issuing of a report that will include recommendation to the United States to halt acts that are in violation of human rights by denying access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury, the making reparation for the harm caused to Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez, and the requiring of the adoption of other measure and actions to stop the ongoing violations of the Charter and the American Declaration by the United States of a pattern and practice to systematically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury so to not hold Federal and State government attorneys and employees, including judges, accountable for malfeasance and business conspiracy.

 

Supplemental Legal Research in Support of Petition (P-926-16) Filed with The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights Against the United States for The Systematic Denial to nonresident U.S./Colombian citizens of Access to an Impartial Court and Civil Trial by Jury of the Evidence of Malfeasance and Business Conspiracy.

May 30, 2016

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

1889 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

United States

Re:       Supplemental Legal Research in Support of Petition (P-926-16) Filed with The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights Against the United States for The Systematic Denial to nonresident U.S./Colombian citizens of Access to an Impartial Court and Civil Trial by Jury of the Evidence of Malfeasance and Business Conspiracy.

Greetings:

In support of my May 15, 2016, Petition (P-926-16)1. Final IACHR Petition and Request for Precautionary Measures (Seldom has there been such clear and extensive evidence of violation of the Charter), based on the evidence of an ongoing serious and urgent situation, filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), against the United States for its systematic denial of access to an impartial trial by jury of the evidence of a pattern and practice of malfeasance by government attorneys and employees, including judges by their willful violation of the United States Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Federal Code, Virginia Code, and domestic law (See http://www.isidororodriguez.com), I submit Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., excellent legal research paper dated April 15, 2016, entitled, Exposing Judges’ Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Wrongdoing: Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting, http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf.

As Dr. Cordero explains in the introduction of his ground breaking research paper,

“This study analyses official statistics, reports, and statements of the Federal Judiciary showing that its judges are unaccountable and their operation is pervaded by secrecy; consequently, they risklesssly do wrong in self-interest and to people’s detriment, which calls for reform. (Emphasis added)

In the last 225 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, only 8 of its judges have been removed from the bench (footnote omitted). They hold all their adjudicative, policy-making, administrative, and disciplinary meetings behind closed doors and never appear before a press conference (cite omitted). They act with impunity. The evidence reveals their motive, means, and opportunity (cite omitted) to engage in financial and non-financial wrongdoing (footnote omitted) by abusing power to deny due process, disregard the law, and decide by reasonless summary orders (footnote omitted). They have hatched a system of wrongdoing so routine, widespread, and coordinated (cite omitted) among themselves and between them and insiders (footnote omitted, e.g., running a bankruptcy fraud scheme (cite omitted), as to have turned wrongdoing into their Judiciary’s institutionalized modus operandi (cite omitted).” (Emphasis added)

I hope this additional research will facilitate and expedite the acceptance of my Petition, the conducting of an investigation, a public hearing to produce additional evidence and the witnesses, and the issuing of a report that will include recommendation to the United States to halt acts that are in violation of human rights by denying access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury, the making reparation for the harm caused to Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez, and the requiring of the adoption of other measure and actions to stop the ongoing violations of the Charter and the American Declaration by the United States of a pattern and practice to systematically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury so to not hold Federal and State government attorneys and employees, including judges, accountable for malfeasance and business conspiracy.

Respectfully Submitted,

Isidoro Rodriguez

U.S. Home address:

2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna Virginia 22180-7488

Mobile: 571-477-5350

e-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com