Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 18889 F Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Re:       Request for Immediate Action on Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16), and Request for Precautionary Measures (MC-367-16)


I filed the above pleadings more than eight months ago, (see, and subsequently filed various supplemental pleadings in support for the Petition and Request for Precautionary Measures.  Given that the above pleadings have only been “Under Study,” I now write to seek a meeting to discuss my need for the immediate need for protection of my property rights and right to employment as a U.S. federal civil litigator, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Organization of American States Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration.

I advise you and attach my Statement to the Fairfax Delegation to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia given on January 7, 2017, and attach a supplemental Memorandum of Law confirming that there is no immunity form accountability for malfeasance by U.S. and Virginia government attorneys and employees, including judges.

In summary, the evidence is that in violation of the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Art. VI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Article 2(1) of the OAS Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration, Federal and Virginia Code, government attorneys in the Obama Administration under the Stewardship of Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Gov’t/Private Attorney Eric Holder, have acted outside the scope of their employment and jurisdiction to establish a policy and practice to assume away accountability for malfeasance, but rather provide absolute immunity for the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to secure accountability for malfeasance.

On the issue of the self-proclaimed doctrine of “judicial immunity,” and immunity of federal government employees generally, not only is it inconsistent with the holding I won when I argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (right to evidentiary hearing before a jury), the key point missed is that under our Constitution system and “federalism” only State Court are courts of general jurisdiction– Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. This distinction is the key to confusion, since federal courts and government views itself as having no limits on its power.   Thus, the holding of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which provides absolute judicial immunity for state court judge only is based upon the general jurisdiction of a State court judge (who are elect for terms of office). It has not incorrectly been applied to Federal court (who are appointed for life). This has been unlawfully done by both judges and attorneys, making all judges above the law and not accountable for violation of the rule of law and usurping of legislative power by the issuance of court rules. This is wrong and I have been litigating and petitioning the legislative branch to investigate and correct this.

My litigation and petitions to the U.S. Congress and the General Assembly of Virginia have been filed pursuant to the holding under Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger: “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 141-142, agreed with Chief Justice Berger on the point above: “While judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”

In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:
“This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties’ numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.”

Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:

“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstave, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.  Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”

Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.

The evidence confirms that there has been a usurping of their legislative authority of the General Assembly of Virginia (see my presentation in 2010 to NOVA member of General Assembly,  This has been allowed by the U.S. Federal Court denying me a trial by jury to secure accountability for malfeasance, a summary dismissal of my suit, and the issuance of a prior restraint enjoining any future suit seeking accountability of government employees in Obama’s Administration for their retaliatory business conspiracy to damage my business as an independent federal litigator, profession, reputation, property rights, and right to employment, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Eric Holder, and Jane/John Does Members of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA (Richmond Division) No. 12 cv 663-JAB (2010). The court orders themselves confirms a systematic denial to me of access to an impartial court and trial by jury, in total disregard of the holding I won in Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995). In summary, this litigation is based on the evidence:

first, of the simultaneous filing in 2003 of two Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (VSBDB) complaints against me in retaliation for my litigating to enforce my Virginia statutory rights:(1) by Eric Holder, seeking to punish me for litigating Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA supra., and litigating for violation of my rights as a father under VA Code, the Hague Convention, and Joint Custody Agreement (See, and Isidoro Rodriguez v. Editor In Chief, Legal Times, Individually and In his Corporate Capacity, et al., No. 08-411, 129 S.Ct. 639 (2008); and, (2) by my client, with Eric Holder, and other Washington D.C. Oligarchy of Lawyer, Lobbyist, and Law Firms, undertaking a business conspiracy to deprive me of my property rights in my choate statutory Virginia Attorney’s Lien on my client’s claim to a 50% share to $18 Billion USD of sunken treasure trove off the coast of the Republic of Colombia; and,

second, of the VSBDB sitting as a “Kangaroo Court” in violation of Art. VI of the Virginia Constitutions and Codes, to issue in 2006 a Void Ab Initio Order disbarring me for litigating to enforce my statutory rights as a father and my choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien (, and the denying to me access to an impartial court and jury trial of the evidence of the business conspiracy and malfeasance to use stare decisis to affirm the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order.

Please advise when we can meet to discuss my pleadings,

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodriguez