IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

________________________________________________           Case No. CL-2018-0016433

Isidoro Rodriguez ,

Petitioner/Plaintiff Pro per,

v.

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board,

Respondent/Defendant.

________________________________________________

AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

1. Pursuant to the common law under VA Code § 1-200, as well as VA Code § 8.01-644, Plaintiff, Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), respectfully petition this Court for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to be issued to Respondent/Defendant Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) for their acts outside the scope of employment and judicial authority in violation of Articles I and VI of the Constitution of Virginia (“VA Const”), the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Code §§18.2-481 & 482, VA Code 18.2-499 & 500, VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (2017), VA Code § 54.1‑3934 (2017), and VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009) (Plaintiff Ex S).

THE RELIEF SOUGHT AND STANDING

2. The benchmark for the Writ is the two hundred and fifteen (215) year precedent under Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the mandates of the separation of power the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine is that

“[c]ourts are constituted by authority, and they cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”  (Emphasis added)

3. Thus, in Virginia under the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor statutory authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance, and the void order may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner, including logically by a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition.See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52 (2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).
4. The evidence is that in violation of the above provisions of VA Const., VA Code the VSBDB issued an unlawful Void Ab Initio Order revoking Rodriguez’s license as an attorney in Virginia for litigating to enforce his statutory rights. The VABDB void ab initio order is the linchpin of the business conspiracy to damage Rodriguez’s federal pro hoc vice litigation practice, reputation, profession and property rights (VA Code 18.2-499 & 500) by Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and Mr. Jack Harbston (last Managing Partner of Rodriguez’s former clients Sea Serch Armada and Armada Company (“SSA”) (dissolved in 2002). (Plaintiff’s Ex D and L),
5. Thus Rodriguez files for a writ commanding the VSBDB to either advise the Circuit Court of its legal authority to act as a lower court or cease usurping judicial power of the County Appeals and Circuit Courts.
6. Rodriguez has the standing to seek this Writ based upon the evidence that the VSBDB has aided and abetted the business conspiracy of the entering of Virginia to file two fraudulent VSBDB bar complaints in 2003 against Rodriguez for litigating to enforce: (a) his contact/quantum merit statutory Choate Virginia Attorneys’ Lien under VA Code § 54.1-3932 on SSA’s contract claim to 50% of the Treasure Trove (USD 18 Billion) on the sunken Spanish 1707 Galleon San Jose; and, (b) his statutory rights as a father pursuant to the Hague Convention, VA Code, and Joint Custody Agreement (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml). (Plaintiff’s Ex. D and L).
7. Also, Rodriguez has standing based on the evidence of the VSBDB filing false statements and using legal sophistry to mislead the Court of the violations of the prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017), and VA Code § 54.1‑3934. For example, on page 3, ¶2, of the VSBDB response, it states

“[Rodriguez is] is inaccurate to allege that [the VSBDB] is a separate court or its members are judges.  Thus, the question by the Petition is flawed in its premise.”

8. But, the VSBDB has argued that the 1998 Rule of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) gave it judicial authority, jurisdiction as a lower court to discipline attorneys, and VSBDB members were appointed as judges to hear the most, “serious cases of lawyer misconduct,” (Plaintiff’s S page v) (See Plaintiff’s Ex. G1, G2 and G3) (See also the VSBDB admission of the defiance of Art VI § 5 VA Const., and the 1932 Act’s decentralized attorney disciplinary system giving judicial authority only to each County Circuit Courts to discipline attorneys (VA Code §§ 54.1‑3915 and  1‑3935 (1950-2009), by arguing that under the Court’s interpretation of VA Code § 54.1‑3909 (1950-2017) the Court issued Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 to establish a “parallel” centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Cour’s control, created and gave the VSBDB judicial authority to discipline attorneys as a lower court, and appointed VSBDB members as judges. Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Cir. Ct., No. CL-2018-0016227, (Notice of Appeal and Transcript filed 03/12/2019, Plaintiff’s Ex V, page 27, line 10 to 20)).
9. Therefore, based on the VSBDB void ab initio order revoking Rodriguez’s license as a Virginia attorney for litigating to enforce his statutory rights standing is present based upon the holding in Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016), that states citizens have standing if there is “sufficient interest” and “the parties will be actual adversaries.” Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984)), because: first, pursuant to Rodriguez’s fundamental right to due process as a citizen of the Commonwealth he has a right to an independent/impartial court and legal profession pursuant to the common law and the constitutional mandate of separation of power; and, second, Rodriguez has/is suffering “irreparable harm[ed]” as an attorney whose license was illegally revoked by the VSBDB void ab initio order issued in violation of Art. I §§ 5, 9 & 15 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (2017), VA Code § 54.1‑3934 (2017), and VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009), and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.
10. Rodriguez has standing because he can “demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” (i.e., stop the business conspiracy and violation of Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine so to recover his pro hoc vice litigation practice, reputation, profession and the loss of earning) such that a court can be assured, “that the issues will be fully and fairly developed.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001). These requirements are easily satisfied given the record. These injuries are concrete, particularized to Rodriguez, and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” at 460.
11. Finally, Rodriguez has standing based on the evidence that in response to his petitions for redress to the General Assembly the VSBDB sought, first, the enactment in January 2017 of ex post facto legislation VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) retroactively expanding the power to the Court in violation of Art. I § 5 VA Const. and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const, and the mandated constitutional amending procedure under Art. XII §1 VA Const., by “conform[ing] the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to the unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6 issued in 1998; and second, in response to Rodriguez’s petition on January 5, 2019, to the NOVA members of the General Assembly (Plaintiff’s Ex. Ni and Nii), four (4) days later on January 9, 2019 Democrat Delegates Hurt, Bourne, Kory, and Simon introduced House Bill No 2111 (Plaintiff’s Ex. Oi and Oii) seeking to give immunity to government employees/judges from civil liability for a business conspiracy.

THE FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES.

12. The Citizens of Virginia ratified I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const., to mandate the separation of power between the General Assembly, the Court and the Executive Branch of government, and guaranteeing Due Process, consistent with the advice of Patrick Henry that,

 “[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.”

13. Thus, the Citizens of Virginia authorize power only to the General Assembly to enact legislation giving judicial authority, establish lower courts, and to appoint lower court judges and reserved exclusively to themselves the power to amend these constitutional restrictions on the legal authority and jurisdiction of the Court, VI §§ 1,[1] 5[2] & 7[3] VA Const., and Art. XII § 1 VA Const. Without the approval of the citizens, these constitutional powers to the General Assembly can neither be delegated nor circumvented by either the General Assembly or the Court.
14. Consistent with the above, the General Assembly enacted the 1932 Acts of Assembly p. 139 to establish a statewide decentralized attorney disciplinary system giving only to each County Court of Appeals and Circuit Court the power to suspend an attorneys license with statewide effect (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1950-2009)) (Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) (Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923). This separation of power was reconfirmed by the General Assembly establishing the Board of Bar Examiners with the sole ability to revoke a license (Plaintiff’s Ex. S).
15. The statewide decentralized attorney disciplinary system was consistent with the separation of power designed by original constitutional draftsmen open distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court specifically. Under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and VA Code 54.1 3915 (2017) the Court is prohibited from promulgating court rules that conflict with the general law and an attorney’s statutory rights. Thus, the VSBDB is also explicitly prohibited from using Arules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute@ [i.e., VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009)]. See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).  Under VA Code § 54.1-3934 (1950).
16. From 1932 until 2017, for more than eighty-nine (89) years, the General Assembly neither amended the decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system, nor violated the mandates of separation of power and the constitutional amendment procedure to enact legislation giving the Court expanded power to permit the use court rules to provide judicial authority, to create the VSBDB as a lower court to discipline attorneys or to appoint the VSBDB members as judges. See 1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1998) and its legislative history, wherein the General Assembly rejected delegating any expanded rulemaking power to the Court to permit the establishment of a “parallel” centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control (Plaintiff’s Ex. B1 and B2, B3 and B4).
17. But, in 1998 defiance of the prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., VA Code § 54.1‑3915, and VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1950-2009), the VSBDB has admitted that the Court used VA Code § 54.1‑3909, to issue Rule Part 6, ‘ IV (Plaintiff’s Ex. C) to create a “parallel” centralized attorney discipline system under its control to give judicial authority the VSBDB as a “lower court” to discipline attorneys, and to appoint VSBDB members as “judges.”
18. On November 27, 2006, to aid and abet Eric Holder et al.’s business conspiracy the VSBDB issued a Void Ab Initio Order disbarring and revoking Rodriguez for litigating to enforce statutory rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D).
19. In response, Rodriguez filed two administrative claims under the common law and Virginia Tort Claims Act VA Code ’01-195 challenging the VSBDB void ab initio order (Certified Mail respectively on June 8, 2005, and November 8, 2007, No. 7004-1350-0001-7098-4500, and No. 7004-0750-0000-8170-5576. (Plaintiff’s Ex. E), and filed a civil action for damages based on the violation of the common law, VA Const., and VA Code.
20. The evidence confirms that based on politics and cronyism with Eric Holder et al., since 2003 to the present, Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial common law jury trial and impartial court to challenge the VSBDB void ad initio order. Acting outside of constitutional authority the courts granted summary judgment by misuse of the obstination doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decises to assume away the exception to sovereign immunity under the common law, abuse the granting of “impunity,” Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796) (Plaintiff’s Ex. F, void orders issued in defiance of the common law to declare the VSBDB absolute immune for violation of the VA Const. and VA Code) (Plaintiff’s Ex. G1, summary disbarment from Federal practice by not enforcing the prohibitions under the VA Const./VA Code to use the VSBDB void ab initio order) (Plaintiff’s Ex. H1 and H2, Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB et al., (2013) EDVA 3:12-cv-00663, the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney violated the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Code. The Hon. Judge, issued an unpublished nationwide void order enjoining and prior restraining Rodriguez from filing future federal litigation challenging: (i) the Court’s unconstitutional rules and the VSBDB void ab initio order; (ii) the Internal Revenue Service/U.S. Tax Court unlawfully “assessing taxes greater then allowed by law” based theirs declaring as “frivolous” Rodriguez’s litigation challenging the VSBDB void order (Plaintiff’s Ex. Gi, Gii, Qi and Qii); and, (iii) the Virginia Employment Commission for denying unemployment compensation benefits in 2006 based on the VSBDB void order (Plaintiff’s Ex. R).
21. Because of the Hon. Judge Gibney’s unpublished nationwide void order enjoining and prior restraining suit in federal court, in 2016 and 2017 Rodriguez’s filed petitions for redress to the General Assembly (Plaintiff’s Exhibit D and I), a Complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and a Petition with the United Nations Committee on Human Rights for the grant of “impunity” from accountability (see http://www.isidororodriguez.com).
22. Instead of investigating Rodriguez’s petitions, the General Assembly in response: First, on January 9, 2017, enacted to unconstitutionally an ex post facto change to the decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1950-2009), to retroactively “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” by adopting Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 [VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)]. Thus, in violation of the amending procedures under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., the General Assembly expanded the Court’s power by retroactively adopting Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6: (a) to create a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system; (b) establish VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) adopt the Court’s appointment of VSBDB members as  judges; and, second, in response to Rodriguez’s presentation on January 5, 2019 (Plaintiff’s Ex. Ni and Nii), four (4) days later on January 9, 2019 Democrat Delegates Hurt, Bourne, Kory, and Simon introduced House Bill No 2111 (Plaintiff’s Ex. Oi and Oii) seeking to give the VSBDB immunity from liability for the business conspiracy.

RODRIGUEZ IS ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

23. The writ of Mandamus “orders a person, usually some official of the executive branch of the government, or the judge of a lower court, to carry out some affirmative action.” In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  For a writ of mandamus to issue, “[1] there must be a clear right in the petitioner to the relief sought, [2] there must be a legal duty on the part of the respondent/defendant to perform the act which the petitioner seeks to compel, and [3] there must be no adequate remedy at law.” Board of City. Supervisors of Prince William City. v. Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584 (1976).  “Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel performance of a purely ministerial duty, but it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.” supra.

Petitioner Has a Clear Right to the Relief Sought.

24. When the legislature delegates authority to the Court to promulgate regulations, those regulations must neither exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent with the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const., and VA Code. See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 34 Va. App. 273, 276, 540 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2001) (legislative enactment which delegates authority to adopt rules does not permit adoption of inconsistent and illegal practices).
25. Furthermore, “delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official. . .. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990) (Emphasis added).
26. Given I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., only the General Assembly can enact legislation to confer judicial authority, create lower courts, and appoint lower court judges, the writ seeks the VSBDB to answer

UNDER WHAT LEGAL AUTHORITY DOES THE VSBDB HAVE THE POWER TO DISBAR AND REVOKE RODRIGUEZ’S LICENSE FOR LITIGATING TO ENFORCE STATUTORY RIGHTS (Plaintiff’s Ex. D)?

27. Based on the above evidence the answer is NONE.
28. The VSBDB is an entity created sometime in 1998 under unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, ‘ IV (Plaintiff’s Ex. C and S page v). The VSBDB does not have any constitutional judicial authority, judicial power, or jurisdiction to render any order to discipline an attorney, nor the power to revoke Rodriguez’s license-thus the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order.
29. Therefore under the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the 2006 VSBDB void order unlawfully revoked Rodriguez’s license as an attorney for litigating to enforce his statutory rights was invalid at the moment of issuance, and a Writ of Mandamus is to be issued to command the VSBDB to cease its usurping of constitutional and statutory judicial authority.

Common Law Right to Question the VSBDB Legal Authority.

27. Dating back to 1613, under the common law there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of scope of employment and jurisdiction, and action for equitable relief and damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise, The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
28. Consistent with the common law at the time of the ratifying of the VA Const., the VSBDB is subject to a Writ of Mandamus seeking equitable relief under VA Code § 8.01-644.[4]
29. As the Court has explained in Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 13 S.E. 262, 263 (1891), “where the object is to enforce obedience to a public statute it has been invariably held that the writ is demandable of right.”
30. Although the VSBDB now seeks to avoid the effect of a Writ by admitting that it is not a lower court nor its members judges (Plaintiff’s Ex. P), even if the Court somehow was to consider quasi-judicial immunity for the VSBDB, it extends only if: (1) they are performing judicial functions, (2) they are acting within their jurisdiction; and (3) they are acting in good faith “acting within the scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311 at 321, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003) (the court explicitly declined to grant blanket immunity to non-prosecutorial conduct, stating, “We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.”)    See Hueston v. Kizer, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 280, 36-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2008) (court denied absolute immunity).
31. None of these elements apply to the VSBDB unlawful acts in violation of VA Const. and Va Code and in furtherance of a business conspiracy.
32. Consequently, since the record and the VSBDB admissions confirms that it has usurped judicial authority, as well as the evidence of the systematic denial of access to a common law jury trial and impartial court to secure accountability of the unconstitutional court rules and the VSBDB void ad initio order, the VSBDB must be compelled to respond to this Petition.
33. Petitioner Has No Adequate Remedy at Law.
34. Rodriguez seeks to enforce obedience to the VA Const., and VA Code by the VSBDB by the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition. The inquiry here is not only whether there is an alternative remedy, but also whether there is an “adequate” alternative remedy “at law” given the evidence of the systematic denial of access to a common law jury trial and impartial court for the business conspiracy to damage Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, and property rights.  The record confirms that Rodriguez has no alternative (Plaintiff’s Ex. G1).
35. The VSBDB would not suffer any prejudice if this Court were to resolve this controversy via mandamus. Mandamus relief is appropriate where “[n]o prejudice was suffered by any party, and harm rather than good would result from sending the parties back to try the same issue, to be raised by different pleadings.” May v. Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 538 (1960). All parties benefit from having this Court immediately and authoritatively decide the important constitutional questions presented in this case based on the record in response to Rodriguez petitions of political cronyism to enact ex-post-facto legislation and “impunity” for the business conspiracy.
36. Finally, “the extraordinary nature of this litigation cannot be ignored as a factor in the overall decision.” Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 652 (7th Cir. 2012). It is imperative that access to an impartial court be provided to permit review and consideration of the validity of the Court rules and the VSBDB void ab Initio Order issued in violation of VA Const., and VA Code.

RODRIGUEZ IS ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

39. For substantially all of the preceding reasons, Rodriguez is entitled to a writ of prohibition.
40. The writ of prohibition “commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which . . . the court is informed he is about to do.” In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 17 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). A writ of prohibition may serve to “suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.” (quotation marks omitted). The writ is used to restrain a government actor “either when he has no jurisdiction or when he exceeds his jurisdiction . . ..” In re Commonwealth, 222 Va. 454, 461 (1981).
41. The evidence is that the VSBDB has participated in Eric Holder et al.’s business conspiracy and usurped judicial authority in violation of the limitations and prohibitions of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Code. The VSBDB is actions are ultra vires– as a court– without judicial authority and “jurisdiction” in violation of VA Const. and VA Code. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2013).
42. This action for a writ of prohibition seeking injunctive relief against the VSBDB for violation of the VA Const. and VA Code is an “adequate remedy” given the evidence of a “lack of an adequate remedy at law.” , based on the record of the systematic denial of access to an impartial common law trial by a jury and court (Plaintiff’s Ex G).  The grant of injunction remedy to the VSBDB would be “adequate.” A remedy is “adequate” if it is “equally as convenient, beneficial, and effective as the proceeding by mandamus.” Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r of Va., 270 Va. 58, 64 (2005) (quotation marks omitted). To be adequate, a remedy “must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a perfect manner, at the present time and in the future; otherwise, equity will interfere and give such relief and aid as the particular case may require.” McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 68 (1942) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). And in determining whether to issue the writ, “consideration must be given to the urgency that prompts the exercise of the discretion, the public interest, and interest of other persons, the results that will occur if the writ is denied, and the promotion of substantial justice.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370–71 (2001).
43. It settled that “a party must establish . . . irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law, before a request for injunctive relief, will be sustained.” Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Va. 44, 61 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). Recently, the issue of “irreparable harm was addressed by the court in Damian Stinnie et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of DMV, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 U.S. Dist. Ct. for the WD of Virginia, Charlottesville Division (December 21, 2018) (page 22 Supplemental Authority for Order of Preliminary Injunction filed  December 26, 2018), wherein it was held,

. . . Factors governing a request for a preliminary injunction—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest—weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. First, where Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being violated, there is a presumption of irreparable harm. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1343 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987)) …. As for the remaining factors, the balancing of the equities and public interest, Fourth Circuit precedent “counsels that ‘a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional. If anything, the system is improved by such an injunction.’” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002)).

44. Time is of the essence, due to the evidence of political cronyism to enact ex-post facto retroactive legislation and grant “impunity” for the VSBDB aiding and abetting Eric Holder et al.’s business conspiracy to damage Rodriguez’ pro hoc vice federal litigation practice, reputation, profession and property rights.

CONCLUSION

45. The VSBDB has admitted to usurping of judicial power in violation of VA Const. and VA Code.
46. But, as part of the business conspiracy Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial jury trial and court to challenge and hold accountable the VSBDB for its Void AB Initio Order and Class 2 & 6 felony to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 and VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500.
47. For the above reasons, all factors strongly support Rodriguez’s request for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to the VSBDB.

Dated: April 4, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

[1] Article VI, § 1 VA Const., states in relevant part that judicial power shall be vested in courts of original or appellate jurisdiction “as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[2] Art. VI § 5 VA Const., states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[3] Article VI, § 7 VA Const., states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

 [4] VA Code § 1-200, states “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA Code § 1-10 (2005)