NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND PRELIMINARY/ PERMANENT INJUNCTION

28 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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The undersign Plaintiff at this moment provides in support of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq. the following supplemental authority:[1]

The Honorable Senior United States District JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON, Memorandum Opinion, and Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction Order of Injunction Unconstitutional VA Code, in Damian Stinnie, et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Moter Vehicles, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 United State District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division (December 21, 2018).

Regarding the granting of a Declaratory Judgement and a preliminary injunction in the instant action to enjoin an unconstitutional ex post facto and retroactive provision of the Virginia Code, the opinion and order of the Hon. Senior District Judge Norman K Moon which is on point and relevant in the instant action to be considered by the Circuit Court. This supplemental authority governs the issuance of an injunction based upon the controlling precedent of the four-part test under Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) and Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013).

As a benchmark for the Circuit Court of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgemwent and the Motion for Injuction to be heard on January 4, 2019 at 0830, the Hon. Senior Judge Norman K Moon wrote at page 22 of in his Memorandum Opinion:

Other Winter Factors

The remaining factors governing a request for a preliminary injunction—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest—weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. First, where Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being violated, there is a presumption of irreparable harm. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1343 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987)) …. As for the remaining factors, the balancing of the equities and public interest, Fourth Circuit precedent “counsels that ‘a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional. If anything, the system is improved by such an injunction.’” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002)). (Emphasis added)

[1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018. Affidavit to serve on the by publication filed on 12/19/18.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence: 2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE ACTION AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR THE EX POST FACTO RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998 BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA.

28 Wednesday Nov 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed in the Fairfax County Circuit Court in November 2018 a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgement under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq.,[1] and filed a verified petition for Writ of Mandamus[2] under VA Code §8.01-644 to seek a binding adjudication of his rights under the common law of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”),[3] under Art. I § 5 & 9, Art VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and Art.XII § 1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”) and VACode § 54.1‑3935 (1998).

At the outset, the suit is for the violation of Rodriguez’s right under Virginia common law to hold government attorneys accountable for acts outside the scope of employment and to hold justices/judges accountable for void ab initio orders outside of judicial authority. The action is filed in the Fairfax Court Court because in 2013 the Hon. U.S. Dist. JudgeJohn A. Gibney, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the U.S.Supreme Court in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (April12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No13-1638, cert. Denied (Nov. 2013) systematically denied access to impartial court and a common law jury trial under Art. I § 11VA Const., the 5^th, 7^th & 14^th Amend to the U.S. Const., VA Code § 801-336, and controlling common law precedent,^[4] by (a)assuming away violation of the common law to grant absolute immunity from accountability for a business conspiracy to injure Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, and property right in violation of VA Code § 18.2.499 to grant “impunity”from accountability for violation of Art.VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the VoidAb Initio Order Doctrine[5] by the use of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”)unconstitutional court rules issued in 1998 to discipline Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights and rights as a father; and, (b) enjoining Rodriguez from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the UnitedStates involving,

“in any way his disbarment [by the VSBDB void ab initio order] or the allegations leading to his disbarment [by the federal courts based upon the VSBDB void ab initio order]. The Court further enjoins [Rodriguez] from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the United States against any of the defendants in this case, against any judge or retired judge, against any United States Attorney or member of aUnited States Attorney’s staff, against the Attorney General of Virginia or any past or present member of the Attorney General’s staff, and against the Virginia State Bar or any agents of the Bar. [Rodriguez] is further enjoined from filing any additional pleadings in the instant case, other than pleadings necessary to perfect and present an appeal. [Rodriguez is further prior restrained from filing any other type of suit in the federal court by ordering that Rodriguez first files a motion] for leave of Court to file suit. . ..”

Finally, the suit is based upon the subsequent evidence that in 2017 of the General Assembly of Virginia (“General Assembly”) compounded the above violations of the common law, VA Const., and VA Code, by disregarding Rodriguez’s petitions seeking an investigation of the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and Judge Gibney.’s violation of Virginia’s common law precedent of accountability for acts outside the scope of judicial authority and employment (Plaintiff’s Ex. I) (See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16 IACHR Petition) and Committee on Human Rights United Nations Complaint) (See also Presentations in January 2010 to NOVA members of the General Assembly https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ & https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), by:

Violating the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. against enacting ex-post-facto legislation outside “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,”Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951) to retroactively in2017 “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6 issued in 1998 (Plaintiff’sExhibit C) in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradleyv. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v.Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); and,

Usurping the power of citizens to amend the VA Const. under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. by violating the citizens’ mandate of separation of power under Art. I § 5, and Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., by retroactively changing the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system established since 1932 under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Ex. A) to expand the Court’s power by by revising VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)(Plaintiff’s Ex. J) to unlawfully delegate legislative authority by adopting unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 issued after 1998 established by court rules: (a) a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) VSBDB members asjudges.

THE VIOLATION OF ART. I §§ 5 & 9, ART. VI § 1, 5, & 7, AND ART. XII § 1 VA CONST., BY THE EX POST FACTO DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE COURT.

Decentralize Statewide Attorney Disciplinary System established by the 1932 Act.

The original constitutional draftsmen of the VA Const. and U.S. Const. openly distrusted the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court specifically. As Patrick Henry observed,

“[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between threebranches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse ofpower. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If wefail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually liveunder judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

Thus, under Art. I § 5 VA Const.[6] the citizens of Virginia mandated the separation of power to create a“distribution grids, apportioning authority,” as a constitutional check on the three branches of government.[7] Separation of power is necessary because as Thomas Jefferson wrote, history has shown, “the violation of the limitation and prohibitions under the VA Const. which define the separation of power would create a despotic government.”Notes on the State of Virginia 196 1787). Echoing this James Madison wrote that the U.S. Constitution, consistent with the VAConst. required the separation of power, because

“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” (Emphasis added).
The Federalist Papers
No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103

Consequently, to eliminate the risk of the Court creating a dangerous node of power,[8] the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI §§ 1,[9]and 7[10] VA Const. to authorize only the General Assembly to enact legislation giving judicial power, establishing “lower courts,” and appointing “judges” The citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI § 5[11]VA Const. to prohibit the Court from issuing rules either inconsistent with statutory rights, i.e. VA Code §§ 54-1-3935(A) (1998), or exceeding the scope of the rulemaking authority delegated to the Court by the General Assembly (the Court cannot issue rules to enact legislation), See VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 (2017).[12] Finally, the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const. to restrict to themselves the authority to amend these limitations and prohibitions on the Court.^[13]

Under the holding of Ex Parte Fisher,6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) 624-25 (1835), under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. the judicial power to revoke a license to practice law is governed by statute, not court rules. See In re: Johathan A. Moseley, Sup Ct. VA No 061237 (2007).

Thus, in response to the holding in Ex Parte Fisher, supra., and, Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249 at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing the General Assembly enacted in 1932 the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”), to establish a decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system to give statewide effect to a lower court’s discipline of an attorney. The 1932 Act only delegated judicial authority only to each County circuit court to discipline attorneys. See When Has the Supreme Court of AppealsOriginal Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia,2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

The 1932 Act limited the delegated authority to the Court to prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct. However, under Art. VI § 5 VA Const, the 1932 Act prohibited the Court from issuing rules inconsistent with rights under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A). With this limited delegated authority, the Court formed the Virginia State Bar with the only the limited power of investigating complaints against attorneys to be exercised in each county by a Council and Investigating Committee. The function of the Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury fact-finding and had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney. Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney by a Circuit Court, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction was the disciplining of an attorney given statewide effect. See Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942) (The constitutionality of the decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system upheld because the 1932 Act did not delegate any legislative powers).

For more than eighty-nine (89) years from 1932 until 2017 there was no significant amendment to the 1932 Act’s decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system, see VA Code 54.1-3935 (1932 thru 2009). During these 89 years, the General Assembly neither enacted any statute establishing under the control of the Court the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial power nor appointed VSBDB members as lower court judges with the power to discipline attorneys. It is important to underscore that the legislative history of the 1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) confirms that the entire General Assembly accepted and ratified the Senate bill which did not delegate any new rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B2), but specifically rejected the House bill expanding rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’sExhibit B3), because the General Assembly cannot delegate this power to legislate judicial authority, create lower court, and appoint judges.

The VSBDB void ab initio order.

The U.S. Supreme Court established the benchmark on the right of Rodriguez to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio order, holding that,

[s]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon thesubject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877)

Thus, Rodriguez has sought answered the question during the past fifteen years of litigation:

UNDER WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE VA CONST. DID THE COURT HAVE TO ISSUE COURT RULES IN 1998 TO GIVE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, TO CREATE THE VSBDB AS A LOWER COURT TO DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS, AND TO APPOINT VSBDB MEMBERS AS JUDGES?

As discussed above in response to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light,137 Va. 249, at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.)619 (1835) (“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added), and the restriction under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. granting power only to the General Assembly to give judicial authority, create “court”and appoint “judges,” the General Assembly enacted the 1932 Act (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935(1950), to establish a decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system by authorizing judicial power to discipline attorneys only to County Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal. Therefore, because the VSBDB as an entity created by Court rules, it is obvious that based on the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine the VSBDB does not have any constitutional and statutory judicial authority, judicial power, or jurisdiction to render any valid order to discipline an attorney in Virginia. The VSBDB order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390,402, (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v.Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).

The 2006 VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D) was invalid at the moment of issuance. Furthermore, the VSBDB void ab initio order under the common law may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally” because it has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. not subject t stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It is not entitled to enforcement. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.” 30A Am Jur. Judgments 44, 45; see also Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

The General Assembly cannot delegate its legislative power given to them by the citizens under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. to the Court to give judicial authority, to establish lower courts, and to appoint lower court judges.

Separation of power is the benchmark of the constitutional prohibition on the General Assembly’s power to delegate legislative authority to the Court. The “delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the [Court] in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990). See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 34 Va. App. 273, 276, 540 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2001) (noting legislative delegation does not permit adoption of inconsistent rules or regulations).

As explained in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. at 253,

It must be remembered that “revisors of statutes are presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statutes; and it is a well-settled rule that in the revision of statutes neither an alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the latter statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former act, excepting where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear.” 36 Cyc. 1067-8; Harrison & Byrd v. Wissler, 98 Va. 597, 600-601, 36 S.E.982; Keister’s Adm’r v. Keister’s Exor’s, 123 Va.157, 174, 96 S.E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439.

Thus, the evidence confirms that the General Assembly violated the mandate of separation of power by enacting in 2017 ex-post fact legislation adopting the 1998 unconstitutional Court rules violating the restrictions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., to retroactively delegate authority to the Court unbounded discretion in adopting rules in defiance of the specifically defined power that the citizens restricted only to the full General Assembly (i.e., give judicial powers, to create “lower courts” and appoint “judges”), as well as to adopting unconstitutional Court rules dealing with broad legislative policies to create a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system.

But, the constitutional limits on the Court’s judicial authority and jurisdiction can neither be circumvented by enacting in 2017 an ex-post facto legislative amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) by changing VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to retroactively adopt Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6, nor circumvented by delegation to retroactively “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” to Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6.

The general language of retroactive delegating authority to the Court found in VA Code § 54.1-3935(2017) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit J) is insufficient and unconstitutional. Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378,381, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994), because “the General Assembly can not delegate its legislative power accompanied only by such a broad statement of general policy. . .. [D]elegations of authority are adequately limited [only] where the terms or phrases employed have a well-understood meaning and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the administrator.” Id. at 381-82, 448 S.E.2d at 624 (citations omitted), and correspondingly said regulations must have “definite standards to guide . . . the exercise of the power.” Ames, 239 Va.at 349, 389 S.E.2d at 705.

As explained in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967) the purpose of sovereign immunity,

“is not for the protection As explained of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ . . .

Here the record confirms that not imposing accountably for acts outside the scope of employment and outside the jurisdiction or judicial authority doesn’t contribute to principled and fearless decision making but rather to “intimidation.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967) (citations omitted).[14] Seldom has there been evidence of collusion to violate the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. and VA Code, by criminal misprision of a felony and a business conspiracy to injure an attorney for litigating to enforce statutory rights and the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and a common law jury trial by the abuse of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.^[15]

II. THERE IS NO IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS.

A right without a remedy is no right at all. Consequently, under the common law dating back to 1613, there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of jurisdiction, and action for equitable relief and damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise, The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027(K.B. 1613).^[16] See also4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141, discussing various English common law cases that provided for accountability and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction and judicial authority.

Therefore, consistent with the common law at the time of the ratifying of the VA Const., sovereign immunity does not invalidate all claims; it only makes a defendant immune from suit and the relief to which the immunity applies.[17] Under the common law, notwithstanding the holding in Messina v. Burden,228 Va. 301, 307 (1984), where the Court declared that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still “alive and well” in the Commonwealth,[18] it is important that citizens of Virginia have a proper way of enforcing the limitation and prohibitions, as well as their constitutional rights against the government, including the Court.^{^[19]} Under the Common law, citizens can bring a civil suit for declarative and equitable relief in Virginia against the government or government officials for acts outside the scope of employment,legislative authority, and judicial authority in violation of the VA Const.[20]

Consistent with the common law the Court in Fox v. Deese,234 Va. 412, 423-24 (1987), reversed the decision of the trial court’s grant of sovereign immunity from the tort claims by underscoring that acommon law trial by jury required because,^[21]

[t]he tort counts not only allege that these defendants committed intentional torts, but that they were acting outside the scope of their employment as well. Resolution of these allegations requires an evidentiary hearing. The defendants are not immune if the evidence establishes that (1) they committed intentional torts, irrespective of whether they acted within or without the scope of their employment, Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372_73(1967), or (2) they acted outside the scope of their employment, see Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 311, 321 S.E.2d657, 662 (1984).

Under the common law sovereign immunity does not protect government actors when either in their individual and/or official capacities, they commit an intentional torts or commit acts outside of the scope of their employment, or enact ex-post-facto legislation outside the ‘the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341U.S. 367 at 376 (1951), or judicial act in”clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Under the common law, when the action seeks to restrain or compel state officials to perform their duties under the VA Const. and VA Code the action for declaratory judgment is not against the state for purposes of sovereign immunity-but for acts outside the scope of employment, legislative functions, jurisdiction, or judicial authority. [22] Under the common law in both England and Virginia as one of the colonies, it was in ordinary courts in either civil or criminal trials -before a jury trial-which determined whether government officers, including judges, were to be held accountable for misbehavior. Prakash and Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L. J. 72 at 74 (2006); See, e.g., R.V. Gaskin, (1799) 1001 Eng. Rep. 1349 (K.B.) (reinstating a parish-clerk upon his demand that his employer shows cause for firing him); James Bragg’s Case (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278-81 (K.B.)(reinstating a Burgess for lack of cause to remove him).

At common law, absolute immunity is given judges only when they did not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S. 355-357 (1871); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349at 357 (1978); Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885). Judges are liable when they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986) (quoting Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131,142 (1885). Pursuant to Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844(1980), and, Den Zeller v. Rankin,101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981), whenever a judge acts where he does not have jurisdiction to affirm and use a void ab initio order, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821). In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger wrote, “If [judges] break the law, they can be prosecuted.” Also, Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion agreed, that, “. . . judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .” supra. at 141-142. Also, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.

There the U.S. Supreme Court held in action against a State court judge, that under common law a state court judge who acts without jurisdiction, or acts in violation of Constitutional, or acts in violation of statutory prohibitions expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost. A Virginia judge is immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and was not performing any act prohibited expressly by constitution and statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980). SeeAmes E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’sPower to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

Consequently, at common law, absolute immunity from civil liability is given to legislators only when they are engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” and have not “exceeded the bounds of legislative power” by the usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the citizens under clearly stated constitutional limitations and prohibitions. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951); See Art. IV, § 9 VA Const. or judicial to immunity in violation; and, Virginia: Hening’s Stats. at Large, Vol. 9, p. 127, because,

[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (Emphasis added). See also, Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

Regarding quasi-judicial immunity for VA government attorneys and the VSBDB, it extends: (1) only if they are performing judicial functions, (2) only if acting within their jurisdiction; and (3) only if acting in good faith. “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311at 321, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003) (the court explicitly declined to grant blanket immunity to non-prosecutorial conduct, stating, “We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.”) See Hueston v. Kizer,2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 280, 36-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2008) (court denied absolute immunity).

Therefore, under the common law if a prosecutor’s involvement is not done as a prosecutor but done outside the scope of his employment in his individual capacity, then he would not have any immunity, and if the prosecutor’s role was one of investigator or administrator he again may not be entitled to absolute immunity. The claim of immunity is a factual determination for a trial by jury under the common law.

Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Olmstad v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).

Conclusion

In defiance of the common law limitation on the use of sovereign immunity Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial court and common law jury trial to challenge the Court’s unconstitutional court rules andVSBDB void ad initio order. The collusion to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[23] to obstruct accountability and justice only if adopting the Court’s unlawful court rules is a violation of Art.I §§ 5 & 9, VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, XII § 1 VA Const. and VA Code §§ 18.2‑481and 482. There has been a retroactive ex-post facto change to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2009) to adopt the unconstitutional rules to delegate to the Court power to give judicial authority, crate the VSBDB as a lower court, and to appoint VSBDBmembers lower court judges.

Based upon the above, the Circuit Court must hold those accountable for the willful defiance of the limitation and prohibitions under Art. I §§ 5 & 9, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, Art. XII § 1 VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1-3915 & 3935 (1932 to 2009) based upon the record of the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law jury trial. Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence: 2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

[1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018.

^[2]Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016433, filed November 19, 2018.

[3] VA Code § 1-200, states “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly. VA. Code § 1-10; 2005.

[4] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Rodriguez argued and won a common law action before the U.S. Supreme Court that held there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the acts of government employees outside the scope of employment (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

[5] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine was first discussed in U.S. jurisprudence in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

[6] Art. I § 5 VA Const., states, “[t]hat the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate and distinct; . . ..” Federalist 47, “[the VA Const.] . . . declares, ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..” Id p 109.

[7] D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, p. 13.

[8] “Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.” Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

[9] Art. VI § 1 VA Const., states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[10] Art. VI § 7 VA Const., states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . . the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[11] Art. VI § 5 VA Const., states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[12] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added) (Plaintiff’s Ex. B7)

[13] Later history confirmed that the violation of separation of power was required prior to undertaking the overthrow of a Constitutional government, i.e. Nuremberg trials documented the NAZI’s efforts to dismantle the legal framework under fundamental constitution principles of the, “separation of judicial powers, of executive powers and legislative powers.” 6 Trial of the Major War Criminal Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946. 534-35 (Testimony of Van der Essen 4 Feb 1946).

[14] As James Madison stated in REPORT OF 1799, VIRGINIA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, “The resolution supposes [the delegation of] dangerous powers, . . . beyond the grant of the Constitution; . . .. However true, . . . that the judicial department, is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve. (Emphasis added)

[15] Chief Justice Marshall wrote Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816), “We [judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. (Emphasis added)

[16] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable, “when a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . . Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

[17] Although the language of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity, the Supreme Court held that when Sec. 1871 was enacted Congress intended to incorporate then-existing common law immunities to excuse individual state and local officials from liability for damages caused by their violations of the federal constitution. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

[18] “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden). “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004).

[19] At common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply for: (A) acts outside the scope of employment, Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-25, 362 S.E.2d 699, 706 (1987); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968); Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942); Deeds v. DiMercurio, 30 Va. Cir. 532 (Albemarle County, 1991); (B) grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994); Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 452 S.E.2d 854 (1995); Meagher v. Johnson, 239 Va. 380, 389 S.E.2d 310 (1990); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 310, 321 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1984); Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 (1987); Bowers v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 245, 253, 302 S.E.2d 511 (1983); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980); (c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 362 S.E.2d 699 (1987); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967); Agyeman v. Pierce, 26 Va. Cir. 140 (Richmond 1991.; or (4) acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 457 S.E.2d 42 (1995) (immunity lost by showing of malice in a slander action); Harlow v. Clatterbuck. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986).

[20] Consistent with the common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded, the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction. See also Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).

[21] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added) See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court to reverse the USCA for the 4^th Circuit, to order a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury for acts outside the scope of employment).

[22] Pennsylvania Academy of Chiropractic Physicians v. Com., Dept of State, Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, 129 Pa. Commw. 12, 564 A.2d 551 (1989) (under the common laws the defense of sovereign immunity inapplicable where petitioner sought declaration which would result in restraining state officials”), Franks v. Tucker, 132 Ill. App. 3d 455, 476 N.E.2d 1315 (1st Dist. 1985) (where suit brought under the common law against state officials seeks to compel them to perform their duty, it is not action against state).

NOTICE OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT FOR THE RETROACTIVE ADOPTION IN 2017 OF SUP. CT VA UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES PROMULGATED IN 1998

20 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code

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Accountability, Limitation under VA Const., separation of power

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“General Assembly”), the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”), the Office of the Governor of Virginia (“Governor”), the Attorney General of Virginia (“VA AG”), and the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) were sued on November 14 and 19, 2018. Respectively a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment ^[1] and Petition for Writ of Mandamus ^[2] were filed under the Common Law and VA Code for acts outside scope of employment of government attorneys, for acts outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, and for acts outside of judicial authority by a Class 2 felony to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 and business conspiracy, evidenced by the:

General Assembly’s collusion outside “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951) in violation of the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. of ex-post facto legislation in 2017 to retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to the 1998 unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6;
General Assembly’s collusion outside the ‘the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” supra., by violating the citizens’ exclusive power to amend the VA Const. under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. and by violating the citizens’ the mandate of separation of power under Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., to retroactively change the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system that was established in 1932 in the Commonwealth under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998), by unlawfully delegating legislative authority given by the citizens of Virginia by adopting in 2017 unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6, issued in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S. 355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978),^[3] thereby obfuscating the Court’s unlawful rules: (a) establishing a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) establishing the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) appointing VSBDB members as judges; and,
the VSBDB, the VA AG and the Court’s from 2003 to the present self-proclaiming “impunity” from accountability for the unconstitutional violations of Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. (See 2016 Petition to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16 IACHR Petition) (2017 United Nations Complaint to the Committee on Human Rights, and Memorandum in Support of UN Complaint) (See also presentations to NOVA members of the General Assembly, https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ,).

Isidoro Rodriguez, 2671 Avenir Place, Apt 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180

Mobile phone No. 571.477.5350; E-mail: busness@isidororodriguez.com

[1] See Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al., Fairfax Cir. Ct. CL-2018-0016227, 11/14/198, Complaint for Declaratory Judgement, Plaintiff’s Exhibits A through M, and filed Motions.

[2] See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax Cir. Ct. CL-2018-0016433, 11/19/198, Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

^[3] In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that an entity that has neither constitutional authority, nor legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

Request to US Attorneys for EDVA and DC, as well as FBI for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.

17 Thursday May 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Federal Criminal Complaint for Misprison of a Felony

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Misprison of a felony by violation of right to due process

May 17, 2017

Hon. Tracy Doherty-McCormick Assistant Director in Charge
The United States Attorney Agent Nancy McNamara
Eastern District of Virginia Washington Metropolitan Field Office
U.S. Attorney’s Office Federal Bureau of Investigation
2100 Jamieson Ave 601 4th Street N.W.
Alexandria, VA 22314 Washington DC, DC 20535 0002

Hon. Jessie Kong Liu
United States Attorney for
the District of Columbia
555 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Request for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.

Greetings,

In support of the attached Petition filed with members of the U.S. Congress for an Oversight Investigation (see Exhibit 1)(see also Exhibit 2, Petition to General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia), I demand pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the Washington Metropolitan Field Office of the FBI investigate and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia arrest, indict and prosecute government attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice, employees in the Internal Revenue Service, and Justices/Judges under the stewardship of the Hon. Chief Justice John Roberts in his capacity as Fourth and District of Columbia Circuit Justice in complicity with former Attorney General Eric Holder (See Violation of Rights of Fathers), to deprive the Undersigned Attorney of his right to due process under the 5th, 7th & 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

The Petition provides the evidence of misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242 and 26 U.S.C. § 7214, by the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury to prevent the securing of accountability. Including monetary damages, for a business conspiracy in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500 to injure Undersigned Attorney’s reputation, profession, VA Code statutory property right in a Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and fundamental right to employment as a pro hac vice civil federal litigator by defying prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the Constitution of Virginia, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1 3935, and then surreally proclaiming “impunity” and absolute immunity for said unlawful acts.

The motive for the business conspiracy and misprision of a felony was to retaliate against Undersigned Attorney’s past 26 years of successful civil litigation to secure accountability, including for his prevailing argument before the United States Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (remand for an evidentiary hearing before a jury for employee accountability for acts outside of the “scope of employment” not within the Federal Torts Claim Act), by use of legal sophistry to systematically deny access to an impartial court so to prevent holding government employees, including attorneys, judges, and justices accountable for defying the VA Const./VA Code and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority.

This misprision of a felony has been compounded by the refusal to investigate and take legislative action to stop illegal court rules issued in violation of constitutional prohibitions by my elected representatives, including Democrat Senators/former VA Governors Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine, Congressman Gerry Connelly, Democrat former VA Governor Terry McAuliffe, Democrat VA Governor Ralph S. Northam, Democrat VA Senator Richard L. Saslaw, and the other Democrat NOVA General Assembly members (see Presentation to NOVA members of General Assembly, and, Change Petition on Accountability).

Query, “[t]o what purpose are court’s powers limited, and to what purpose are a limitation in writing on the court if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by the courts who are intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

I am not delusional for more than 200 years ago James Madison wrote that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788. This is because, “[t]here is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice,” U.S. vs. Jannottie, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3rd Cir. 1982).

Consequently, the attached Petition is my Statement of Probable Cause and will serve to draft a Criminal Complaint. Knowledge of the crime of misprision of a felony, and the jurisdiction to pursue those responsible imposes upon you, the legal obligation to do so. I request that as a victim of the alleged crimes I am kept informed of the status of the investigation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc: President Donald J. Trump Congressman Bob Goodlatte
The White House 2309 Rayburn HOB
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington DC 20515-4606
Washington, D.C. 20500

Senator Chuck Grassley
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Attorney General Jeff Sessions
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

REQUEST TO THE HONORABLE RALPH S. NORTHAM TO MEET TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIRGINIA’S ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES IN VIOLATION OF ART. VI OF VA CONST., AND VA CODE.

23 Friday Feb 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Uncategorized

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February 6, 2018

The Honorable Ralph S. Northam
Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, P.O. Box 1475
Richmond, VA 23218

Re: Request to meet to Provide Evidence of The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Issuance of Unlawful Court Rules Violating the Art IV of the Constitution of Virginia, VA Code, The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and The Mandate of Due Process Under 5^th& 14^th Amend to U.S. Constitution.

Dear Governor Northam,

I request a meeting because although the General Assembly has been in session since January 12, 2018, neither my elected representatives [Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.)], nor any other NOVA elected official has responded to the attach Petition (see http://www.isidororodriguez.com, and presentation at the Fairfax County Judicial Center http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), to investigate/stop the Supreme Court of Virginia’s (“Court”) illegal rules. The irrefutable evidence is that these rules have violated the explicit restriction on the delegated rulemaking authority from the General Assembly under VA Code § 54-1-3909 and the prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1 5, and 7 of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1‑3935, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. [1]

To comply with the mandate to provide due process under the 5^th & 14^th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Art. I of the Constitution of Virginia, the following four questions must be answered: (a) pursuant to what authority did the Court create the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys?; (b) pursuant to what authority did the Court choose\appoint VSBDB members as “judges”?; (c) pursuant to what authority did the Court create under its control a centralized attorney discipline system in defiance of the General Assembly’s decentralized attorney discipline system under VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 & 3935?; and, (d) pursuant to what authority did the Court grant itself, judges on the Fairfax Court Cir. and Court of Appeals, government attorneys, and employees, “impunity” and absolute immunity for “resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482? (See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796).

Regarding these limitations on the Judicial Branch, query, “[t]o what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

Please have your staff contact me as to a time and date for me to drive to your office.

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc: Attorney General of Virginia Mark R. Herring

[1] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, in accordance with due process mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA’S COURT RULES VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, VA CODE, THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, AND THE MANDATE OF DUE PROCESS UNDER 5TH AND 14TH AMEND TO U.S. CONSTITUTION.

07 Sunday Jan 2018

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Dear Senator and Delegate of the General Assembly of Virginia,

The above issue concerns every citizen of Virginia’s right to secure access to an independent legal profession, right to an impartial court, and right to a civil jury trial to hold accountable government attorneys, employees, and judges for unlawful acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority. Thus, I am following my recent presentation to NOVA member of the General Assembly at Fairfax Government Center on January 6, 2018, to file the attach Petition with every Senator and Delegate irrespective of the district, political party or affiliation.

An investigation and hearing are requested as part of your 2018 review of the budget for the Judicial Branch. This is based upon the evidence that the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) has issued and is using illegal Rules of Part 6, § IV, in defiance of its delegated authority from the General Assembly, and in clear violation of the explicit limitations and prohibitions on the Court under Art. VI §§ 1 5, and 7 of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1‑3935, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and, the mandate of due process under Art. I of the Constitution of Virginia, and the 5^th & 14^th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The questions to be investigated and answered are: (a) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to issue rules establishing it creating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys?; (b) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to issue rules permitting it to choose\appoint VSBDB members as “judges”?; (c) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to defy the General Assembly’s a decentralized attorney discipline system established pursuant to VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 3935, by the Court’s use of court rules to create under its control a centralized attorney discipline system?; and, (d) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to grant itself, lower court judges, government attorneys, and employees, “impunity” and absolute immunity for unlawful “resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482? (See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796; see also http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

Query, “to what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

P.S. Note: I file this Petition with the General Assembly due to my elected representatives [Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.)], failure to investigate these unlawful acts of malfeasance (See Fairfax County Judicial Center presentation (http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5).

______________________________________________________

PETITION FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND HEARING ON THE CRIMINAL COMPLICITY TO USE ILLEGAL COURT RULES TO CREATE AN UNLAWFUL LOWER “COURT” AND TO UNLAWFULLY NAME “JUDGES” IN VIOLATION OF THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS OF ART. VI OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION, VA CODE, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

The Petition seeks to stop the issuance and use of the illegal Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) Part 6, § IV, that unlawfully established a centralized attorney discipline system under the Court’s control by it creating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as an unlawful lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys, and it unlawfully appointing VSBDB members as “judges.” These unlawful rules are in clear violation of the explicit limitations and prohibitions on the Court under Art. VI §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] and 7[3] of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915[4] & 54.1‑3935,[5] the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, [6] and, the 5^th, 7^th, and 14^th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The question to be addressed by the members of the General Assembly in response to this Petition is,

“to what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803) [Chief Justice Marshall writing for the majority].

But, irrefutable the evidence confirms a willful violation of the limitation and prohibition on the Court under Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935,[7] by the Court unlawfully issuing and using court rules to establish a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control. The Court has obfuscated and assumed away the decentralized attorney disciplinary system established by the General Assembly under VA Code § 54.1‑3935.[8]

Compounding the Court’s willfully defiance of the limitations and provisions under the VA Const. and VA Code, the evidence confirms the complicity of the Court the Fairfax County Court and Court of Appeals, the Virginia State Bar, the VSBDB, and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia’s violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482,[9] to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,” and in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500 participation in a business conspiracy.[10] The evidence confirms that these entities and individual have used legal sophistry and misused the judicially created doctrine of stare decisis/res judicata to surreally use the VSBDB void ab initio order to disbar and deprive the undersigned of his right to of due process and his statutory property rights, and then grant themselves “impunity” and absolute immunity from accountability said illegal acts (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796), by:

First, violating Art. VI §§ 1 and 7 of the VA Const., to not stop the VSBDB acting as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys, not stop the Court from choosing/appointing the 21 members of the VSBDB as “judges,” and not stop the defying of the limitation on the Virginia State Bar to only the investigation of bar complaints; and,

Second, violating VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by arguing for the unlawful use of the VSBDB void ab initio orders to disbar the undersign from federal practice before the U. S. Supreme Court, the U. S. Court of Appeal for the 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 11^th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the U. S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and U.S. Tax Court; and, arguing for the systematic denying to the undersign access to an impartial court and jury trial by enjoining and prior restraining the undersigns from litigating to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio orders, business conspiracy, and other unlawful acts. (See unpublished void orders of Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney and 4^th Cir. USCA Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB, et al., EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (2013)(https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5) and (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).[11]

Thus, the Petition seeks to protect the undersigns due process and statutory property rights by a finding that the VSBDB void ab initio order unlawfully disbarred the undersign for litigating to enforce Virginia statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf). Also, the Petition seeks to protect the rights of all citizens of Virginia from the issuance and use of illegal court rules that has deprived citizens of Virginia of pro hoc vice litigators independent of the dominance of the Judicial Branch,[12] has systematically denied citizens of access to an impartial court, and been used to deny citizens of their right to civil jury trial of the evidence of unlawful criminal and tortious acts by government attorneys, employees, and judges accountable.[13]

Consequently, based on President Theodore Roosevelt’s statement that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it,” the General Assembly must initiate an investigation and hearing of these unlawful acts in willful violation of VA Const., VA Code, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500, and §§ 18.2‑481/482, by the Court, the Court the Fairfax County Court and Court of Appeals, the Virginia State Bar, the VSBDB, and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence: 2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

[1] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction, states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[2] Article VI, § 5, states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[3] Article VI, § 7, states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . . the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[4] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added)

[5] VA. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has. . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . [it] shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond….

[6] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

[7] The General Assembly enacted this Code section to assist the Judicial Branch based upon the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), that “[t]he powers to . . . make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of [Virginia] must be conferred by statute,” although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney only in that particular court (Emphases added). See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

[8] In summary, the General Assembly used its exclusive legislative powers under Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., to enact VA Code § 54.1‑3935, to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system–by granting sole authority and jurisdiction to discipline an attorney only to the judges it had chosen in the Court of Appeals and the circuit courts. Obedience by the Court to this decentralized attorney disciplinary system was mandated by Art. VI § 5 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3915, by restricting the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Court under VA Code § 54.1‑3909. Specifically, the Court was denied any authority to issue rules inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code, and the Virginia State Bar was limited to the investigation of a bar complaint, but only at the request of the courts of appeals or circuit courts.

[9] It is a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority,” thus there is neither “impunity” nor absolute immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, judicial authority and jurisdiction.

[10] This was uncovered during the undersigns litigation: first, to stop the violation of Art VI of the VA Const., VA Code, and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the VSBDB issuing a void ab initio order disbarring me in 2006 for litigating to enforce my statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf); and to obtain damages for the retaliatory criminal/civil business conspiracy by Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al. in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499, 500, by the filing of two fraudulent VSBDB complaints for seeking to enforce my statutory property rights in a choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and my rights as a father under VA Code and Treaty (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

[11] These summary void ab initio orders have aided and abetted the business conspiracy to deprive the undersigned of his law office, profession, reputation, right to employment, property, and rights as a father, by disbarring the undersigned from federal practice based upon the VSBDB void ab initio order in retaliation for successful pro hoc vice litigation challenging the U.S. Department of Justice under the control of Eric Holder during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, i.e. Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Undersigned argued and won before the U.S. Supreme Court against Holder, DOJ, and the USCA 4th Cir.’s surreal argument that a DEA agent was within his scope of employment when driving drunk and having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (Undersigned argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. the First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (Undersigned argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.)” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (Undersigned challenged Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order under War Power Act as a prohibited bill of attainder); and, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., et al. v. Nat’l Ctr. For Missing & Exploited Children, et al., 03-cv-00120 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 2003) (Undersigned challenge the violation of the “zone or war exception to The Hague Convention Children (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

[12] The controlling precedent on this issue is Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), wherein Associate Justice Powell writing for the court held that the practice of law is a “fundamental right” and stressed the importance of pro hoc vice litigators who bring “claims that would be too unpopular for resident lawyers to bring.” (Emphasis added)

[13] In addition to this Petition challenging the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and the surreal grant of “impunity”/absolute immunity for unlawful acts, the undersigned has filed complaints with the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OAS) (P-926-16) (See http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

PETITION FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COMPLICITY BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD, THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR, AND THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINA TO VIOLATE THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION, VA CODE, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

09 Saturday Dec 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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The Petition seeks to stop the violations of the limitations and prohibitions of Art. VI §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] and 7[3] of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915,[4] by the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) issuance and use of illegal court rules in complicity with the Virginia State Bar, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”), and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia (“Government Attorneys”). The benchmark of the Petition is President Theodore Roosevelt statement that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it.”

These allegations are based upon the evidence of violations of VA Code § 54.1‑3935,[5] wherein the General Assembly used its exclusive power to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system granting authority and jurisdiction to discipline an attorney with statewide effect only to the judges it had chosen to the Court, Court of Appeals, and circuit court.[6] Obedience to the decentralized attorney disciplinary system was mandated by Art. VI § 5 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3915 restricting the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Court under VA Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting the Court from issuing rules inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code, and restricting the Virginia State Bar-created under Court rules authorized by the General Assembly–only to the investigation of bar complaints, but solely upon the request of legally chosen judges of established courts under the VA Const. and/or VA Code.

But, the evidence is both flagrant and irrefutable,[7] that in violation of the restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions of Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935, and §§ 18.2‑499/500, the 5^th, 7^th, & 14^th Amend. to the U.S. Const., 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine,[8] the Court issued unlawful rules to establish the VSBDB as a court and complicity to use the Court’s unlawful rules to assume away the decentralized attorney disciplinary system established by the General Assembly.[9] Subsequently, the courts and government attorneys were complicit in resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482,[10] by their use of legal sophistry and misuse of stare decisis/res judicata, by:

First, violating Art. VI § 1 of the VA Const., to disregard prohibition against establishing the VSBDB as a “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys;

Second, violating Art. VI § 7 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3935(B), to disregard the prohibition on the Court from choosing and appointing the 21 members of the VSBDB as “judges” under its control and defying the restriction on the Virginia State Bar;

Third, violating the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the Court and the lower court’s affirming the VSBDB void ab initio order and in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 granting themselves Judicial Immunity for unlawful acts and malfeasance (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796);

Fourth, violation of VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the unlawful use the VSBDB and Court’s void ab initio orders to disbar me from federal practice before the U. S. Supreme Court, the U. S. Court of Appeal for the 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 11^th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the U. S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and U.S. Tax Court; and,

Fifth, violation of the VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney and U. S. Court of Appeal for the 4^th Circuit issuance of unpublished void orders issued in 2013 to systematically deny access to an impartial court and jury trial to challenge the above void ab initio orders and unlawful acts by enjoining/prior restraining future litigation by use of legal sophistry and misuse of stare decisis/res judicata, (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB, et al., (2013) EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5) and (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).[11]

Consequently, pursuant to their oath of office and the doctrine of separation of power each member of the General Assembly is petitioned to investigate the above evidence complicity of the Court, the Virginia State Bar, VSBDB, and Office of Attorney General, to violate Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935, and the 5^th, 7^th, & 14^th Amends. to the U.S. Const.,[12] and, to take action to stop the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to obtain accountability and damages for violation of VA Const., VA Code, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500.[13]

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence: 2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180; (571) 477-5350/E-mail business@isidororodriguez.com

[3] Article VI, § 7, states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . . the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[5] Va. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has. . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . [it] shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond….

[6] This was done by the General Assembly to assist the Judicial Branch subsequent to Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), which held that “[t]he powers to . . . make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of [Virginia] must be conferred by statute,” although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney only in that particular court (Emphases added). See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

[7] This evidence was uncovered during my past 14 years of litigation to obtain: first, damages for the retaliatory criminal/civil business conspiracy of Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al. in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499, 500, evidenced by the filing of two fraudulent VSBDB complaints filing law suits to enforce my statutory property rights in a choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and my rights as a father under VA Code and Treaty (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml); and second, to stop the usurping of the General Assembly’s power to choose judges and establish lower courts under Art VI of the VA Const. and VA Code—as well as stop the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the VSBDB issuing a void ab initio order disbarring me in 2006 for litigating to enforce my statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

[8] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

[9] The motive for these illegal acts was to systematically deprive citizens of an independent legal profession, access to an impartial court, and civil jury trial to bar liability for criminal and tortious acts of government attorneys, employees, and judges.

[10] It is a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority,” thus there is neither “impunity” nor absolute immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, judicial authority and jurisdiction.

[11] These final void ab initio orders have aided and abetted the business conspiracy to deprive me of my law office, profession, reputation, right to employment, property, and rights as a father. The evidence is that I was disbarred from federal practice in retaliation for my successfully challenging the U.S. Department of Justice under the control of Eric Holder during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations: See also Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (I argued and won before the U.S. Supreme Court against Holder, DOJ, and the USCA 4th Cir.’s surreal argument that a DEA agent was within his scope of employment when driving drunk and having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. the First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.)” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (I challenged Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order under War Power Act as a prohibited bill of attainder); and, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., et al. v. Nat’l Ctr. For Missing & Exploited Children, et al., 03-cv-00120 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 2003) (I challenge the violation of the “zone or war exception to The Hague Convention Children (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

[12] I resort to filing this Petition with each member of the General Assembly, because my elected representatives Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.), failed to act pursuant to the doctrine of separation of power to protect me from the above unlawful acts and malfeasance. (See My address to NOVA representatives respectively 2009 and 20010, Fairfax County Judicial Center (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ), and (http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5).

[13] In addition to this Petition seeking protection as a citizens of Virginia and the United States pursuant to the U.S./Virginia Constitutions, VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, I have filed complaints with the United Nations and with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (P-926-16), Memorandums of Law, and as exhibits the Void Ab Initio Court Orders, pursuant to my fundamental rights under Treaty to challenge the surreal void ab initio orders granting “impunity” and absolute immunity to government attorneys, employees, and judges for unlawful acts (See http://www.isidororodriguez.com) requested, electronic PDF copy will be sent).

https://static.change.org/product/embeds/v1/change-embeds.js“>Petitiion can be signed at Change.org

Unlawful Acts Outside the Scopse of Employment of Gov’t Attorneys in Collusion with Judges’ Outside of Judicial Authoirty Acting During the Obama Administration in Violations of the Common Law, the VA Const., VA Code, the U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the IRC 26 U.S.C. § 7214.

26 Sunday Nov 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Uncategorized

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November 27, 2017

President Donald J. Trump Attorney General Jeff Sessions

The White House U.S. Department of Justice

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20500 Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Via U.S. Mail and Telefax (202-456-2461)

Re: Unlawful Acts During the Obama Administration in Violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Virginia Constitutions and Code, the U.S. Constitution, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine[1] by The U.S. Department of Justice-Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the District Court for the E.D. of Virginia.

Dear President Trump and Attorney General Sessions,

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7214 Internal Revenue Code,[2] I write to respectfully request that the U.S. Department of Justice opposes Ms. Lois Lerner’s motion to seal her deposition seeking to avoid accountability for acts of malfeasance outside the scope of employment during the Obama Administration (See http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/11/20/lois-lerner-wants-irs-testimony-sealed-fearing-death-threats.html).

This request is to secure accountability generally and to assist my efforts challenging the retaliatory business conspiracy depriving me of my profession, reputation, right to employment, property and law practice as an independent attorney litigating against Eric Holder et al., during the Obama Administration for violation of the Art. VI of the Virginia Constitution, Va Code, U.S. Constitution, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine^[3] (See my United Nations Complaint, and my Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (P-926-16) of the Organization of American States at http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

The evidence confirms that in furtherance of Eric Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy against me the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Art I U.S. Tax Court affirmed the declaring as “frivolous” and summarily striking of my litigation expenses for litigation challenging void orders, and issued a Deficiency Notice without any investigation or audit or other minimal factual predicates. Thus, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes greater than allowed by law by denying me of my self-employment FY 2006 Schedule C 1040 business deductions for me and my wife (law partner) law office est. since 1987.

During the same period in furtherance of Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy, I was systematically denied access to an impartial court to challenge the retaliatory unlawful disbarment of me as a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeal for the 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 11^th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the United States District Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and the U.S. Tax Court, by their use of legal sophistry to dishonestly apply the judicially crated doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata in violation of Article VI of the Virginia Constitution, the Void Ab Initio Orders Doctrine. The U.S. Tax Court also refused to comply with the mandate of 26 USC Section 7214. Finally, in furtherance of Eric Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy unpublished Void Ab Initio Orders were issued to grant to Holder et al. “impunity” and absolute immunity for unlawful acts by enjoining and issuing a prior restraining on all future suits alleging violations of Art VI of the Virginia Constitution and Code (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jane Doe et al., Case No. 3:12-cv-00663- the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, E.D. VA Apr. 12, 2013at https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5), and the Honorable Justices of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 13-1638 at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).

The U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Art I U.S. Tax Court, have acted arbitrarily without a rational foundation, excessive and harassment in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7214. I challenge these unlawful acts during the Obama Administration because these unlawful acts aided and abetted Holder et al. retaliatory business conspiracy against me for my past litigation against “Deep State” of Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges’ violation the Rule of Law. Based on the above I respectfully request the U.S. Department of Justice file opposition to Ms. Lois Lerner’s motion.

Your servant,

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc: Gen. John Kelly (Ret.), White House Chief of Staff

[1] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio—therefore not subject stare decisis/res judicata as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

[2] Excerpts from 26 USC Section 7214(a) are as follows:

Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States –

who is guilty of any . . . (omitted) willful oppression under color of law; or
who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law. . . (omitted); or
who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; . . ..
who makes or signs any fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs any fraudulent certificate, return, or statement; or
who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue law by any person, or . . . fails to report, in writing, such knowledge or information to the Secretary; . . ..

shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution.

[3] I took an oath as a Vietnam Vet more than 52 years ago to defend the Constitution and Republic, “from all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Surreally, my past 45 years as a federal litigator uncovered “domestic” enemies seeking to violate the limitation and prohibitions under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions so to assume away accountability, See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (I argued and won before the United States Supreme Court against Holder and DOJ’s surreal argument that a DEA agent acting negligently outside of the US was not personally liable for damages causing a car accident while driving drunk and having sex. The Court reversed and remanded holding that there was to be an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the alleged acts outside scope of employment); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution accountable for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); and, Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (A challenge as a prohibited bill of attainder by Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order use of the War Power Act).

Article IV of the Constitution of Virginia Restrictions, Limitations and Prohibitions on the Jurisdiction and Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court of Virginia

19 Tuesday Sep 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Uncategorized, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The benchmark of my challenge to the grant of “impunity” and absolute immunity to the Washington D.C./Virginia oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges is President Theodore Roosevelt’s observation that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it.”

In that context, given the clear restrictions, prohibitions, and limitations of the VA Const. cited below on the Supreme Court of Virginia:

First, query, under judicial authority did the Supreme Court of Virginia have to promulgate court rules to create a centralized attorney discipline system under the Court’s control, create the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “court, and appoint VSBDB members as “judges?”

Second, query, under what judicial authority and jurisdiction did the Federal Courts have to enjoin and grant “impunity” for unlawful acts of systematically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury for violation of the below provisions of the VA Const.?

VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish. (Emphasis added)

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added)

Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 7. Selection . . . of judges. The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . .. The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . .. (Emphasis added)

VIRGINIA CODE SECTIONS INVOLVED

VA Code § 54.1‑3909. The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations: . . . Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and attorneys.

The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations:

Defining the practice of law.

Prescribing procedures for the limited practice of law by third-year law students.

Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys including the practice of law or patent law through professional law corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships, and a code of judicial ethics.

Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys.

VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner. (Emphasis added)

DISCUSSION

The VA Const. and U.S. Const. confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern—”We the People,” and mandate the separation of power to serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority…,” to protect the rights of citizens. [1] D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, 13.

In that context, echoing James Madison writing in Federalist No. 47, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the violation of the limitation and prohibitions defining the separation of power would create a “despotic government.”Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787).[2] Consequently, both Founding Fathers understood that the clear lessons from history show that,

Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be. Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to a Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

Regarding the need for constitutional checks on the Judicial Branch, Patrick Henry wrote,

“Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.”

It is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Judicial Branch specifically. The key to protection of the rights of citizens was “federalism” and the separation of power between and among entities in government thereby fractures power in innumerable ways to assure independent review of any violation of the law. To this end, VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirmed no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

VA General Assembly Established a Decentralized Attorney Disciplinary System

VA Const. VI §§ 1,[3] and 7 [4] diffused the power of the Virginia Judicial Branch by restricting the authority to create courts and appoint judges exclusively to the Virginia General Assembly, thereby limiting the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within the Judicial Branch inconsistent with the VA Const. and VA Code. To this end, VA Const. VI § 5,[5] and VA Code § 54-1-3915[6] strictly and clearly prohibited the Supreme Court of Virginia jurisdiction and authority to promulgate court rules in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights (in short, the courts cannot enact legislation).[7]

Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia, held that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835).[8] Thus, the General Assembly enacted the Acts of Assembly 1932. p. 139, to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system-specifically, not under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia. But, rather the General Assembly gave to each county court of appeals the jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and gave statewide effect to the disciplining of an attorney before that particular court.[9]

Pursuant to VA Const. VI § 5, the General Assembly’s decentralized attorney disciplinary system, the Supreme Court of Virginia was gives authority only to promulgate rules establishing an integrated Virginia State Bar (VSB), specifically enacting VA Code § 54-1-3915 to prohibit the Court from the promulgation of court rules in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights of an attorney (in short, the courts cannot enact legislation). To this end the VSB was given only the limited powers of investigating complaints against attorneys, to be exercised by a Council and Investigating Committee in each county. The function of the VSB Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury, as a fact-finding board. It had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney. Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction, was,

the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the case in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule . . .. (Emphasis added)

In Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942), the constitutionality of the decentralized attorney disciplinary system was upheld, by holding that the General Assembly merely intended to give the county courts the general jurisdiction to hear and determine disbarment proceedings and did not intend to delegate to the tribunal any legislative powers. However, pursuant to the clear wording of VA Code §54.1-3935, the General Assembly specifically denied any power to the Supreme Court of Virginia to discipline attorneys statewide, by mandating that any Supreme Court of Virginia disciplinary action was to be referred to a specifically selected three-judge panel from the City of Richmond. Appeal from the judgment of the three-judge county court was a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Also, the attorney who had been disbarred had the right to apply to the Governor for reinstatement, if at the time of application for such relief, “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law.” See VA Code of 1950, 12-45.

Subsequently, VA. Code § 54.1‑3935, was enacted by the General Assembly to re-confirm the decentralized attorney disciplinary system’s use of the jurisdiction of each County Court of Appeals, and circuit courts to discipline an attorney. VA Code §54.1-3935(B), again re-confirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond–The statute specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline an attorney directly. Under VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, limited the delegated authority to the Supreme Court of Virginia under VA. Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting the Court from prescribing, adopting, promulgating, and amending rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct, that would be inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code.[10] Thus, it is incontrovertible that the General Assembly repeatedly rejected creating any centralized attorney disciplinary system under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

2.Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions on the Supreme Court of Virginia

VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7 diffused the power of the Judicial Branch in Virginia to limit the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within it. VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915. Specifically, prohibits the Supreme Court of Virginia from the promulgation of court rules in conflict with both substantive and statutory rights of attorneys.[11]

To enforce this control on the Supreme Court of Virginia both the U.S. Const. and VA Const., confirm that there exists no “impunity” or immunity of the absolute right of citizens to access to an impartial court and civil jury trial for malfeasance.[12] See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

3.Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by affirming the VSBDB the Void Ab Initio Order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez.

The United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the challenge to any void ab initio order. There the court stated,

“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

Consistent with this the Supreme Court of Virginia, held that “[a] void judgment is one that has been . . . entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987) (Emphasis added), see also Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).

This is because all void ab initio orders or judgments issued without jurisdictional authority are invalid at the moment of issuance, are to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which their effect is sought to be given.

This Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity does not have the statutory, constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio it is a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. All void ab initio order may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” All void ab initio orders have none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, thus, neither can the doctrine of stare decisis nor res judicata can be applied to give validity to a void order, not subject to becoming valid by the use of either stare decisis or res judicata. Because “[i]t has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments.” 44 and 45.

Thus, Mr. Rodriguez has provided evidence of the ongoing repeated violations of fundamental rights by the Federal Court by their use of the VSBDB void ab initio order, as well as the denial to him of his fundamental right to challenge the various federal court disbarments based upon their use of stare decisis and res judicata to give effect to and not enjoin the VSBDB void ab initio order.

In short, the validity of the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, as well as those of the Federal Courts (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, and 4a thru m), are unlawful because of their failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial court of with subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also, Restatements, Judgments 4(b). The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extends to the judicial branch, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

Because, the Virginia Supreme Court, “cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void [ab initio], and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).

Finally, it is a fundamental doctrine of law under the U.S. Const. VA Const., and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, that because Mr. Rodriguez is affected by a personal judgment of the VSBDB and Federal Court’s void ab initio orders, he must have his day in an impartial court, and an opportunity to be heard by a civil jury trial, on the evidence of the business conspiracy and malfeasance. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

4. Court Orders issued in Violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine

The Federal Courts have issued void ab initio orders by use of VSBDB void order sitting as a “kangaroo court” illegally created by court rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Article VI of the VA Const., thus, all of the courts had a duty to, “vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972); see also Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974). The affirmance of the VSBDB void ab initio order, based on stare decisis and res judicata not only fails to create any binding decision but equally important is prima facie evidence of the ongoing extent and nature of the business conspiracy. Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370.

The orders issued the Hon. Judge Gibney (Exhibit 2a), denied Mr. Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial of the business conspiracy and malfeasance in violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. All of these void ab initio orders exceeded the court’s jurisdiction and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed. 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed. 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L ed. 608. This is because, “[i]f a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.). [13]

CONCLUSION

In summary, the evidence confirms that by cronyism, obfuscation and legal sophistry there has been a cover-up to conceal the disobedience to the 1^st, 5^th, 7^th, and 14^th Amendments to the U.S. Const., the limitations and prohibitions on the courts under Article VI §§ 1, 5, and 7 of the Constitution of the VA Const., the restricts under VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, 3932, and 3935, the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article V, XIV, XVII, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, & XXVI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and Articles 7, 8, 10, & 12 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, by the Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges.

In furtherance of this business conspiracy to injure Mr. Rodriuez international pro hoc vice law practice, reputation, profession, right to property and employment, the Hon. Judge Gibney issue an order surreally granting “impunity” and absolute immunity from accountability for unlawful civil and criminal acts in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2-499, 500 by affirming and using the VSBDB void ab initio order (Exhibit #3) (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), to conceal the promulgation and use of illegal Supreme Court of Virginia Court Rules establishing the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court,” and appointing VSBDB members as “judges” in violation of the VA. Const. and VA Code.

But, while every breach of the public trust is a matter of concern, few can be more grievous than those committed by our judiciary. If the Government and courts in the United States are allowed to be lawbreakers, “it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy,” Olmstead v. the United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).[14] Thus, the Commission must act pursuant to Articles 7, 8, 10, and 17 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, to assure that Mr. Rodriguez be permitted to secure access to a trial by jury so to have accountability and damages for injury to his business, reputation, profession, right to employment, property rights, and statutory benefits.

A government attorney, employee, and judge are all bound by honor and their oath to uphold and defend their respective Constitutions and citizens. The basic tenet is that government is not to be used for personal enrichment and the extending of benefits to the corrupt. Government and the Judicial Branch are to work to ensure that public officials are using their office to further the public interest and not to enrich themselves or others. A United States Court is a public institution, and it has a duty to promote respect for the law.

If the vaunted rule of law can be disregarded by the tyranny of irritated ministers and judges which is evidenced by the acts against Mr. Rodriguez’s fundamental rights, then the United States is being permitted to have a policy and practice of “impunity” by denying accountability for the unlawfully disbarring Mr. Rodriguez by the courts and then the courts declaring them absolutely immune from suit for malfeasance. Neither the United States nor all the other members of the United Nations can long survive the unbridled tyranny of a judiciary in collusion with government attorneys, employees, and judges when they place themselves above and beyond the law.[15]

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

[1] Federalist No. 47 p 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”

[2] More than 229 years ago Mr. James Madison in Federalist No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788, first addressed the concern that, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Thus, forecasting unlawful acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction and judicial authority the Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy by disregarding the limitation and prohibitions of the U.S. Const., VA Const., VA Code, and U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

[3] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish. (Emphasis added)

[4] Article VI, § 7. Selection and qualification of judges–The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly . . .. The judges of all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . . members elected to each house of the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[5] Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. — The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules governing the course of appeals and the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly….

[6] VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. . .. (Emphasis added)

[7] As stated by another Virginia attorney. Chief Justice Marshall, “[We judge] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816) (Emphasis added).

[8]The Court held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, “[t]he powers to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).

[9] See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

[10] Federalist 47, p. 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”

[11] As Virginia Circuit Judge the Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, wrote, “The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to write laws that the legislature failed to enact, or to repeal those that violate no recognizable constitutional principle, or to amend laws that are reasonably adequate but nonetheless can be improved upon. As Thomas Jefferson put it, a judiciary that pushes beyond these limits would place us all under the “despotism of an oligarchy” —one flatly at odds with the democratic principles of our republic.” VSB Journal, Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, Law & Politics: The Imperative of Judicial Self‑Restraint, (2004). at p.5.

[12] VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirm that there is no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

[13] “A judgment which is void . . . is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448].

[14] The United States Supreme Court has observed in, United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961): “[A] democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”

[15] The famed 19th-century orator Daniel Webster rightly noted, “[t]here can be no office in which the sense of responsibility is more necessary than in that of a judge; especially of those judges who pass, in the last resort, on the lives, liberty, and property of every man. The judiciary power, on the other hand, acts directly on individuals. The injured may suffer without sympathy or the hope of redress. The last hope of the innocent, under accusation and in distress, is in the integrity of his judges. If this fail, all fails, and there is no remedy on this side the bar of Heaven.” Daniel Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1851), Vol. III, pp. 6‑7.

DEPRIVED OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT AND TRIAL BY JURY OF THE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF MALFEASANCE AND BUSINESS CONSPIRACY.

17 Sunday Sep 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Uncategorized

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Under common law, Article I, Bill of Rights, Section 11 of the VA Const.,[1] and the 7th Amendment to the U.S. Const., it is a fundamental right to a jury trial-not to a judge-which determined whether government officers, including judges, were to be held accountable in either civil or criminal jury trials for misbehavior.

Both the U.S. Const. and VA Const. confirmed an absolute right to civil jury trial of the evidence of malfeasance.[2] See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).[3]

Thus, there never was absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority, but more importantly, the factual issues were to be decided by a jury hearing the evidence, see Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995). Therefore, an action will lie for unlawful malfeasance and the business conspiracy to issue and enforce the void ab initio orders issued as part of an illegal enterprise.

[1] Article I, Bill of Rights, Section 11. Due process of law; obligation of contracts; taking or damaging of private property; prohibited discrimination; jury trial in civil cases.

That no person shall be deprived of his . . .property without due process of law; that the General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; . . ..

That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. . ..

[2] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)

[3] See Justice John F. Molloy, The Fraternity: Lawyers and Judges in Collusion, Paragon House (2004). “When a lawyer puts on a robe and takes the bench, he or she is called a judge. But in reality, when judges look down from the bench they are lawyers looking upon fellow members of their fraternity. In any other area of the free-enterprise system, this would be seen as a conflict of interest. When a lawyer takes an oath as a judge, it merely enhances the ruling class of lawyers and judges. . .. How can they be expected not to be beholden to those who elevated them to the bench? When they leave the bench, many return to large and successful law firms that leverage their names and relationships.”

Accountability for Violation of the Common Law By Acts Outside the Sphere of Legislative/Judicial Authority and Employment

~ accountability for unlawful acts, treason, malfeasance, independent advocates, Judicial Branch

Category Archives: Denial of access to impartial court

NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND PRELIMINARY/ PERMANENT INJUNCTION

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE ACTION AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR THE EX POST FACTO RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998 BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA.

NOTICE OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT FOR THE RETROACTIVE ADOPTION IN 2017 OF SUP. CT VA UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES PROMULGATED IN 1998

Request to US Attorneys for EDVA and DC, as well as FBI for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.

REQUEST TO THE HONORABLE RALPH S. NORTHAM TO MEET TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIRGINIA’S ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES IN VIOLATION OF ART. VI OF VA CONST., AND VA CODE.

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA’S COURT RULES VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, VA CODE, THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, AND THE MANDATE OF DUE PROCESS UNDER 5TH AND 14TH AMEND TO U.S. CONSTITUTION.

Article IV of the Constitution of Virginia Restrictions, Limitations and Prohibitions on the Jurisdiction and Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court of Virginia

DEPRIVED OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT AND TRIAL BY JURY OF THE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF MALFEASANCE AND BUSINESS CONSPIRACY.