On May 15, 2016, Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) a Petition (P-926-16) and Requests for Precautionary Measures (MC-367-16) (see http://isidororodriguez.com), for protection from an ongoing business conspiracy and acts of malfeasance by named and unnamed government attorneys and employees, including judges of the United States and Commonwealth of Virginia.
The Petition and Requests for Precautionary Measures were filed with evidence confirming that since 2003 government attorneys and employees, including judges of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia, have willfully obfuscated and concealed their ongoing business conspiracy and acts of malfeasance to deprive Rodriguez of his business, reputation, property, and right to employment as an independent federal civil litigator, by unlawful use of the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata to obstruct justice and conceal the unlawful promulgation and use of the Supreme Court of Virginia Court Rules. Thus, Rodriguez has been and is still systematically denied of his fundamental right of access to an impartial court to enjoin the ongoing violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (“5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const.”), Article VI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”), the Internal Revenue Code, and Virginia Code, as well as the right to a trial by jury for monetary damages against each named defendant, all in violation of Article 2(1) of the OAS Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration.
As explained in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), a case Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court, the impartial review is a mainstay of our system of government so to be able to hold government employees accountable for an unlawful act. As Madison wrote,
“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time… ” The Federalist No. 10, p. 79 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
On the issue of the self-proclaimed doctrine of “judicial immunity,” and immunity of federal government employees generally, not only is it inconsistent with the holding I won when I argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (right to evidentiary hearing before a jury), the key point missed is that under our Constitution system and “federalism” only State Court are courts of general jurisdiction– Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. This distinction is the key to confusion, since federal courts and government views itself as having no limits on its power. Thus, the holding of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which provides absolute judicial immunity for state court judge only is based upon the general jurisdiction of a State court judge (who are elect for terms of office). It has not incorrectly been applied to Federal court (who are appointed for life). This has been unlawfully done by both judges and attorneys, making all judges above the law and not accountable for violation of the rule of law and usurping of legislative power by the issuance of court rules.
Under Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger: “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 141-142, agreed with Chief Justice Berger on the point above: “While judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”
In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:
“This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties’ numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.
Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:
“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstave, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348. Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”
Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; . . ..”
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, grantees the right to a trial by jury for alleged malfeasance by any government employee, including judges.
The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”
VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly.
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 7. Selection . . . of judges. The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . .. The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . ..
VIRGINIA CODE SECTIONS INVOLVED
VA Code § 54.1‑3909. The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations: . . . Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and attorneys.
VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.
VA Code 54.1‑3932. Lien for fees. A. Any person having or claiming a right of action sounding . . . liquidated or unliquidated damages on contract, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the same, and the attorney shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security for is fees for any services rendered in relation to the cause of action or claim. When any such contract is made, and written notice of the claim of such lien is given to the opposite party, his attorney or agent, any settlement or adjustment of the cause of action shall be void against the lien so created, except as proof of liability on such cause of action.
VA. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.
- If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has . . .violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
- If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court.
- Bar Counsel of the Virginia State Bar shall prosecute the case. . ..
- Upon the hearing, if the attorney is found guilty by the court, his license to practice law in this Commonwealth shall be revoked. …
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
Part 6, § IV, 13-6, established the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board to hear the most, “serious cases of lawyer misconduct. The twenty-member board appointed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is composed of sixteen attorneys and four lay members. The board issues written opinions following its hearings.”
STATEMENT OF FACTS
- The General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935, establishing a decentralized attorney disciplinary system under the control of each county court of appeals, not under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
- In 2003, in retaliation for Rodriguez litigating to enforce his Virginia statutory rights, Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder entered into a business conspiracy with a client of Rodriguez, to simultaneously file two complaints with the VSBDB: first, pursuant to VA Code § 54.1-3932, to protect his property right in a Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to sunken treasure trove off the coast of the Republic of Colombia aboard the 1707 Galleon San Jose (NPR report’s on Pres. of the Republic of Colombia confirming Dec. 2, 2015, of finding treasure trove valued at $18 Billion USD); and, second, pursuant to Treaty, VA Code, and joint custody agreement, to enforce his rights as a father to protect in 2001 his 13 year-old son from being forced against his son’s express desire, from Virginia to a “zone of war” in the Republic of Colombia (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).
- On November 27, 2006, after denying various motions challenging the VSBDB authority and jurisdiction as a court, the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order, surreally disbarring and punished Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).
- In 2007, in violation of Rodriguez’s statutory rights, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the doctrine of stare decises, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirm VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Isidoro Rodriguez as an independent Virginia trial attorney,
- Between 2008 and 2014, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United States Tax Court, violated Rodriguez’s statutory rights, the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. and the Art. VI of VA Const., Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the doctrine of stare decises, by their use of the VSBDB void order to disbar him and deprive Rodriguez’s interstate/international law business, reputation, profession, the right to property, and the right to employment as an independent federal litigator.
● In May 2013, the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., denied the demand for a jury trial on the evidence of an ongoing business conspiracy and malfeasance, to summarily dismissed and issued a prior restraint enjoining Rodriguez from filing future suits against government attorneys and employees, including judges, for violation of 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. VA Const. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 54-1-3935, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB.
- VA General Assembly Established Decentralize Attorney Disciplinary System
In response to the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia, that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), the General Assembly enacted the Acts of Assembly 1932. p. 139, to establish a decentralize attorney disciplinary system. The General Assembly gave to each county court of appeals the jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and giving statewide effect to the disciplining of an attorney before that particular court.
Pursuant to this legislation, the Supreme Court of Virginia did promulgate rules establishing an integrated Virginia State Bar (VSB), with limited powers of investigating complaints against attorneys, to be exercised by a Council and Investigating Committee in each county. The function of the VSB Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury, as a fact-finding board. It had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney. Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction, was,
the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the case in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule . . .. (Emphasis added)
The constitutionality of this decentralized attorney disciplinary system was upheld in Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942). There, the Court held that evident from the provisions of the statute the General Assembly merely intended to create a new tribunal with general jurisdiction to hear and determine disbarment proceedings and did not intend to delegate to the tribunal any legislative powers. Appeal from the judgment of the three-judge court was a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Also, the attorney who had been disbarred had the right to apply to the Governor for reinstatement, if at the time of application for such relief, “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law.” See VA Code of 1950, 12-45.
Subsequently, VA. Code § 54.1‑3935, was enacted by the General Assembly, which again specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline an attorney directly. Also, the General Assembly limited the delegated authority to the Supreme Court of Virginia under VA. Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting under VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, the Court from prescribing, adopting, promulgating, and amending rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct, that would be inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code.
Thus, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A), to reconfirm the decentralized attorney disciplinary system’s use of the jurisdiction of each county’s Court of Appeals, and circuit courts to discipline an attorney. Also, VA Code §54.1-3935(B), again reconfirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond.
- Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions on the Supreme Court of Virginia
The General Assembly rejected creating a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia. In summary, the General Assembly mandated that separation of power within the Judicial Branch serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority. . ..” D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, page 13.
As Chief Justice, John Marshall wrote more than 2000 years ago, “[We judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816) (Emphasis added). To enforce this control on the Judicial Branch both the U.S. Const. and VA Const., confirm that there exists no immunity from the absolute right of citizens to access to an impartial court and civil jury trial for malfeasance. See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).
VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7, diffused the power of the Judicial Branch in Virginia to limit the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within it. To this end, VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 prohibit the Supreme Court of Virginia from the promulgation of court rules which are in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights because courts cannot enact legislation. In short, separation of power between and among entities in government fractures power in innumerable ways to assure independent review of any violation of either the VA Const. or VA Code.
This was consistent with Thomas Jefferson writings that the violation of the limitation and prohibitions defining the separation of power would create a “despotic government.” Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787). As James Madison explained, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103 (Emphasis added). These drafters of both the VA Const., and U.S. Const., understood that the clear lessons from history show that,
Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be. Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.
Therefore, to protect citizens the VA Const., and U.S. Const., confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern–We the People, and are limited. Consequently, it is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally. As to the need of constitutional checks specifically on the Virginia and Federal Judicial Branch, Patrick Henry, wrote,
Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.
- Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by Establishing a Centralized Attorney Disciplinary System Under its Rules
In flagrant disregard of the General Assembly’s mandated decentralized attorney disciplinary system established under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A) and (B), and in violation of the limitation and prohibitions under VA Const. Article VI, § 1, 5, and 7, and VA Code § 54.1‑3915, the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rule Part 6, IV, &13, to establish a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control. The Supreme Court of Virginia created the VSBDB as “court” and appointing its members as “judges,” with jurisdiction to discipline attorneys. In short, by creating the VSBDB by unlawful court rules that usurped the exclusive constitutional power of the General Assembly and willfully obfuscated court rules to assume away the exclusive jurisdiction of each county Court of Appeals and circuit court to discipline attorneys, the Supreme Court of Virginia created the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court” whose order are void ab initio.
- Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by Violating the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to affirm the VSBDB disbarment of Rodriguez
Pursuant to Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402,(2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987), the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity did not have the constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. A void ab initio order or judgment is invalid at the moment of issuance, it is to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. A void ab initio order may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” A void ab initio order has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments ” 44 and 45. As explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia, “[a] void judgment is one that has been . . . entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987) (Emphasis added).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the challenge of any void ab initio order. There the court stated,
“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).
This decision, as well as others, provides Rodriguez with thclear a right to challenge the various federal court disbarments based upon their use of stare decisis and res judicata to give effect to and not enjoin the VSBDB void ab initio order. Because a void ab initio order cannot be affirmed by the federal court’s use of either stare decisis or res judicata. “A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur Judgments ” 44, 45. This because logically and legally a judgment may not be issued which in violation of the limitation and prohibitions of constitutional protections.
The validity of the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, as well as those of the Federal Courts, are affected by their failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also, Restatements, Judgments 4(b). The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to the judicial branch, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.
Because, the Virginia Supreme Court, “cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void [ab initio], and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).
Finally, it is a fundamental doctrine of law under the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, is that Rodriguez, who is affected by a personal judgment of the VSBDB’s void ab initio order, Rodriguez must have his day in an impartial court, and an opportunity to be heard, on the evidence of the violation of the business conspiracy and malfeasance by a civil jury trial. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.
No Opportunity to Be Heard
The evidence confirms that Rodriguez has yet to be heard by any impartial court and has been deprived of his right jury trial damages on his challenge to the VSBDB void ab initio order. This is most troubling, since the judgment of the VSBDB issued without authority or jurisdiction, and the use of stare decisis by the federal courts has denied him of his right to heard and is not are not a valid judicial determination of Rodriguez’s statutory rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. This is because “[a] void judgment does not create any binding obligation.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370 (1940); Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861. An illegal order is forever void.
Court Orders Exceeding Jurisdiction
The order issued in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB, denying Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial, dismissing the action, and enjoining future suits against government attorneys and employees, including judges, for a business conspiracy and malfeasance, based on violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, exceeds the jurisdiction and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed. 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed. 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L ed. 608.
This is because, “[i]f a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.). Here the VSBDB is a “kangaroo court” illegally created by court rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Article VI of the VA Const. Thus, the VSBDB disbarment order is a void judgment without legal effect. Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)) “a court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972). Thus, the affirmance of the VSBDB void ab initio order, based on stare decisis does not create any binding decision. Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370.
- Business Conspiracy to Systematically Deny Access to an Impartial court and Jury Trial
It is a fundamental doctrine of due process and the common law that a party to be affected by a void personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.
However, the evidence confirms that the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order by being a “kangaroo court” and disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his Virginia statutory rights to property and employment. The evidence confirms that on appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia “[resisted] the execution of the laws under color of authority,” to conceal and obfuscate the promulgation of illegal court rules by affirming the VSBDB’s void ab initio order. Finally, the evidence confirms a conspiracy to conceal illegal acts by systematically denying access to an impartial federal court and trial by a jury of the evidence of malfeasance and the business conspiracy to deprive Rodriguez of his business, reputation, profession, property, and right to employment.
But, under the common law right to fair trial on the issue of the scope of employment, as well as VA Const., and VA Code, the question is to be resolved by an evidentiary hearing before an impartial jury under 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This is because as pointed out by Jefferson, the jury trial is the most important safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive governmental policies.
The memorandum of law is submitted to seek immediate action on the IACHR Petition and Requests for Precautionary Measures filed eight months ago, to bring public attention and to stop the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to deny Rodriguez’s right to seek damages for the ongoing use and enforcement of the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order issued in violation of the 5th and 14th Amend to the U.S. Const., Art. VI of the Virginia Constitutions and VA Codes, as a “Kangaroo Court” (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).
The evidence submitted confirm that government attorneys and employees in the Obama Administration, in collusion with the judges of the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, D.C. and Federal Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the United District Tax Court, willfully entered into a business conspiracy to undertake acts of malfeasance by systematically denying Rodriguez access to an impartial court so to obstruct justice by aiding and abetting the ongoing violation of Article VI of the Constitution of Virginia and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as well as to deny Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial for the business conspiracy to damage his business, reputation, profession, right to property, and right to employment as an independent federal civil litigator.
To this end, the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB, denied Rodriguez of his fundamental right to a trial by jury pursuant to Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), summarily dismissed this action, and issued a prior restraint to effectively enjoin future suit seeking accountability and damages for the promulgation and use of illegal court rules in violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the Internal Revenue Code.
But, “[c]rime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy,” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).
Consequently, because “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law,” within the United States, to protect the fundamental rights of Rodriguez and all citizen under the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the Organization of American, IACHR must take action.
 See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.
The General Assembly specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline attorneys statewide, by mandating that any Supreme Court of Virginia disciplinary action was to be referred to a three-judge panel selected from the City of Richmond, VA Code §54.1-3935.
 VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirm that there is no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”
 As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)
Fed. 47 p 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”
As Virginia Circuit Judge the Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, wrote, “The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to write laws that the legislature failed to enact, or to repeal those that violate no recognizable constitutional principle, or to amend laws that are reasonably adequate but nonetheless can be improved upon. As Thomas Jefferson put it, a judiciary that pushes beyond these limits would place us all under the “despotism of an oligarchy” —one flatly at odds with the democratic principles of our republic.” VSB Journal, Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, Law & Politics: The Imperative of Judicial Self‑Restraint, (2004). at p.5.
 “A judgment which is void . . . is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.)
 Misprision of treason is defined pursuant to VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482.
The Court held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, “[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).