The orders of the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. (USDCT E.D. VA), Hon Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Hon. John G. Roberts Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court/Circuit Judge of the USCT Appeals for the 4th and District of Columbian Circuit (Exhibits 2a, 2aii, 2aiii and 2aiv), and the legal analysis of the Attorney General of Virginia (Exhibits 2av and 2avi) oddly and arrogantly used legal sophistry to misuse stare decisis and res judicata  in violation of the void ab initio order doctrine[1]so to unlawfully grant “impunity” and absolute immunity to all government actors, as well as to Jack Harbeston, for their unlawful business conspiracy and acts outside their scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority in violation of the limitation and prohibitions under Article VI of the VA Const., as well as the restrictions in VA. Code § 54.1‑3915.

“Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article [delegating limited rulemaking authority], the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. . ..”

Thus, this surreal grant of “impunity” and absolute immunity by unpublished “Star Chamber” like opinions by misuse of stare decisis and res judicata are violations of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to systematically deny Mr. Rodriguez of his fundamental right to an impartial court and right to a civil jury trial to secure accountability and damages for acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority. [2]  This is because dating back to The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), under common law there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of jurisdiction, and an action for damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise.[3]

It is a fundamental doctrine of equal protection of the laws and due process, incorporated into the common law that Mr. Rodriguez as a party affected by various void ab initio orders and personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard, before an impartial court with jurisdiction to hear the matter. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.  This is because every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard before an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

This is also mandated by Article 10 of the United Nations Bill of Rights, wherein it is written that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations . . ..”[4]   It is for this reason that judges were never given either “impunity” or absolute immunity for unlawful acts, particularly for acts outside their jurisdiction and judicial authority.[5]

In response to the legal sophistry and poor legal analysis of both the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General of Virginia (Exhibit 2a, 2av, and 2vi), research confirms that in both England and the colonies, it was in ordinary courts-before a jury trial-which determined whether government officers, including judges, with good behavior tenure, were to be held accountable in either civil or criminal trials for misbehavior.  Prakash and Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L. J. 72 at 74 (2006).

Also, it was Blackstone who first discussed various English statutes that provided for the making accountable and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.  These were not a statutory exception to grants of good-behavior tenure, but consistent with the concept that a judge could be tried in court for unlawful acts outside of their jurisdiction.  See, e.g. R. V. Gaskin, (1799) 1001 Eng. Rep. 1349 (K.B.) (reinstating a parish-clerk upon his demand that his employer shows cause for firing him); James Bragg’s Case (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278-81 (K.B.)(reinstating a Burgess for lack of cause to remove him).

Consistent with common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.  See Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).  Thus, the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General are not only wrong in their misuse of the holding in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 at 360 (1978), but to their analysis provides additional evidence of their unlawful acts in furtherance of the business conspiracy by granting “impunity” and absolute immunity for acts outside of scope or employment, jurisdiction and judicial authority to injure Mr. Rodriguez.[6]

But not only are the federal government entities of limited and prescribed authority and jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution but also federal legislation does not nor can it provide for them any judicial immunity for unlawful acts of malfeasance in violation of their jurisdiction and judicial authority.  Pursuant to Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980), and, Den Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981), whenever a judge acts where he does not have jurisdiction to affirm and use a void ab initio order, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).

Consequently, the evidence confirms that the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General of Virginia have unlawfully acted to obstruct justice to conceal the unlawful acts by, “[resisting] the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[7] to conceal and obfuscate the unlawful promulgation of illegal court rules in violation of VA Const., and VA Code.  This was part of the conspiracy to systematically deny access to an impartial federal court and trial by a jury of the evidence of malfeasance and the business conspiracy to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of business, reputation, profession, property, and right to employment.[8]

In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berge wrote, “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Also, Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion agreed, that, “. . . judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”  supra. at 141-142.  Also, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies, they must, in such cases, resort.”  (Emphasis added) Ibid.

Therefore, the “impunity” and absolute “judicial immunity” given by the Hon. Judge Gibney, was an act outside his jurisdiction and judicial authority because it violated Article IV of the VA Const. And VA Code, and inconsistent/violation of the holding in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which limited absolute judicial immunity for acts with jurisdiction and judicial authority of the court.

Finally, “impunity” and absolute judicial immunity has not even been extended even to State judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, The Court wrote: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same, the Court held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.  But at no time was there to be “impunity” for an unlawful activity  outside of their jurisdiction, such as for the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, U.S./VA Const., and VA Code.[9]

                [1] More than 214 years ago in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 137 (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall first defined for U.S. jurisprudence the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, writing that, “a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”  See also Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, a void order is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.  This is because “[a] void judgment does not create any binding obligation.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L Ed. 370 (1940); and, Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861 (1882), holding that an illegal order is forever void.

                [2] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Mr. Rodriguez argued and won by before the U.S. Supreme Court the holding that there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury on the alleged acts of government employees outside the scope of employment (

[3] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable,

[W]hen a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .  Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

[4] In investigating and considering the merits of this complaint for the usurping of legislative constitutional authority by the Washington D.C. Oligarchy Federal/Virginia government attorneys, employees, and judge to permit the promulgation of court rules by violation of the limitation and prohibitions under Article VI of the VA Const., as well as the restrictions in VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights must recall that Charter was established in part to respond to the sorry behavior of German and other European judges, lawyers, and law schools assuming away the limitations and prohibitions of their respective constitutions that aided to power Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (“NAZI”) before World War II.  Because, “[b]y the time the gas vans came and the human slaughter factories were built in Auschwitz and the other death camps, the murder of the six million Jews and other persecuted minorities was done completely within the framework of German law.” Yad Vshem, The Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes Remem­brance Authority, 2004.

                [5] “I. COMBATING IMPUNITY: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS, PRINCIPLE 1. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO TAKE. EFFECTIVE ACTION TO COMBAT IMPUNITY, “Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.”  E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, at page 7, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity.

                [6] There the U.S. Supreme Court held in an action against a State court judge, that pursuant to common law a state court judge who acts without jurisdiction, or acts in violation of Constitutional, or acts in violation of statutory prohibitions expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost.  This is because a State judge would be immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and/or was not performing any act expressly prohibited by statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980).  This is exactly what the evidence confirms the Supreme Court of Virginia has done.

[7] Misprision of treason to violate the VA Const., is defined pursuant to VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482.

                [8]  See Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., excellent legal research paper dated April 15, 2016, entitled, Exposing Judges’ Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Wrongdoing: Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting,  As Dr. Cordero explains in the introduction of his ground-breaking research paper,

“This study analyses official statistics, reports, and statements of the Federal Judiciary showing that its judges are unaccountable and their operation is pervaded by secrecy; consequently, they recklessly do wrong in self-interest and to people’s detriment, which calls for reform. (Emphasis added)

In the last 225 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, only 8 of its judges have been removed from the bench (footnote omitted). They hold all their adjudicative, policy-making, administrative, and disciplinary meetings behind closed doors and never appear before a press conference (cite omitted). They act with impunity. The evidence reveals their motive, means, and opportunity (cite omitted) to engage in financial and non-financial wrongdoing (footnote omitted) by abusing power to deny due process, disregard the law, and decide by reasonless summary orders (footnote omitted). They have hatched a system of wrongdoing so routine, widespread, and coordinated (cite omitted) among themselves and between them and insiders (footnote omitted, e.g., running a bankruptcy fraud scheme (cite omitted), as to have turned wrongdoing into their Judiciary’s institutionalized modus operandi (cite omitted).” (Emphasis added)

                [9] Administrative decisions, although essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:

“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.  Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”