• AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION TO THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD
  • Challenging on going violations of VA Const. and VA Code during 10 min. argument to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia and Panel: Isidoro Rodriguez vs. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (No 191136).
  • EMAIL 03/21/2021-TO GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF SECURING JUDICIAL BRANCH ACCOUNTABLITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS TO VIOLATE U.S. REPUBLIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
  • ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT HIS BEING THE 2019 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY SENATE DISTRICT 035 SEAT
    • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PETITION FOR APPEAL, RECORD NO. ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner Pro Per, v. The General Assembly of Virginia, The Office of the Governor of Virginia, The Supreme Court of Virginia, The Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, The Virginia State Bar, and The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Defendants-Respondents.
  • MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF LITIGATION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998
  • Motion For Preliminary/Permanent Injunction Of Va Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) And Va Code § 8.01-223.2 (2017), Filed in Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, SCOTUS Docket No. 20-25
  • MOTION TO ENPANEL A SPECIAL GRAND JURY FOR VIOLATION OF VA CODE §§ 18.2 481 & 482 AND VA CODE § 18.2 499, TO “[RESIST] THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY”
  • NOTICE OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW BY ENACTMENT OF EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION IN 2017 TO RETROACTIVELY ADAPT UNCONSTITUTIONAL SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA RULES ISSUED IN 1998
  • ORAL ARGUMENT TO SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PANEL FREDERICKSBURG, VA August 22, 2019 ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ v. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., NO. 190579
  • Petition for Congressional Investigation of Government Attorneys, Employees, and Justices/Judges Self-proclaimed Impunity and Absolute Immunity from Accountability for Misprision of Felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 241 & 242 and VA Code §§ 18.2 481 & 482.
    • PRESS RELEASE: SUIT AGAINST GOV’T ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION
  • Petition for Oversight Investigation of Government Employees, including Attorneys, Judges, and Justices for their Misprision of Felony and their Self-proclaimed Impunity and Absolute Immunity from Accountability.
  • PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

Systemic Denial of Access to an Impartial Court and Trial by Jury by the Virigina and Federal Judical Branches for Act Outside their Judicial Authority

~ Separation of power, Judicial accountability for unlawful acts, treason, malfeasance, Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine

Systemic Denial of Access to an Impartial Court and Trial by Jury by the Virigina and Federal Judical Branches for Act Outside their Judicial Authority

Category Archives: Denial of access to impartial court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PETITION FOR APPEAL, RECORD NO. ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner Pro Per, v. The General Assembly of Virginia, The Office of the Governor of Virginia, The Supreme Court of Virginia, The Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, The Virginia State Bar, and The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Defendants-Respondents.

06 Monday May 2019

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Federal Criminal Complaint for Misprison of a Felony, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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Accountability, Limitation under VA Const., Misprison of a felony by violation of right to due process, separation of power

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Circuit Court erred under VA Code § 1-200 (2005) in violation of the Common Law exception to Sovereign Immunity for acts outside the sphere of legislative authority, scope judicial authority, and scope of employment by the defiance of the separation of power under Art. I §§ 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.), the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., and the prohibition on ex post facto laws under Art. I § 9 VA Const., by enacting VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to retroactively adopt the 1998 court rules issued in violation of VA Code § 54.1 3915 (1950-2017), VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1950-2009), and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as alleged in Petitioner’s Complaint.

These errors were preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court denying Petitioner’s motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

2. The Circuit Court erred by a grave injustice in not impaneling a Special Grand Jury to investigate and report on the evidence of Class 2 & 6 Felony under VA Code §§18.2-481 & 482 to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority” and misdemeanor business conspiracy under VA Code 18.2-499 & 500, as alleged in Petitioner’s Complaint.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint.

3. The Circuit Court erred in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the use of Res Judicata to dismiss the Complaint.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court denying motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

4. The Circuit Court erred in granting Respondent’s Demure based on a misnomer, lack of standing and failure to state a claim.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Order of the Circuit Court denying motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

5. The Circuit Court erred in holding that the General Assembly cannot be served under court-ordered publication VA Code §§ 8.01-316(b) & 318.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Order of the Circuit Court denying the motion on February 22, 2019, and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

NATURE OF THE CASE/MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On November 14, 2018, Plaintiff-Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgement seeking equitable and monetary relief under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq., against Respondents, including entities created under Art. IV § 1 & 14, Art. V § 1, and Ar, VI § 1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”) respectively the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“General Assembly”), Office of the Governor of Virginia (“Office of the Governor”) and the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”), as well as the the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, the Virginia State Bar, and the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (”VSBDB”).

Rodriguez provided evidence (Plaintiff’s Ex A through V filed with the Complaint and thereafter Supplemental filings), establishing that from 2003 to the present Respondents during the administrations of Governors Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Bob McDonnell, Terry McAuliffe, and Ralph Northam, acted outside the sphere of their legitimate legislative activity, the scope of judicial authority, and employment to unlawfully expand the power of the Court by violating: (a) the separation power under Art. I § 5 VA Const. and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const.; (b) the amending procedures under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.; (c) the prohibition under Art. I § 9 VA Const on the enactment of ex post facto legislation; and, (d) the right to due process under Art. I §§ 11 & 15 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by a  business conspiracy and Class 2 & 6 felony VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

In response to Rodriguez’s petitions to the General Assembly for an investigation, and complaints to the OAS and the UN for the surreal grant of “impunity” for acts outside fo legal authority (www.isidororodriguez.com), Respondents in 2017 enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to expand the power of the Court by retroactively “conform[ing] the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6, issued in 1998 that created a “parallel” centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control, establishment of the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys and appointing VSBDB members as judges.  The motive for violation of Art. I § 5 VA Const. and VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017) restrictions on the Court was to defy the rights of all citizens of the independent decentralized legal profession established in 1932 under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1950-2009).

All other the Respondents were serviced by the Sheriff on November 28, 2018, but the General Assembly refused to accept service. On December 26, 2018, Rodriguez filed an affidavit under oath that the General Assembly refused to accept service by the Sheriff at the General Assembly Building, Richmond, VA, declined to name an agent for service, and refused all U.S. postal service mail.  On January 2, 2019, the Circuit Court issued an Order of Publication by the Washington Times on January 10, 17, 24, and 31, 2019.  On January 31, 2019, the newspaper filed a Notarized Affidavit of Publication.  Rodriguez filed on February 8, 2019, a motion for Default Judgement against the General Assembly for failure to appear as Ordered.

On January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019, the Circuit Court denied all of Rodriguez’s motions for (1) an injunction of the VSBDB 2006 Void Ab Initio Order unlawfully revoking Rodriguez’s license to practice law for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights and rights as a father; (2) a Writ Quo Warrento against Respondents; (3) an injunction of ex post facto VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017); (4) for a Special Grand Jury; and, (5) for Default against the General Assembly for failure to answer/appear pursuant to court-ordered publication.

On February 21, 2019, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Respondents’ Plea to Dismiss based on Sovereign Immunity, Res Judicata and Demurrer.  The Circuit Court dismissed Rodriguez’s Complaint, over specific objections. Rodriguez filed on March 12, 2019, a Notice of Appeal and Notice of Filing of the Transcript.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Citizens ratified Art. I § 5 VA Const., to mandate the separation of power between the General Assembly, the Office of the Governor, and the Court.

Based on the open distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court expressly of the drafters of the VA Const., the Citizens ratified Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., to give only to the General Assembly the power to enact statutes giving judicial authority, establishing lower courts, and appointing judges.  Also, the Citizens ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const., to reserve to themselves the power to amend the constitutional restrictions on the Court.

In 1932 in response to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249, at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) (“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added), the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”) (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009), was passed to maintain the separation of power and restrictions on the Court by establishing a decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system authorizing the judicial power to discipline attorneys only to County Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal, and explicitly denying the Court power to discipline attorneys directly (VA Code § 54.1‑3934, giving only to the Board of Bar Examiners power to revoke an attorney’s license).

To assure the Court’s compliance with the decentralized attorney disciplinary system, Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1 3915 (1950-2017) prohibited the Court from promulgating court rules or regulations inconsistent with VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009). See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

However, in defiance of the prohibitions on the Court, the Respondents used legal sophistry to interpret VA Code § 54.1‑3909 & 3910 to issue Rule Part 6, ( IV to establish a “parallel” centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control by issuing court rules in 1998 to give judicial authority the VSBDB as a “lower court” to discipline attorneys, and to appoint VSBDB members as “judges.” (Respondents Admissions and the Circuit Court order, Transcript of 02/21/2019 hearing pages 33 and 34).

Shortly after that, in retaliation for Rodriguez’s litigations during the Clinton/Bush Administrations Washington D.C./Virginia Lobbyist/Lawyer Oligarchy under the stewardship of Eric Holder undertook a business conspiracy in violation of VA Code 18.2-499 & 500 to damage Rodriguez’s Federal pro hoc vice litigation practice, reputation, profession and property rights.  Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and Mr. Jack Harbeston (former Managing Partner of Rodriguez’s clients Sea Search Armada and Armada Company (“SSA”) dissolved in 2002) filed in 2003 two fraudulent VSBDB bar complaints against Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights: (a) in a Choate Virginia Attorneys’ Lien under VA Code § 54.1-3932 on SSA’s contract claim to 50% of the Treasure Trove (USD 18 Billion) on the sunken Spanish 1707 Galleon San Jose; and, (b) as a father pursuant to Treaty, VA Code, and Joint Custody Agreement (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

On November 27, 2006, the VSBDB issued a Void Ab Initio Order usurping judicial authority to revoke Rodriguez’s license for litigating to enforce statutory rights. This Court affirmed in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia, (Va. Sup. Ct No. 07-0283, VSB Docket Nos. 04-052-0794 and 04-052-1044), cert denied Nos. 07-A142 and 07A370 (2007).  See also Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia et al., (S. Ct. No. 07-419, November 2, 2007).

Rodriguez filed two administrative claims in 2007 under the common law and Virginia Tort Claims Act VA Code ( 8.01-195 challenging the VSBDB void ab initio order, and filed civil actions seeking damages.

But Respondents systematically denied access to an impartial common law jury trial and courts to deny challenges the VSBDB void ad initio order and to enforce Rodriguez’s Choate Attorney’s Lien.  In violation of their judicial authority, the courts assume away the Common Law exception to the claim of either sovereign immunity, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine bar to the use of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or stare decisis. See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796) (void order holding the VSBDB absolute immune for violation of the VA Const. and VA Code); see Plaintiff’s Ex. G1 filed with the Complaint listing the use of the VSBDB void ab initio order; see also, Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB et al., (2013) EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney surreally issued an unpublished nationwide void order granting “impunity” by enjoining and prior restraining the filing future federal litigation challenging the violations of due process, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Code).

In response to Rodriguez’s complaints to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS (P-926-16), and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the General Assembly on January 9, 2017, enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to expand the power of the Court by retroactively “conform[ing] the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to the unlawful Court’s rule.

In response Rodriguez’s January 5, 2019 petition, in violation of Art. IV §14 ¶4(18) House Bill No 2111 was introduced on January 9, 2019, as Special Legislation to give immunity from accountability to government attorneys and judges from civil liability for their business conspiracy since 2003 (Supplemental Filing on February 21, 2019).

AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN VIOLATING THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTION TO THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. (Assignment of Error No. 1)
  2. The Standard of Review Is De Novo.

“The legal question presented by a circuit court’s decision to sustain a demurrer requires the application of a de novo standard of review.” Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 284 Va. 102, 106, 726 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2012) (citing Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County, 266 Va. 550, 544, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003)). “On appeal, a plaintiff attacking a trial court’s judgment sustaining a demurrer need only show that the court erred, not that the plaintiff would have prevailed on the merits of the case.” Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006).

  1. UNDER THE COMMON LAW THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS VIOLATING THE VA CONST., VA CODE, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

At the outset, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 1-200 (2005), to mandate that the,

“The Common Law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA. Code § 1-10; 2005. (Emphasis added)

Thus, the English Common Law controls all judicial decisions, except when the General Assembly specifically enacted legislation to change the Common Law rule.

Regarding the defense of Sovereign Immunity, Common Law only permitted its use when a defendant was acting within the legal authority.  This is consistent with the Magna Carta which held officials and judges accountable for acts outside of their legal authority and jurisdiction.  As explained by Sir Edward Coke, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41,

[W]hen a Court has. . . has no [judicial authority or] jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [not before a person who a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . . (Emphasis added)

The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), held that an action for equitable relief and damages would lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of a criminal enterprise outside of legal authority, and the facts were to be decided by a common law trial by jury. Thus, the Common Law provided for accountability and removal of officials and judges for acts outside of their jurisdiction and judicial authority, 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.

The Common Law did not permit the defense of Sovereign Immunity to allow the aiding and abetting of unlawful acts outside of governmental functions.

Regarding the Common Law and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 140 (1803), held that,

“[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”

Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order as a lower court-it is a void ab initio order as a complete nullity from the date of its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95 (1987).

Consistent with the Common Law, VA Code §8.01-195.3, to permit the holding of a judge or government attorney accountable with no immunity from tort suit for acts outside of the scope of employment or judicial authority or jurisdiction (relief from tort liability apply only to actions within “official capacity”).  In Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. at 229 and 230, 22 S.E.2d at 12 and 13 (1942), the court held that sovereign immunity applies only when government entities, officials, or employees were “acting legally within the scope of their employment.”  Thus, Respondents cannot claim Sovereign Immunity for:

(A) Acts outside the scope of employment, Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Rodriguez argued/won before the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse to USCA 4th Cir., to obtain the holding that there was a right to a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury on the alleged acts of government employees acts outside the scope of employment); See also Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988).

(B) Grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994);

(c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); or,

(4) Acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996).

Rodriguez under the Common Law is only required to prove that Respondents have acted outside the scope of legislative authority, judicial authority, or employment in violation of the VA Const, and VA Code.  Therefore the Circuit Court erred because there is no absolute immunity from equitable and injunctive relief for the acts in violation of the limitations and prohibitions under Art. I § 5 & 9 VA Const., Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., and, Art. XII § 1 VA Const.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN NOT EMPANELING A SPECIAL GRAND JURY TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON THE EVIDENCE OF WILLFUL ACTS OUTSIDE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY. (Assignment of Error No. 2)

The record confirms that neither courts nor prosecutors have investigated Rodriguez’s criminal complaint (Plaintiff’s Ex. K filed with the Complaint).  But, as explained in U.S. v. Udzuela, 671 F.2d 995 (1982, Ill.),

Strictly speaking, the grand jury is a constitutional fixture in its own right, belonging to neither the executive nor the judicial branch, see United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied; United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C.Cir.1973); In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1956) (Emphasis added)

The Handbook for Virginia Grand Juries-City of Charlesville, explains that under the Common Law the Special Grand Jury serves as a quality control device on government, or more appropriately, serves as a (watchdog( against the wrongdoing. See Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (Developed the issues that led to the Declaration of Independence).

Under VA Code § 19.2-211, a Special Grand Jury is allowed to investigate wrongdoing and crimes, but not to indict.  Vihko v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 413 (VA.C. App 1990) (the evidence gathered by the Special Grand Jury is presented to the regular grand jury, which may indict).

Here the evidence is that both the Respondents and the Circuit Court have misinterpreted VA Code § 54.1‑3909 & 3910, to circumvent the prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and  VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017) violate the 1932 Act’s decentralized attorney discipline system under VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1950-2009).

This evidence confirms the ongoing violations of the VA Const., and VA Code, by the Class 2 & 6 felony VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 to, “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority,” and business conspiracy in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499 & 500.

Under Va. Code §19.2-191 and § 19.2-206, a Special Grand Jury may be convened by the circuit court at any time upon the court’s own motion to investigate and report any condition which involves or tends to promote criminal activity.  Furthermore, the 2007 ed. of the Handbook for Virginia Grand Jurors at page 16, published by Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, states that ([a]ny Citizen . . . may ask the Circuit Court of a county to convene a Special Grand Jury. (  Therefore, a Circuit judge may impanel a Special Grand Jury to investigate a crime and malfeasance upon the request of a citizen of Virginia.  See 70-71 Va. AG 106A; See also 156 ALR 330.

Finally, under VA Code §§ 8.01-186 and 8.01-188 the Circuit Court was given the power to grant further relief “whenever necessary and proper,” this includes the ability to impanel a Jury or logically a Special Grand Jury–to investigate the Respondents violations of the Common Law, VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ad Initio Doctrine.  Thus, the Circuit Court erred in permitting the Special Grand Jury to be captured by the Respondents.

III. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY VIOLATING THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE RESTRICTION BY ITS USE OF RES JUDICATA.  (Assignment of Error No. 3)

 

It is a fundamental doctrine of due process under the common law, the VA. Const. VA Code, and the U.S. Const., that Rodriguez as the party affected must have his day before a validly constitutionally created impartial court and had an opportunity to a common law trial by a jury of the business conspiracy outside legal authority. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 6 S Ct 1194 (1886).

But, the VSBDB and this Court have not issued a valid judgment by their violations of the VA Const., and VA Code limitations, prohibitions and protections of due process. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 (1876).  See also Restatements, Judgments 4(b).

In violation of the mandates of separation of power and due process under Marbury v. Madison, supra., Art. I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const., and Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017), and VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009) in 2006 the VSBDB issued an unlawful Void Ab Initio Order revoking Rodriguez’s license as an attorney for litigating to enforce his statutory rights.  Compounding this illegal act, this Court issued a void order affirming. However, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), holds that,

Since the adoption of the [VA Const.] and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of void judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added)

But the record confirms this was never done (Plaintiff’s Exhibit G1).      All of the courts issued void order outside of their jurisdiction and constitutional authority in violation of the common law exception to the claim of sovereign immunity and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to grant government employees and judges “impunity” for violations of the VA Const., and VA Code.  Court records confirm that all of the dismissals were for lack of venue “without prejudice,” or specifically “declined to rule on [Respondents] plea of res judicata,” or and did not address the allegations of a business conspiracy. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct. App. N. 07-5334enied US Sup Ct. 08-411(2008); see also,  injunction denied SC Ct. No. 07A601, cert. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Hassell et al., Fairfax Circuit Court No. CL-2007-15396, VA S. Ct. No. 081146, cert. denied 08-574 (2008). See petitions for redress to the General Assembly (Plaintiff’s Exhibit D and I), Complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and a Petition with the United Nations Committee on Human Rights for the grant of “impunity” (see  http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

As explained in Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390 (2007) that held,

(An order that is void ab initio is a complete nullity that may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. ( (quoting Singh v. Mooney, supra.) Furthermore “[a]n order is void ab initio rather than merely voidable, if ‘the character of the judgment was not such as the court had the power to render, or because the mode of procedure employed by the court was such as it might not lawfully adopt'” (quoting Evans v. Smyth‑Wythe Airport Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 73(1998); Morgan v. Russia and Triangle Assocs., L.L.C., 270 Va. 21, 26‑27 (2005).

The Circuit Court violated the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine and the Common Law by its use of res judicata.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DEMURE BASED ON LACK OF STANDING, MISNOMER, AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. (Assignment of Error No. 4)
  2. Rodriguez has Standing

The Complaint is filed based upon the willful violation of the limitations and prohibitions under Art. I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., Art. XII § 1 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as well as the particularized damage to Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession and property rights.

Since 2003 Rodriguez was deprived of his fundamental right to his pro hoc vice law practice, reputation, profession, and property right in his Choate Virginia statutory Attorney’s Lien based the use of unconstitutional Court’s rules.  Since January 2017 the General Assembly enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to retroactively “conform” the statute to the unlawful court rules.

Thus, Rodriguez has standing as a citizen of Virginia and as an attorney injured by the VSBDB void ab initio order under the holding in Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016), where this Court held that citizens have standing if there is “sufficient interest” and “the parties will be actual adversaries.” Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984)).

To claim standing Rodriguez need only “demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” to assure a court, “that the issues will be fully and fairly developed.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001).

That standard is easily satisfied given the litigation record (Plaintiff’s Ex. G1 filed with the Complaint) and the evidence of the business conspiracy by the violation of legally protected interest mandated by the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., before the separation of power under Art. I § 5 & 9, and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const, can be altered between the General Assembly and the Supreme of Virginia.

Also, these injuries are “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 460, and both concrete and particularized to Rodriguez given the systematic denial of access to Common Law trial by a jury of the evidence of the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine in any Federal court based on the Hon J. Gibbons surreal nationwide prior restraint and injunction.  See Damian Stinnie et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 US Dist. Ct W.D. VA, Charlottesville (December 21, 2018) (Supplemental Authority filed with the Circuit Court on December 26, 2018).

  1. Misnomer

The Circuit Court dismisses based on “misnomer,” holding that Respondents could not be sued as entities in their respective constitutional titles, but rather must be sued as individuals. (Transcript page 32).

The VA Const., specifically name and empower the General Assembly (not the House of Delegates and Senate), the Governor, and the Court as constitutional entities under Art. I § 5, VI, ( 1, 5, and 7, and Art. XII § 1 VA Const.  Thus, the Circuit Court erred because:

First, the restrictions and the mandate of separation of power under Art. I § 5 VA Const. and Art. § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. and logic is that the constitutional entities name, not in the individual’s designation of an office holder from 2003 to the present, are to be held accountable for constitutional violations.

The New York Court of Appeals held in Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1144 (N.Y. 1996), that the entity, as well as the individual, are liable so to deter deprivations of state constitutional rights because no government can sustain itself when the law immunizes official violations of substantive rules leaving victims without any realistic remedy. As constitutional officers, the acts will be a violation of the oath of their respective duties of the office, and grounds for removal from office.  As explained in Clea v. Mayor and City Council of Maryland, 541 A.2d 1303 at 1314 (Md. 1988):

“To accord immunity to the responsible government officials, and leave an individual remediless when his constitutional rights are violated, would be inconsistent with the purpose of the constitutional provisions.”

Second, the evidence is that since 2003 it has been the constitutional entities, not just the individual that held office during the administrations of Governors Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Bob McDonnell, Terry McAuliffe, and Ralph Northam – who have been involved in the business conspiracy to systemically violate the VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

Third, logic dictates that the action for the violation of the VA Const. and VA Code, be against the constitutional entities not restricted to the individual office holders.

Thus, the Circuit Court erred.

  1. Rodriguez has Stated a Cause of Action

The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine holds that Rodriguez has a right to challenge and attacked in any court at any time, (directly or collaterally.( Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987). Thus, Rodriguez has stated a cause of action where relief is to be granted.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE SERVED UNDER VA CODE §§ 8.01-316(B) & 318 BY COURT-ORDERED PUBLICATION. (ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5)

The General Assembly refused to answer or otherwise defend below-despite repeated notice by Circuit Court order of publication under VA Code § 8.01-318.

Under VA Code § 8.01-317 upon receipt of proof of publication” by the affidavit from the Washington Times on January 31, 2019, the clerk of court must enter a default against the Defaulted General Assembly before or on February 21, 2019. Once the clerk enters default, the Court must take as true the factual allegations in the Complaint for Declaratory Judgement. AME Fin. Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392-93 (2011).  There is no exception to Chapter 8, Process requirements.

In Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that as a constitutional entity a state legislature has the standing to sue, and logically be sued.  Thus, subject to service of process under VA Code by the Sheriff or by publication.

Thus, the Circuit Court erred in ordering that the General Assembly cannot be served by publication.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant review to correct the errors of the Circuit Court.

Dated: May 2, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez, Pro Per, Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180, (571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

 

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ’S COMMENT (SPEAKER #31) AT THE PUBLIC FORUM ON JAN. 5, 2019 AT 0900hrs. TO THE NOVA GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS PRIOR TO THE 2019 SESSION

07 Monday Jan 2019

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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(The hearing was televised live on Fairfax County Television Channel 16 (Channel 1016 in HD on Cox; Channel 16 on Verizon or Comcast), and can also be viewed online through the Channel 16 stream.)

            Good Morning, I am Isidoro Rodriguez.  More than 55 years ago I took the oath to defend our constitutional system under our Republic against all enemies “foreign and domestic.”  That oath never expires.  Thus, I appear before you today not to ask for funds or any government largest, but demand that each of you abide by the oath you took for your office as a member of the General Assembly.

            In that context, my comment prior to all of you prior to the 2019 Session of the General Assembly of Virginia is to bring to the attention of each of you and the citizens of Virginia that each of you who were in office in February 2017 enacted an ex post facto VA Code § 54.1-3935 (2017) in violation of the mandate of separation or power by surreally “conform[ing] the statutory procedure” established in 1931 under VA Code § 54.1-3935 (1950) of a decentralized attorney discipline system to retroactively adopt unconstitutional 1998 Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) creating a centralized attorney discipline system to do away with independent attorneys.

            The evidence is that in February 2017 each of you, and in particular my representatives Senator Richard L. Saslaw and Delegate Marcus B. Simon-acted outside the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” by violating your oath of office, violating the prohibition under Art. I § 9 VA Const. against ex-post facto law, violating the mandate of separation of power between the General Assembly and the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) under Art. I § 5 VA Const., violating Art. VI § 1, 5, and 7 VA Const., and violating the amending procedure under XII § 1 VA Const.

            In summary:

            First, each of you refused to investigate my past petitions as to the Court’s the violation of the delegated rulemaking authority (See presentations to NOVA members of the General Assembly, https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ) (See also http://www.isidororodriguez.com complaint for the assertion of “impunity” for violation of the U.s. and Virginia constitutions filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights Complaints), but rather each of you who were in office in February 2017 surreally voted to enact an ex post facto law to retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1952)] for the disciplining of attorneys,” to the 1998 unconstitutional Court’s rules.

            Second, each of you who were in office in February 2017 usurped the exclusive amending power of the citizens of Virginia under XII § 1 VA Const. by enacting the ex post facto law expanding in violation of the mandate of separation of power-the Court’s authority retroactively by adopting the 1998 unconstitutional Court rules: (a) that unlawfully establish a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) that unlawfully created the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (VSBDB”) as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (b) that unlawfully permitted the Court to appoint VSBDB members as lower court judges.

            Thus, irrespective of being Democrat, Republican or Independent, citizens must take action to assure the separation of power and an independent legal profession not controlled by the Court.  Citizens must compel the General Assembly during this 2019 Session to vacate the ex-post facto law (See www.isidororodriguez.com).[1]

            After that, citizens must take action to compel the General Assembly and the Court’s compliance with the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. and VA Code, or if the citizens determine to amend the separation of power established since 1789 under Va Const. between the Legislative and Judicial Branch, citizens can direct the General Assembly to begin the constitutional amending procedures under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.[2]

Date: January 5, 2019

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

2671 Avenir Place, Apt 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

Mobile phone No. 571.477.5350

E-mail: busness@isidororodriguez.com

            [1] I note from 2010 thru 2017, each of you refused to inquire into my petitions and comments seeking an investigation of the Court’s defiance of the mandated decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system under Art. IV §§ 1, 5, and 7 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1‑3915 & § 54.1‑3935 (1952) by the Court’s issuance in 1998 of unconstitutional court rules in “clear absence of all [judicial authority and] jurisdiction” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9jBOJ34sa8&feature=youtu.be).  Thus, I have filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Cir. Ct., Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, 11/14/2018), and a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Cir. Ct., Docket No. CL-2018-0016433, 11/19/2018) to challenge the ex post facto law and seek a binding adjudication of my rights under the common law, VA Const. and VA Code by obtaining accountability for acts outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity by the General Assembly, acts outside scope of employment by the Office of the Governor and Attorney General, and acts outside of judicial authority by the Supreme Court of Virginia et al., by a Class 2 felony VA Code§§ 18.2‑481 & 482 to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority” by their business conspiracy to damage my law practice, reputation, profession, and property rights.

[2] However, I note and stress that it was Patrick Henry in 1988, as well as the other original drafter of the both the VA and U.S. Constitutions who mandated the separation of power, because they observed,

“[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

 

38.901223 -77.265260

VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO COMMAND THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD TO STATE UNDER WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE VA CONST. AND VA CODE THEY WERE GIVEN JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO ACT AS A LOWER COURT

29 Saturday Dec 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code

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            Under VA Code § 8.01-644, and the common law,[1] Plaintiff, Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), respectfully petition this Court based upon Art. I § 1, 5, 11 & 15, and Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 of the Constitutions of Virginia (“VA. Const.”), and  VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (2009) for the issuance of writs of mandamus to Respondent/Defendant Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”), and for grounds in support thereof states:

  1. THE RELIEF SOUGHT

            Rodriguez seeks entry of a writ of Mandamus[2] commanding the respondent/defendant VSBDB to cite the provisions of VA Const. and VA Code under which the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) gave it judicial authority as a lower court and appoint its members as judges to discipline attorneys?

  1. WRIT OF MANDAMUS

           The writ of Mandamus “orders a person, usually some official of the executive branch of the government, or the judge of a lower court, to carry out some affirmative action.”   In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  For a writ of mandamus to issue, “[1] there must be a clear right in the petitioner to the relief sought, [2] there must be a legal duty on the part of the respondent/defendant to perform the act which the petitioner seeks to compel, and [3] there must be no adequate remedy at law.” Board of City. Supervisors of Prince William City. v. Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584 (1976).  “Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel performance of a purely ministerial duty, but it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.” Supra.

  • THE FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES PRESENTED

             The Citizens of Virginia ratified Art. I § 5 VA Const. to mandate separation of power between the General Assembly, the Court and the Executive Branch of government.

            The Citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI §§ 1,[3] & 7[4] VA Const. to authorize only the General Assembly to enact legislation to give judicial authority, to establish lower courts to the Court, and to appoint lower court judges.  These constitutional powers/restrictions which the citizens ratified can neither be delegated nor circumvented.

            The Citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI, ‘ 5[5] VA Const. prohibited the Court from promulgating court rules that would conflict with statutory rights.

            The Citizens of Virginia ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const. to give only to themselves the power to amend these constitutional restrictions on the General Assembly and the prohibitions on the judicial authority and jurisdiction of the Court.

            Therefore, under Art. 1, 5, and 7 VA Const., and the controlling president of Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) and Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), only the General Assembly has the exclusive legislative powers to establish by statute a statewide attorney disciplinary system by making suspension or revocation of an attorneys license in a particular circuit court effective in all other courts of Virginia.

            Based upon that holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), the General Assembly enacted in 1932 the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”) (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950), to establish a statewide decentralized attorney disciplinary system to give judicial authority and jurisdiction to discipline attorneys only to each County Circuit Court established/appointed by the General Assembly.[6]

            Consistent with the original constitutional draftsmen open distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court specifically, [7] as well as the prohibition under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., the 1932 Act delegated to the Court only limited authority to prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules of unprofessional conduct, but specifically prohibited the Court from Apromulgating rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute@ i.e. VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950). See VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1988).

            For more than eighty-nine (89) years, from 1932 until 2017, the General Assembly did not amend the 1932 Act’s decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system, see VA Code 54.1-3935 (1932 thru 2009), to enact legislation augmenting the Court authority to issue court rules to create the VSBDB as a lower court to discipline attorneys or appoint VSBDB members as judges.

            A review of the legislative history to the 1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B2 filed with the Complaint for Declaratory Judgement) confirms that the entire General Assembly rejected any change and only accepted and ratified the Senate bill which did not delegate any expanded new rulemaking power to the Court.

The legislative history to the 1998 amendment confirms that the entire General Assembly specifically rejected the House bill (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B4 filed with the Complaint for Declaratory Judgement) proposal to delegate expanded rulemaking power to the Court, thereby rebuffing Court’s rules: (a) creating a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the control of the Court; (b) giving judicial power to discipline attorneys to the VSBDB as a “lower court;” and, (c) permitting the Court and Defendant Virginia State Bar (“VSB”) to appoint VSBDB members as “lower court” judges.

However, in defiance of the General Assembly’s rejection of the House proposal, in 1998 the Court still put into effect Rule Part 6, ‘ IV (Plaintiff’s Ex. C) to establish a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control, created the VSBDB as a “lower court” with judicial power to discipline attorneys, and appointed VSBDB members as “judges.”

            In 2004, in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2-499 a business conspiracy was commenced by Washington D.C. Lobbyist/former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and the Managing Partner of Rodriguez’s dissolve client, to injure Rodriguez’s international law business, reputation, profession, statutory property rights by their filing two fraudulent VSBDB complaints against Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on the client’s claim to a 50% share to $18 Billion USD of treasure trove and for Rodriguez litigating to enforce his rights as a father right pursuant to the Hague Convention, VA Code, and Joint Custody Agreement (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

            On November 27, 2006, based only on unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, ‘ IV  surreally giving the VSBDB judicial authority and jurisdiction to discipline an attorney, the VSBDB issued a Void Ab Initio Order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce statutory rights  (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

            To challenge the unconstitutional Court’s rule and the VSBDB void ad initio order, Rodriguez filed two administrative claims under the common law and Virginia Tort Claims Act VA Code ‘ 8.01-195 by Certified Mail respectively on June 8, 2005, and November 8, 2007, No. 7004-1350-0001-7098-4500, and No. 7004-0750-0000-8170-5576. (Plaintiff’s Ex. E)

            In response, in violation of Art. I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const., Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const., and the common law,[8] Defendant Attorney General of Virginia abused and misstated the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the common law (Plaintiff’s Ex. H3) so to deny access to a common law jury trial[9] on the issue of acts outside of judicial authority to block any meaningful adjudication by an impartial court by filing motions for summary judgment to dismiss Rodriguez’s challenges to the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and VSBDB void ad initio order, Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796) (surreal void order issued in defiance of the common law to declare absolute immunity and unaccountability for violation of the VA Const. and VA Code). (Plaintiff’s Ex. F and G)

            Subsequently, Rodriguez was again deprived of due process by the summary disbarring from Federal practice based on the refusal to review the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and the VSBDB void ad initio order (Plaintiff’s Ex. G1, list of void ab initio orders) (See Plaintiff’s Ex. G2, relevant parts of the United States Tax Court void disbarment order use of legal sophistry to disregard the prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & & VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine).

            Based upon this evidence of willful violations of the common law and VA Const./VA Code by systematically denying Rodriguez of access to an impartial court and a common law trial by jury to challenge the Court’s rule and the VSBDB void ab initio order, Rodriguez’s filed a federal action under the common law and federal civil rights statutes,[10] Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB et al., (2013) EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663. (Plaintiff’s Ex. H1 and H2)

            In response, in 2011 Defendant Office of Attorney General again violated the common law, VA Const/VA Code, and the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. by misuse of sovereign immunity to file a motion for summary judgment and monetary sanctions (Plaintiff’s Ex. H3).

            In violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Code, the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney used stare decisis/res judicata to issue an unpublished void order (https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5), in 2013 to enjoin and prior restrain Rodriguez from filing future federal litigation challenging the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and the VSBDB void ab initio order (aff’d https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).

            In response to this surreal federal court’s void order issued in defiance of the common law granting impunity and unaccountability for the violations of Art. I §§ 11 & 15, and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the 5th, 7th, & 14th Amend. U.S. Const., Rodriguez petitioned for redress the General Assembly (Plaintiff’s Exhibit D and I) (See http://www.isidororodriguez.com) (See also presentation in 2010 to NOVA General Assembly members https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (see  http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

            The General Assembly’s reaction in January 2017 was as follows:

  • To violate the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. by enacting in 2017 an ex post facto alteration to the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system established, instituted and unchanged for more than 85 years in the Commonwealth since 1932 under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2098), by enacting VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to unconstitutionally retroactively “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” by adopting Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6; and,
  • To violate the citizen’s mandate of separation of power and the citizen’s control of amending the Constitution of Virginia under Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 and XII § 1 VA Const. by retroactively adopting in 2017 Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6: (a) to surreptitiously establish under the Court’s control a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system; (b) to surreptitiously establish VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) to surreptitiously adopt the Court’s appointment of VSBDB members as

I. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A WRIT

A.        Petitioner Has a Clear Right to the Relief Sought.

When the legislature delegates authority to the Court to promulgate regulations, those regulations must neither exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent with the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const., and VA Code. See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 34 Va. App. 273, 276, 540 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2001) (legislative enactment which delegates to authority to adopt rules does not permit adoption of inconsistent and illegal rules). [11]

Furthermore, “delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official. . .. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990) (Emphasis added).

            Thus, given Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. grant and prohibition of power only to the General Assembly to enact legislation to confer judicial authority, to create the lower courts, and to appoint lower court judges, the question which the VSBDB has systematically refused to address and answer since 2003 during the past fifteen years, is:

UNDER WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE VA CONST. AND VA CODE DID THE COURT HAVE LEGAL POWER TO GIVE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO THE VSBDB TO ACT AS A LOWER COURT, AND VSBDB MEMBERS TO ACT AS JUDGES WITH THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS?

            The obvious answer is that since the VSBDB is an entity only created sometime in 1998 under unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, ‘ IV (Plaintiff’s Ex. C), the VSBDB does not have any constitutional judicial authority, judicial power, or jurisdiction to render any order to discipline an attorney.  Therefore, based on the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the VSBDB order is void ab initio–and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner as a complete nullity from its issuance.  Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402, (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).  Thus, the 2006 VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights was invalid at the moment of issuance.

            The benchmark on the right of Rodriguez to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio order is the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), holding,

Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

            Therefore, Rodriguez has a right to a Writ of Mandamus to command the respondent/defendant VSBDB to explain under what law it has and is acting as a lower court with judicial authority.

  1. Petitioner Has a Right to Question the VSBDB Legal Authority.

            As the Court has explained in Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 13 S.E. 262, 263 (1891), “where the object is to enforce obedience to a public statute it has been invariably held that the writ is demandable of right.”  Thus, notwithstanding the holding in Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307 (1984),[12] consistent with the common law at the time of the ratifying of the VA Const., sovereign immunity does not make the VSBDB immune from a Writ of Mandamus seeking equitable relief.

              Dating back to 1613, under the common law there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of scope of employment and jurisdiction, and action for equitable relief and damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise, The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).[13]  It was Blackstone who first discussed various English common law statutes that provided for accountability and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction and judicial authority.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.  Thus, common law held that a right without a remedy is no right at all.[14]  To enforce the limitation and prohibitions, as well as their constitutional rights against the government, including the Court,[15] under the Common law, citizens can bring a civil suit for declarative and equitable relief in Virginia against the government or government officials for acts outside the scope of employment, legislative authority, and judicial authority in violation of the VA Const. and VA Code.

            Regarding quasi-judicial immunity for the VSBDB, it extends: (1) only if they are performing judicial functions, (2) only if acting within their jurisdiction; and (3) only if acting in good faith “acting within the scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311 at 321, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003) (the court explicitly declined to grant blanket immunity to non-prosecutorial conduct, stating, “We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.”)    See Hueston v. Kizer, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 280, 36-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2008) (court denied absolute immunity).[16]

            The VSBDB has legal duty to perform the act of responding to the Writ of Mandamus which Rodrigues seeks to compel.  The record confirms the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law jury trial to challenge the Court’s unconstitutional court rules, the VSBDB void ad initio order, and the alleged collusion to since 2003 to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[17] Board of City Supervisors of Prince William City. v. Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584 (1976).

  1. Petitioner Has No Adequate Remedy at Law.

Rodriguez seeks to enforce obedience to the VA Const., and VA Code by the VSBDB.  Rodriguez is authorized to seek that relief in this Court via mandamus.  The inquiry here is not only whether there is any alternative remedy, but also whether there is an “adequate” alternative remedy “at law” given the business conspiracy to damage Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, and property rights.

The record confirms that Rodriguez has no alternative to this Writ of Mandamus given the past 15 years of systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law trial by a jury of the VSBDB acts outside the scope of employment and acts outside of judicial authority.  This is confirmed by the enacting of VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) outside of the ‘sphere of legitimate legislative activity” by an ex post facto change to the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system established since 1932 to surreally retroactively “conform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6.

Respondent/Defendant VSBDB would not suffer any prejudice for complying with VA Const. and VA Code if this Court were to resolve this controversy via mandamus. Mandamus relief is appropriate where “[n]o prejudice was suffered by any party, and harm rather than good would result from sending the parties back to try the same issue, to be raised by different pleadings.” May v. Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 538 (1960).

In this case, all parties benefit from having this Court immediately and authoritatively decide the important constitutional questions presented in this case particularly based on the record of the General Assembly enacting ex-post-facto legislation in response to Rodriguez petitions since 2008 challenging the unconstitutional Court rules and the VSBDB void order, thus forcing Petitioners to seek mandamus.

            Finally, “the extraordinary nature of this litigation cannot be ignored as a factor in the overall decision.” Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 652 (7th Cir. 2012). It is imperative that access to an impartial court be provided to permit review and consideration of the validity of the Court rules and the VSBDB void ab Initio Order issued in violation of VA Const. and VA Code.

II.  PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

          For substantially all of the preceding reasons, Rodriguez is also entitled to a writ of prohibition. The writ of prohibition “commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which . . . the court is informed he is about to do.” In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 17 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). A writ of prohibition may serve to “suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The writ is used to restrain a government actor “either when he has no jurisdiction or when he exceeds his jurisdiction . . ..” In re Commonwealth, 222 Va. 454, 461 (1981).

          Here the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. And VA Code is clear.  Thus, by “exceeding the scope of [their] authority,” Respondent/Defendant VSBDB is acting ultra vires—that is, without judicial authority and “jurisdiction” of a court. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2013).

           It settled that “a party must establish . . . irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law, before a request for injunctive relief, will be sustained.” Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Va. 44, 61 (2008) (quotation marks omitted) (See Motion for Injunctive Relief filed 11/14/18). An action for injunctive relief plainly cannot be an “adequate remedy at law” when an injunction does not issue unless the movant establishes the “lack of an adequate remedy at law.” Id.  Here the record of the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law trial by a jury shows no adequate remedy at law.  Also, there is no adequate remedy because Petitioner who at almost 73 years old cannot be compensated for the injury to his health and shorten lifespan due to his heart attack caused by the stress of being unlawfully disbarred and unemploy as an attorney since 2006.

          Nor would a Circuit Court injunction remedy be “adequate.” A remedy is “adequate” only if it is “equally as convenient, beneficial, and effective as the proceeding by mandamus.” Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r of Va., 270 Va. 58, 64 (2005) (quotation marks omitted). To be adequate, a remedy “must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a perfect manner, at the present time and in the future, otherwise equity will interfere and give such relief and aid as the particular case may require.” McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 68 (1942) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). And in determining whether to issue the writ, “[c]onsideration must be given to the urgency that prompts the exercise of the discretion, the public interest, and interest of other persons, the results that will occur if the writ is denied, and the promotion of substantial justice.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 370–71 (2001).

          Time is of the essence.  This is apparent based upon the ex-post facto change to the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system by retroactively enacting in 2017 VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017).  This retroactive delegation of legislative power to the Court to “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6, obfuscates the issues by (a) accepting the Court’s control of a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system; (b) accepting as a lower court theVSBDB with judicial authority; and, (c) accept as  judges” VSBDB members appointed by the Court.

CONCLUSION

            For the preceding reason, all factors strongly support Rodriguez’s request.

 Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez, Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

                [1] VA Code § 1-200, states “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA Code § 1-10 (2005)

                [2] See Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al., Fairfax Cir. Ct. CL-2018-0016227, 11/14/198, Complaint for Declaratory Judgement, Plaintiff’s Exhibits A through M, and filed Motions.

[3] Article VI, § 1 VA Const., states in relevant part that judicial power shall be vested in courts of original or appellate jurisdiction “as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[4] Article VI, § 7 VA Const., states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[5] Art. VI § 5 VA Const., states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

                [6] See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

            [7] It was Patrick Henry who wrote, “[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

                [8] Consistent with the common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded, the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.

[9] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”

(Emphasis added) See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court to reverse the USCA for the 4th Circuit, to order a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury for acts outside the scope of employment.

            [10] The language of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity.  But the Supreme Court held in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967), that under this federal statute enacted in 1871 Congress did intend to incorporate only the existing common law immunities under the state constitution for lawful acts within the scope of employment, legislative and judicial authority-however, acts outside legal authority has no immunity. See Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).

                [11] Regarding the limits on the judicial authority of courts, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), held that “[c]ourts are constituted by authority, and they cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920).

                [12] “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden).  “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004).

[13] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable,

[W]hen a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .  Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

                [14] Consistent with the common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded, the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.  See also Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).

            [15] At common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply for: (A) acts outside the scope of employment, Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-25, 362 S.E.2d 699, 706 (1987); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968); Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942); Deeds v. DiMercurio, 30 Va. Cir. 532 (Albemarle County, 1991); (B) grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994); Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 452 S.E.2d 854 (1995); Meagher v. Johnson, 239 Va. 380, 389 S.E.2d 310 (1990); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 310, 321 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1984); Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 (1987); Bowers v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 245, 253, 302 S.E.2d 511 (1983); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980); (c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 362 S.E.2d 699 (1987); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967); Agyeman v. Pierce, 26 Va. Cir. 140 (Richmond 1991.; or (4) acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 457 S.E.2d 42 (1995) (immunity lost by showing of malice in a slander action); Harlow v. Clatterbuck. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986).

                [16] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Mr. Rodriguez argued and won a common law action before the U.S. Supreme Court holding that there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury on the alleged acts of federal government employees outside the scope of employment (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

[17] VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, makes it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority,” and the common law confirms that is no immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction.

NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND PRELIMINARY/ PERMANENT INJUNCTION

28 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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            The undersign Plaintiff at this moment provides in support of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq. the following supplemental authority:[1]

The Honorable Senior United States District JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON, Memorandum Opinion, and Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction Order of Injunction Unconstitutional VA Code, in Damian Stinnie, et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Moter Vehicles, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 United State District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division (December 21, 2018).

            Regarding the granting of a Declaratory Judgement and a preliminary injunction in the instant action to enjoin an unconstitutional ex post facto and retroactive provision of the Virginia Code, the opinion and order of the Hon. Senior District Judge Norman K Moon which is on point and relevant in the instant action to be considered by the Circuit Court.  This supplemental authority governs the issuance of an injunction based upon the controlling precedent of the four-part test under Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) and Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013).

            As a benchmark for the Circuit Court of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgemwent and the Motion for Injuction to be heard on January 4, 2019 at 0830, the Hon. Senior Judge Norman K Moon wrote at page 22 of in his Memorandum Opinion:

Other Winter Factors

The remaining factors governing a request for a preliminary injunction—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest—weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. First, where Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being violated, there is a presumption of irreparable harm. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1343 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987)) …. As for the remaining factors, the balancing of the equities and public interest, Fourth Circuit precedent “counsels that ‘a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional. If anything, the system is improved by such an injunction.’” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002)). (Emphasis added)

[1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018.  Affidavit to serve on the by publication filed on 12/19/18.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE ACTION AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR THE EX POST FACTO RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998 BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA.

28 Wednesday Nov 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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              Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed in the Fairfax County Circuit Court in November 2018 a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgement under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq.,[1] and filed a verified petition for Writ of Mandamus[2] under VA Code §8.01-644 to seek a binding adjudication of his rights under the common law of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”),[3] under Art. I § 5 & 9, Art VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and Art.XII § 1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”) and VACode § 54.1‑3935 (1998).

            At the outset, the suit is for the violation of Rodriguez’s right under Virginia common law to hold government attorneys accountable for acts outside the scope of employment and to hold justices/judges accountable for void ab initio orders outside of judicial authority.  The action is filed in the Fairfax Court Court because in 2013 the Hon. U.S. Dist. JudgeJohn A. Gibney, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the U.S.Supreme Court in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (April12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No13-1638, cert. Denied (Nov. 2013) systematically denied access to impartial court and a common law jury trial under Art. I § 11VA Const., the 5th, 7th & 14th Amend to the U.S. Const., VA Code § 801-336, and controlling common law precedent,[4] by (a)assuming away violation of the common law to grant absolute immunity from accountability for a business conspiracy to injure Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, and property right in violation of VA Code § 18.2.499 to grant “impunity”from accountability for violation of Art.VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the VoidAb Initio Order Doctrine[5] by the use of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”)unconstitutional court rules issued in 1998 to discipline Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights and rights as a father; and, (b) enjoining Rodriguez from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the UnitedStates involving,

“in any way his disbarment [by the VSBDB void ab initio order] or the allegations leading to his disbarment [by the federal courts based upon the VSBDB void ab initio order]. The Court further enjoins [Rodriguez] from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the United States against any of the defendants in this case, against any judge or retired judge, against any United States Attorney or member of aUnited States Attorney’s staff, against the Attorney General of Virginia or any past or present member of the Attorney General’s staff, and against the Virginia State Bar or any agents of the Bar. [Rodriguez] is further enjoined from filing any additional pleadings in the instant case, other than pleadings necessary to perfect and present an appeal.  [Rodriguez is further prior restrained from filing any other type of suit in the federal court by ordering that Rodriguez first files a motion] for leave of Court to file suit. . ..”

            Finally, the suit is based upon the subsequent evidence that in 2017 of the General Assembly of Virginia (“General Assembly”) compounded the above violations of the common law, VA Const., and VA Code, by disregarding Rodriguez’s petitions seeking an investigation of the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and Judge Gibney.’s violation of Virginia’s common law precedent of accountability for acts outside the scope of judicial authority and employment (Plaintiff’s Ex. I) (See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16 IACHR Petition) and Committee on Human Rights United Nations Complaint) (See also Presentations in January 2010 to NOVA members of the General Assembly https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ & https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), by:

  • Violating the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. against enacting ex-post-facto legislation outside “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,”Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951) to retroactively in2017  “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6 issued in 1998 (Plaintiff’sExhibit C) in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradleyv. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v.Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); and,
  • Usurping the power of citizens to amend the VA Const. under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. by violating the citizens’ mandate of separation of power under Art. I § 5, and Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., by retroactively changing the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system established since 1932 under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Ex. A) to expand the Court’s power by by revising VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)(Plaintiff’s Ex. J) to unlawfully delegate legislative authority by adopting unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 issued after 1998 established by court rules: (a) a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) VSBDB members asjudges.
  1. THE VIOLATION OF ART. I §§ 5 & 9, ART. VI § 1, 5, & 7, AND ART. XII § 1 VA CONST., BY THE EX POST FACTO DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE COURT.
  1. Decentralize Statewide Attorney Disciplinary System established by the 1932 Act.

            The original constitutional draftsmen of the VA Const. and U.S. Const. openly distrusted the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court specifically.  As Patrick Henry observed,

“[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between threebranches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse ofpower. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If wefail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually liveunder judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

            Thus, under Art. I § 5 VA Const.[6] the citizens of Virginia mandated the separation of power to create a“distribution grids, apportioning authority,” as a constitutional check on the three branches of government.[7]  Separation of power is necessary because as Thomas Jefferson wrote, history has shown, “the violation of the limitation and prohibitions under the VA Const. which define the separation of power would create a despotic government.”  Notes on the State of Virginia 196 1787).  Echoing this James Madison wrote that the U.S. Constitution, consistent with the VAConst. required the separation of power, because

 “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” (Emphasis added).

The Federalist Papers
No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103

            Consequently, to eliminate the risk of the Court creating a dangerous node of power,[8] the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI §§ 1,[9]and 7[10] VA Const. to authorize only the General Assembly to enact legislation giving judicial power, establishing “lower courts,” and appointing “judges” The citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI § 5[11]VA Const. to prohibit the Court from issuing rules either inconsistent with statutory rights, i.e. VA Code §§ 54-1-3935(A) (1998), or exceeding the scope of the rulemaking authority delegated to the Court by the General Assembly (the Court cannot issue rules to enact legislation), See VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 (2017).[12]  Finally, the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const. to restrict to themselves the authority to amend these limitations and prohibitions on the Court.[13]

            Under the holding of Ex Parte Fisher,6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) 624-25 (1835), under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. the judicial power to revoke a license to practice law is governed by statute, not court rules.  See In re: Johathan A. Moseley, Sup Ct. VA No 061237 (2007).

            Thus, in response to the holding in Ex Parte Fisher, supra., and, Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249 at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing the General Assembly enacted in 1932 the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”), to establish a decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system to give statewide effect to a lower court’s discipline of an attorney. The 1932 Act only delegated judicial authority only to each County circuit court to discipline attorneys. See When Has the Supreme Court of AppealsOriginal Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia,2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

            The 1932 Act limited the delegated authority to the Court to prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct. However, under Art. VI § 5 VA Const, the 1932 Act prohibited the Court from issuing rules inconsistent with rights under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A).  With this limited delegated authority, the Court formed the Virginia State Bar with the only the limited power of investigating complaints against attorneys to be exercised in each county by a Council and Investigating Committee. The function of the Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury fact-finding and had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney.  Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney by a Circuit Court, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction was the disciplining of an attorney given statewide effect. See Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942) (The constitutionality of the decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system upheld because the 1932 Act did not delegate any legislative powers).

            For more than eighty-nine (89) years from 1932 until 2017 there was no significant amendment to the 1932 Act’s decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system, see VA Code 54.1-3935 (1932 thru 2009). During these 89 years, the General Assembly neither enacted any statute establishing under the control of the Court the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial power nor appointed VSBDB members as lower court judges with the power to discipline attorneys.  It is important to underscore that the legislative history of the 1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) confirms that the entire General Assembly accepted and ratified the Senate bill which did not delegate any new rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B2), but specifically rejected the House bill expanding rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’sExhibit B3), because the General Assembly cannot delegate this power to legislate judicial authority, create lower court, and appoint judges.

  • The VSBDB void ab initio order.

            The U.S. Supreme Court established the benchmark on the right of Rodriguez to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio order, holding that,

 [s]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon thesubject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877)

            Thus, Rodriguez has sought answered the question during the past fifteen years of litigation:

UNDER WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE VA CONST. DID THE COURT HAVE TO ISSUE COURT RULES IN 1998 TO GIVE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, TO CREATE THE VSBDB AS A LOWER COURT TO DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS, AND TO APPOINT VSBDB MEMBERS AS JUDGES?

            As discussed above in response to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light,137 Va. 249, at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.)619 (1835) (“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added), and the restriction under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. granting power only to the General Assembly to give judicial authority, create “court”and appoint “judges,” the General Assembly enacted the 1932 Act (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935(1950), to establish a decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system by authorizing judicial power to discipline attorneys only to County Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal.  Therefore, because the VSBDB as an entity created by Court rules, it is obvious that based on the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine the VSBDB does not have any constitutional and statutory judicial authority, judicial power, or jurisdiction to render any valid order to discipline an attorney in Virginia.  The VSBDB order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.  Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390,402, (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v.Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).

            The 2006 VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D) was invalid at the moment of issuance.  Furthermore, the VSBDB void ab initio order under the common law may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally” because it has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. not subject t stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It is not entitled to enforcement. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.” 30A Am Jur. Judgments 44, 45; see also Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

  • The General Assembly cannot delegate its legislative power given to them by the citizens under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. to the Court to give judicial authority, to establish lower courts, and to appoint lower court judges.

            Separation of power is the benchmark of the constitutional prohibition on the General Assembly’s power to delegate legislative authority to the Court.  The “delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the [Court] in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990). See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 34 Va. App. 273, 276, 540 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2001) (noting legislative delegation does not permit adoption of inconsistent rules or regulations).

            As explained in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. at 253, 

It must be remembered that “revisors of statutes are presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statutes; and it is a well-settled rule that in the revision of statutes neither an alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the latter statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former act, excepting where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear.” 36 Cyc. 1067-8; Harrison & Byrd v. Wissler, 98 Va. 597, 600-601, 36 S.E.982; Keister’s Adm’r v. Keister’s Exor’s, 123 Va.157, 174, 96 S.E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439.

            Thus, the evidence confirms that the General Assembly violated the mandate of separation of power by enacting in 2017  ex-post fact legislation adopting the 1998 unconstitutional Court rules violating the restrictions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., to retroactively delegate authority to the Court unbounded discretion in adopting rules in defiance of the specifically defined power that the citizens restricted only to the full General Assembly (i.e., give judicial powers,  to create “lower courts” and appoint “judges”), as well as to adopting unconstitutional Court rules dealing with broad legislative policies to create a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system.

             But, the constitutional limits on the Court’s judicial authority and jurisdiction can neither be circumvented by enacting in 2017 an ex-post facto legislative amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) by changing VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to retroactively adopt Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6, nor circumvented by delegation to retroactively “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” to Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6.

            The general language of retroactive delegating authority to the Court found in VA Code § 54.1-3935(2017) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit J) is insufficient and unconstitutional. Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378,381, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994), because “the General Assembly can not delegate its legislative power accompanied only by such a broad statement of general policy. . .. [D]elegations of authority are adequately limited [only] where the terms or phrases employed have a well-understood meaning and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the administrator.” Id. at 381-82, 448 S.E.2d at 624 (citations omitted), and correspondingly said regulations must have “definite standards to guide . . . the exercise of the power.” Ames, 239 Va.at 349, 389 S.E.2d at 705.

            As explained in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967) the purpose of sovereign immunity,

“is not for the protection As explained of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ . . .

            Here the record confirms that not imposing accountably for acts outside the scope of employment and outside the jurisdiction or judicial authority doesn’t contribute to principled and fearless decision making but rather to “intimidation.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967) (citations omitted).[14]  Seldom has there been evidence of collusion to violate the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. and VA Code, by criminal misprision of a felony and a business conspiracy to injure an attorney for litigating to enforce statutory rights and the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and a common law jury trial by the abuse of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.[15]

            II. THERE IS NO IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS.

            A right without a remedy is no right at all.  Consequently, under the common law dating back to 1613, there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of jurisdiction, and action for equitable relief and damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise, The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027(K.B. 1613).[16]  See also4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141, discussing various English common law cases that provided for accountability and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction and judicial authority. 

         Therefore, consistent with the common law at the time of the ratifying of the VA Const., sovereign immunity does not invalidate all claims; it only makes a defendant immune from suit and the relief to which the immunity applies.[17]  Under the common law, notwithstanding the holding in Messina v. Burden,228 Va. 301, 307 (1984), where the Court declared that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still “alive and well” in the Commonwealth,[18] it is important that citizens of Virginia have a proper way of enforcing the limitation and prohibitions, as well as their constitutional rights against the government, including the Court. [19]  Under the Common law, citizens can bring a civil suit for declarative and equitable relief in Virginia against the government or government officials for acts outside the scope of employment,legislative authority, and judicial authority in violation of the VA Const.[20]

            Consistent with the common law the Court in Fox v. Deese,234 Va. 412, 423-24 (1987), reversed the decision of the trial court’s grant of sovereign immunity from the tort claims by underscoring that acommon law trial by jury required because,[21]

 [t]he tort counts not only allege that these defendants committed intentional torts, but that they were acting outside the scope of their employment as well. Resolution of these allegations requires an evidentiary hearing.  The defendants are not immune if the evidence establishes that (1) they committed intentional torts, irrespective of whether they acted within or without the scope of their employment, Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372_73(1967), or (2) they acted outside the scope of their employment, see Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 311, 321 S.E.2d657, 662 (1984).

            Under the common law sovereign immunity does not protect government actors when either in their individual and/or official capacities, they commit an intentional torts or commit acts outside of the scope of their employment, or enact ex-post-facto legislation outside the ‘the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341U.S. 367 at 376 (1951), or judicial act in”clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

            Under the common law, when the action seeks to restrain or compel state officials to perform their duties under the VA Const. and VA Code the action for declaratory judgment is not against the state for purposes of sovereign immunity-but for acts outside the scope of employment, legislative functions, jurisdiction, or judicial authority. [22]  Under the common law in both England and Virginia as one of the colonies, it was in ordinary courts in either civil or criminal trials -before a jury trial-which determined whether government officers, including judges, were to be held accountable for misbehavior.  Prakash and Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L. J. 72 at 74 (2006);  See, e.g., R.V. Gaskin, (1799) 1001 Eng. Rep. 1349 (K.B.) (reinstating a parish-clerk upon his demand that his employer shows cause for firing him); James Bragg’s Case (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278-81 (K.B.)(reinstating a Burgess for lack of cause to remove him).

            At common law, absolute immunity is given judges only when they did not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S. 355-357 (1871); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349at 357 (1978); Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885).  Judges are liable when they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”  Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986) (quoting Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131,142 (1885).  Pursuant to Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844(1980), and, Den Zeller v. Rankin,101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981), whenever a judge acts where he does not have jurisdiction to affirm and use a void ab initio order, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).  In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger wrote, “If [judges] break the law, they can be prosecuted.” Also, Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion agreed, that, “. . . judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .” supra. at 141-142.  Also, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held: 

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity.  The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.

            There the U.S. Supreme Court held in action against a State court judge, that under common law a state court judge who acts without jurisdiction, or acts in violation of Constitutional, or acts in violation of statutory prohibitions expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost. A Virginia judge is immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and was not performing any act prohibited expressly by constitution and statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980).  SeeAmes E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’sPower to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

            Consequently, at common law, absolute immunity from civil liability is given to legislators only when they are engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” and have not “exceeded the bounds of legislative power” by the usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the citizens under clearly stated constitutional limitations and prohibitions. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951); See Art. IV, § 9 VA Const. or judicial to immunity in violation; and, Virginia: Hening’s Stats. at Large, Vol. 9, p. 127, because,

[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.  United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (Emphasis added).  See also, Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

            Regarding quasi-judicial immunity for VA government attorneys and the VSBDB, it extends: (1) only if they are performing judicial functions, (2) only if acting within their jurisdiction; and (3) only if acting in good faith.  “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311at 321, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003) (the court explicitly declined to grant blanket immunity to non-prosecutorial conduct, stating, “We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.”)   See Hueston v. Kizer,2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 280, 36-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2008) (court denied absolute immunity).

            Therefore, under the common law if a prosecutor’s involvement is not done as a prosecutor but done outside the scope of his employment in his individual capacity, then he would not have any immunity, and if the prosecutor’s role was one of investigator or administrator he again may not be entitled to absolute immunity.  The claim of immunity is a factual determination for a trial by jury under the common law.

Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 

Olmstad v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).

            Conclusion

            In defiance of the common law limitation on the use of sovereign immunity Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial court and common law jury trial to challenge the Court’s unconstitutional court rules andVSBDB void ad initio order. The collusion to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[23] to obstruct accountability and justice only if adopting the Court’s unlawful court rules is a violation of Art.I §§ 5 & 9, VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, XII § 1 VA Const. and VA Code §§ 18.2‑481and 482.  There has been a retroactive ex-post facto change to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2009) to adopt the unconstitutional rules to delegate to the Court power to give judicial authority, crate the VSBDB as a lower court, and to appoint VSBDBmembers lower court judges.

            Based upon the above, the Circuit Court must hold those accountable for the willful defiance of the limitation and prohibitions under Art. I §§ 5 & 9, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, Art. XII § 1 VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1-3915 & 3935 (1932 to 2009) based upon the record of the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law jury trial. Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com


            [1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018.

                        [2] Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016433, filed November 19, 2018.

            [3] VA Code § 1-200, states “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA. Code § 1-10; 2005.

                [4] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Rodriguez argued and won a common law action before the U.S. Supreme Court that held there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the acts of government employees outside the scope of employment (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

                [5] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine was first discussed in U.S. jurisprudence in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

                [6] Art. I § 5 VA Const., states, “[t]hat the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate and distinct; . . ..”  Federalist 47, “[the VA Const.] . . . declares, ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..” Id p 109.

                [7] D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, p. 13.

                [8] “Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.”  Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

[9] Art. VI § 1 VA Const., states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[10] Art. VI § 7 VA Const., states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[11] Art. VI § 5 VA Const., states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[12] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added) (Plaintiff’s Ex. B7)

                [13] Later history confirmed that the violation of separation of power was required prior to undertaking the overthrow of a Constitutional government, i.e. Nuremberg trials documented the NAZI’s efforts to dismantle the legal framework under fundamental constitution principles of the, “separation of judicial powers, of executive powers and legislative powers.” 6 Trial of the Major War Criminal Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946.  534-35 (Testimony of Van der Essen 4 Feb 1946).

                [14] As James Madison stated in REPORT OF 1799, VIRGINIA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, “The resolution supposes [the delegation of] dangerous powers, . . . beyond the grant of the Constitution; . . .. However true, . . . that the judicial department, is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve. (Emphasis added)

[15] Chief Justice Marshall wrote Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816), “We [judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. (Emphasis added)

[16] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable, “when a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .  Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

                [17] Although the language of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity, the Supreme Court held that when Sec. 1871 was enacted Congress intended to incorporate then-existing common law immunities to excuse individual state and local officials from liability for damages caused by their violations of the federal constitution. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

                [18] “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden).  “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004).

                [19] At common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply for: (A) acts outside the scope of employment, Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-25, 362 S.E.2d 699, 706 (1987); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968); Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942); Deeds v. DiMercurio, 30 Va. Cir. 532 (Albemarle County, 1991); (B) grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994); Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 452 S.E.2d 854 (1995); Meagher v. Johnson, 239 Va. 380, 389 S.E.2d 310 (1990); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 310, 321 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1984); Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 (1987); Bowers v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 245, 253, 302 S.E.2d 511 (1983); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980); (c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 362 S.E.2d 699 (1987); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967); Agyeman v. Pierce, 26 Va. Cir. 140 (Richmond 1991.; or (4) acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 457 S.E.2d 42 (1995) (immunity lost by showing of malice in a slander action); Harlow v. Clatterbuck. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986).

                [20] Consistent with the common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded, the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.  See also Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).

[21] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added) See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court to reverse the USCA for the 4th Circuit, to order a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury for acts outside the scope of employment).

                [22] Pennsylvania Academy of Chiropractic Physicians v. Com., Dept of State, Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, 129 Pa. Commw. 12, 564 A.2d 551 (1989) (under the common laws the defense of sovereign immunity inapplicable where petitioner sought declaration which would result in restraining state officials”), Franks v. Tucker, 132 Ill. App. 3d 455, 476 N.E.2d 1315 (1st Dist. 1985) (where suit brought under the common law against state officials seeks to compel them to perform their duty, it is not action against state).

NOTICE OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT FOR THE RETROACTIVE ADOPTION IN 2017 OF SUP. CT VA UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES PROMULGATED IN 1998

20 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code

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Accountability, Limitation under VA Const., separation of power

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“General Assembly”), the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”), the Office of the Governor of Virginia (“Governor”), the Attorney General of Virginia (“VA AG”), and the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) were sued on November 14 and 19, 2018.  Respectively a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment[1] and Petition for Writ of Mandamus[2] were filed under the Common Law and VA Code for acts outside scope of employment of government attorneys, for acts outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, and for acts outside of judicial authority by a Class 2 felony  to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 and business conspiracy, evidenced by the:

  • General Assembly’s collusion outside “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951) in violation of the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. of ex-post facto legislation in 2017 to retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)] for the disciplining of attorneys”  to the 1998 unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6;
  • General Assembly’s collusion outside the ‘the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” supra., by violating the citizens’ exclusive power to amend the VA Const. under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. and by violating the citizens’ the mandate of separation of power under Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., to retroactively change the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system that was established in 1932 in the Commonwealth under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998), by unlawfully delegating legislative authority given by the citizens of Virginia by adopting in 2017 unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6, issued in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S. 355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978),[3] thereby obfuscating the Court’s unlawful rules: (a) establishing a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) establishing the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) appointing VSBDB members as judges; and,
  • the VSBDB, the VA AG and the Court’s from 2003 to the present self-proclaiming  “impunity” from accountability for the unconstitutional violations of Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. (See 2016 Petition to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16 IACHR Petition) (2017 United Nations Complaint to the  Committee on Human Rights, and Memorandum in Support of UN Complaint) (See also presentations to NOVA members of the General Assembly, https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5 and  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ,).

Isidoro Rodriguez, 2671 Avenir Place, Apt 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180

Mobile phone No. 571.477.5350; E-mail: busness@isidororodriguez.com

                [1] See Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al., Fairfax Cir. Ct. CL-2018-0016227, 11/14/198, Complaint for Declaratory Judgement, Plaintiff’s Exhibits A through M, and filed Motions.

                [2] See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax Cir. Ct. CL-2018-0016433, 11/19/198, Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

                [3] In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that an entity that has neither constitutional authority, nor legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

38.880663
-77.229093

Request to US Attorneys for EDVA and DC, as well as FBI for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.

17 Thursday May 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Federal Criminal Complaint for Misprison of a Felony

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Misprison of a felony by violation of right to due process

May 17, 2017

Hon. Tracy Doherty-McCormick                       Assistant Director in Charge
The United States Attorney                                Agent Nancy McNamara
Eastern District of Virginia                                Washington Metropolitan Field Office
U.S. Attorney’s Office                                           Federal Bureau of Investigation
2100 Jamieson Ave                                               601 4th Street N.W.
Alexandria, VA 22314                                          Washington DC, DC 20535 0002

Hon. Jessie Kong Liu
United States Attorney for
the District of Columbia
555 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Request for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.

Greetings,

In support of the attached Petition filed with members of the U.S. Congress for an Oversight Investigation (see Exhibit 1)(see also Exhibit 2, Petition to General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia), I demand pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the Washington Metropolitan Field Office of the FBI investigate and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia arrest, indict and prosecute government attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice, employees in the Internal Revenue Service, and Justices/Judges under the stewardship of the Hon. Chief Justice John Roberts in his capacity as Fourth and District of Columbia Circuit Justice in complicity with former Attorney General Eric Holder (See Violation of Rights of Fathers), to deprive the Undersigned Attorney of his right to due process under the 5th, 7th & 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

The Petition provides the evidence of misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242 and 26 U.S.C. § 7214, by the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and civil trial by jury to prevent the securing of accountability. Including monetary damages, for a business conspiracy in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500 to injure Undersigned Attorney’s reputation, profession, VA Code statutory property right in a Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and fundamental right to employment as a pro hac vice civil federal litigator by defying prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the Constitution of Virginia, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1 3935, and then surreally proclaiming “impunity” and absolute immunity for said unlawful acts.

The motive for the business conspiracy and misprision of a felony was to retaliate against Undersigned Attorney’s past 26 years of successful civil litigation to secure accountability, including for his prevailing argument before the United States Supreme Court in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (remand for an evidentiary hearing before a jury for employee accountability for acts outside of the “scope of employment” not within the Federal Torts Claim Act), by use of legal sophistry to systematically deny access to an impartial court so to prevent holding government employees, including attorneys, judges, and justices accountable for defying the VA Const./VA Code and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority.

This misprision of a felony has been compounded by the refusal to investigate and take legislative action to stop illegal court rules issued in violation of constitutional prohibitions by my elected representatives, including Democrat Senators/former VA Governors Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine, Congressman Gerry Connelly, Democrat former VA Governor Terry McAuliffe, Democrat VA Governor Ralph S. Northam, Democrat VA Senator Richard L. Saslaw, and the other Democrat NOVA General Assembly members (see Presentation to NOVA members of General Assembly, and, Change Petition on Accountability).

Query, “[t]o what purpose are court’s powers limited, and to what purpose are a limitation in writing on the court if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by the courts who are intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

I am not delusional for more than 200 years ago James Madison wrote that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788. This is because, “[t]here is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice,” U.S. vs. Jannottie, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3rd Cir. 1982).

Consequently, the attached Petition is my Statement of Probable Cause and will serve to draft a Criminal Complaint. Knowledge of the crime of misprision of a felony, and the jurisdiction to pursue those responsible imposes upon you, the legal obligation to do so. I request that as a victim of the alleged crimes I am kept informed of the status of the investigation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc: President Donald J. Trump                                         Congressman Bob Goodlatte
The White House                                                                 2309 Rayburn HOB
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW                                      Washington DC 20515-4606
Washington, D.C. 20500

Senator Chuck Grassley
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Attorney General Jeff Sessions
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

REQUEST TO THE HONORABLE RALPH S. NORTHAM TO MEET TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIRGINIA’S ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES IN VIOLATION OF ART. VI OF VA CONST., AND VA CODE.

23 Friday Feb 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Uncategorized

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February 6, 2018

The Honorable Ralph S. Northam
Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, P.O. Box 1475
Richmond, VA 23218

Re:       Request to meet to Provide Evidence of The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Issuance of Unlawful Court Rules Violating the Art IV of the Constitution of Virginia, VA Code, The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and The Mandate of Due Process Under 5th& 14th Amend to U.S. Constitution.

Dear Governor Northam,

I request a meeting because although the General Assembly has been in session since January 12, 2018, neither my elected representatives [Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.)], nor any other NOVA elected official has responded to the attach Petition (see http://www.isidororodriguez.com, and presentation at the Fairfax County Judicial Center http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), to investigate/stop the Supreme Court of Virginia’s (“Court”) illegal rules.  The irrefutable evidence is that these rules have violated the explicit restriction on the delegated rulemaking authority from the General Assembly under VA Code § 54-1-3909 and the prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1 5, and 7 of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1‑3935, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. [1]

To comply with the mandate to provide due process under the 5th & 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Art. I of the Constitution of Virginia, the following four questions must be answered: (a) pursuant to what authority did the Court create the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys?; (b) pursuant to what authority did the Court choose\appoint VSBDB members as “judges”?; (c) pursuant to what authority did the Court create under its control a centralized attorney discipline system in defiance of the General Assembly’s decentralized attorney discipline system under VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 & 3935?; and, (d) pursuant to what authority did the Court grant itself, judges on the Fairfax Court Cir. and Court of Appeals, government attorneys, and employees, “impunity” and absolute immunity for “resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482? (See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796).

Regarding these limitations on the Judicial Branch, query, “[t]o what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

Please have your staff contact me as to a time and date for me to drive to your office.

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

cc:  Attorney General of Virginia Mark R. Herring

                [1] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, in accordance with due process mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA’S COURT RULES VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, VA CODE, THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, AND THE MANDATE OF DUE PROCESS UNDER 5TH AND 14TH AMEND TO U.S. CONSTITUTION.

07 Sunday Jan 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Uncategorized

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Dear Senator and Delegate of the General Assembly of Virginia,

            The above issue concerns every citizen of Virginia’s right to secure access to an independent legal profession, right to an impartial court, and right to a civil jury trial to hold accountable government attorneys, employees, and judges for unlawful acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority.  Thus, I am following my recent presentation to NOVA member of the General Assembly at Fairfax Government Center on January 6, 2018, to file the attach Petition with every Senator and Delegate irrespective of the district, political party or affiliation.

An investigation and hearing are requested as part of your 2018 review of the budget for the Judicial Branch.  This is based upon the evidence that the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) has issued and is using illegal Rules of Part 6, § IV, in defiance of its delegated authority from the General Assembly, and in clear violation of the explicit limitations and prohibitions on the Court under Art. VI §§ 1 5, and 7 of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1‑3935, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and, the mandate of due process under Art. I of the Constitution of Virginia, and the 5th & 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The questions to be investigated and answered are: (a) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to issue rules establishing it creating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys?; (b) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to issue rules permitting it to choose\appoint VSBDB members as “judges”?; (c) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to defy the General Assembly’s a decentralized attorney discipline system established pursuant to VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 3935, by the Court’s use of court rules to create under its control a centralized attorney discipline system?; and, (d) pursuant to what authority did the Court have to grant itself, lower court judges, government attorneys, and employees, “impunity” and absolute immunity for unlawful “resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482? (See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796; see also  http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

Query, “to what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” [Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803)].

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

P.S. Note: I file this Petition with the General Assembly due to my elected representatives [Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.)], failure to investigate these unlawful acts of malfeasance (See Fairfax County Judicial Center presentation (http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5).

______________________________________________________

PETITION FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND HEARING ON THE CRIMINAL COMPLICITY TO USE ILLEGAL COURT RULES TO CREATE AN UNLAWFUL LOWER “COURT” AND TO UNLAWFULLY NAME “JUDGES” IN VIOLATION OF THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS OF ART. VI OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION, VA CODE, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

The Petition seeks to stop the issuance and use of the illegal Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) Part 6, § IV, that unlawfully established a centralized attorney discipline system under the Court’s control by it creating the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as an unlawful lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys, and it unlawfully appointing VSBDB members as “judges.”  These unlawful rules are in clear violation of the explicit limitations and prohibitions on the Court under Art. VI §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] and 7[3] of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915[4] & 54.1‑3935,[5] the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, [6] and, the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The question to be addressed by the members of the General Assembly in response to this Petition is,

“to what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803) [Chief Justice Marshall writing for the majority].

But, irrefutable the evidence confirms a willful violation of the limitation and prohibition on the Court under Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935,[7] by the Court unlawfully issuing and using court rules to establish a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control.  The Court has obfuscated and assumed away the decentralized attorney disciplinary system established by the General Assembly under VA Code § 54.1‑3935.[8]

Compounding the Court’s willfully defiance of the limitations and provisions under the VA Const. and VA Code, the evidence confirms the complicity of the Court the Fairfax County Court and Court of Appeals, the Virginia State Bar, the VSBDB, and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia’s violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482,[9] to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,” and in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500 participation in a business conspiracy.[10] The evidence confirms that these entities and individual have used legal sophistry and misused the judicially created doctrine of stare decisis/res judicata to surreally use the VSBDB void ab initio order to disbar and deprive the undersigned of his right to of due process and his statutory property rights, and then grant themselves “impunity” and absolute immunity from accountability said illegal acts (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796), by:

First, violating Art. VI §§ 1 and 7 of the VA Const., to not stop the VSBDB acting as a lower “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys, not stop the Court from choosing/appointing the 21 members of the VSBDB as “judges,” and not stop the defying of the limitation on the Virginia State Bar to only the investigation of bar complaints; and,

Second, violating VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by arguing for the unlawful use of the VSBDB void ab initio orders to disbar the undersign from federal practice before the U. S. Supreme Court, the U. S. Court of Appeal for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the U. S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and U.S. Tax Court; and, arguing for the systematic denying to the undersign access to an impartial court and jury trial by enjoining and prior restraining the undersigns from litigating to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio orders, business conspiracy, and other unlawful acts. (See unpublished void orders of Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney and 4th Cir. USCA Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB, et al., EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (2013)(https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5) and (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).[11]

Thus, the Petition seeks to protect the undersigns due process and statutory property rights by a finding that the VSBDB void ab initio order unlawfully disbarred the undersign for litigating to enforce Virginia statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).  Also, the Petition seeks to protect the rights of all citizens of Virginia from the issuance and use of illegal court rules that has deprived citizens of Virginia of pro hoc vice litigators independent of the dominance of the Judicial Branch,[12] has systematically denied citizens of access to an impartial court, and been used to deny citizens of their right to civil jury trial of the evidence of unlawful criminal and tortious acts by government attorneys, employees, and judges accountable.[13]

Consequently, based on President Theodore Roosevelt’s statement that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it,” the General Assembly must initiate an investigation and hearing of these unlawful acts in willful violation of VA Const., VA Code, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500, and §§ 18.2‑481/482, by the Court, the Court the Fairfax County Court and Court of Appeals, the Virginia State Bar, the VSBDB, and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia.

Respectfully submitted,

         Isidoro Rodríguez 

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

[1] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction, states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[2] Article VI, § 5, states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[3] Article VI, § 7, states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[4] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added)

[5] VA. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has. . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
  2. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . [it] shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond….

                [6] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

                [7] The General Assembly enacted this Code section to assist the Judicial Branch based upon the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), that “[t]he powers to . . . make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of [Virginia] must be conferred by statute,” although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney only in that particular court (Emphases added).  See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

                [8] In summary, the General Assembly used its exclusive legislative powers under Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., to enact VA Code § 54.1‑3935, to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system–by granting sole authority and jurisdiction to discipline an attorney only to the judges it had chosen in the Court of Appeals and the circuit courts.  Obedience by the Court to this decentralized attorney disciplinary system was mandated by Art. VI § 5 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3915, by restricting the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Court under VA Code § 54.1‑3909.  Specifically, the Court was denied any authority to issue rules inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code, and the Virginia State Bar was limited to the investigation of a bar complaint, but only at the request of the courts of appeals or circuit courts.

                [9] It is a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority,” thus there is neither “impunity” nor absolute immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, judicial authority and jurisdiction.

                [10]  This was uncovered during the undersigns litigation: first, to stop the violation of Art VI of the VA Const., VA Code, and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the VSBDB issuing a void ab initio order disbarring me in 2006 for litigating to enforce my statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf); and to obtain damages for the retaliatory criminal/civil business conspiracy by Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al. in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499, 500, by the filing of two fraudulent VSBDB complaints for seeking to enforce my statutory property rights in a choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and my rights as a father under VA Code and Treaty (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

                [11] These summary void ab initio orders have aided and abetted the business conspiracy to deprive the undersigned of his law office, profession, reputation, right to employment, property, and rights as a father, by disbarring the undersigned from federal practice based upon the VSBDB void ab initio order in retaliation for successful pro hoc vice litigation challenging the U.S. Department of Justice under the control of Eric Holder during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, i.e. Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Undersigned argued and won before the U.S. Supreme Court against Holder, DOJ, and the USCA 4th Cir.’s surreal argument that a DEA agent was within his scope of employment when driving drunk and having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (Undersigned argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. the First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (Undersigned argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.)” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (Undersigned challenged Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order under War Power Act as a prohibited bill of attainder); and, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., et al. v. Nat’l Ctr. For Missing & Exploited Children, et al., 03-cv-00120 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 2003) (Undersigned challenge the violation of the “zone or war exception to The Hague Convention Children (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

                [12] The controlling precedent on this issue is Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), wherein Associate Justice Powell writing for the court held that the practice of law is a “fundamental right” and stressed the importance of pro hoc vice litigators who bring “claims that would be too unpopular for resident lawyers to bring.” (Emphasis added)

                [13] In addition to this Petition challenging the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and the surreal grant of “impunity”/absolute immunity for unlawful acts, the undersigned has filed complaints with the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OAS) (P-926-16) (See  http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

 

PETITION FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COMPLICITY BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD, THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR, AND THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINA TO VIOLATE THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION, VA CODE, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

09 Saturday Dec 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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The Petition seeks to stop the violations of the limitations and prohibitions of Art. VI §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] and 7[3] of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and VA Code § 54-1-3915,[4] by the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) issuance and use of illegal court rules in complicity with the Virginia State Bar, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”), and the Office of Attorney General of Virginia (“Government Attorneys”).  The benchmark of the Petition is President Theodore Roosevelt statement that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it.”

These allegations are based upon the evidence of violations of VA Code § 54.1‑3935,[5] wherein the General Assembly used its exclusive power to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system granting authority and jurisdiction to discipline an attorney with statewide effect only to the judges it had chosen to the Court, Court of Appeals, and circuit court.[6]  Obedience to the decentralized attorney disciplinary system was mandated by Art. VI § 5 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3915 restricting the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Court under VA Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting the Court from issuing rules inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code, and restricting the Virginia State Bar-created under Court rules authorized by the General Assembly–only to the investigation of bar complaints, but solely upon the request of legally chosen judges of established courts under the VA Const. and/or VA Code.

But, the evidence is both flagrant and irrefutable,[7] that in violation of the restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions of Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935, and §§ 18.2‑499/500, the 5th, 7th, & 14th Amend. to the U.S. Const., 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine,[8] the Court issued unlawful rules to establish the VSBDB as a court and complicity to use the Court’s unlawful rules to assume away the decentralized attorney disciplinary system established by the General Assembly.[9]  Subsequently, the courts and government attorneys were complicit in resisting the execution of the laws under color of authority in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482,[10] by their use of legal sophistry and misuse of stare decisis/res judicata, by:

First, violating Art. VI § 1 of the VA Const., to disregard prohibition against establishing the VSBDB as a “court” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline attorneys;

Second, violating Art. VI § 7 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54-1-3935(B), to disregard the prohibition on the Court from choosing and appointing the 21 members of the VSBDB as “judges” under its control and defying the restriction on the Virginia State Bar;

Third, violating the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the Court and the lower court’s affirming the VSBDB void ab initio order and in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 granting themselves Judicial Immunity for unlawful acts and malfeasance (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796);

Fourth, violation of VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the unlawful use the VSBDB and Court’s void ab initio orders to disbar me from federal practice before the U. S. Supreme Court, the U. S. Court of Appeal for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the U. S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and U.S. Tax Court; and,

Fifth, violation of the VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney and U. S. Court of Appeal for the 4th Circuit issuance of unpublished void orders issued in 2013 to systematically deny access to an impartial court and jury trial to challenge the above void ab initio orders and unlawful acts by enjoining/prior restraining future litigation by use of legal sophistry and misuse of stare decisis/res judicata, (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB, et al., (2013) EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5) and (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).[11]

Consequently, pursuant to their oath of office and the doctrine of separation of power each member of the General Assembly is petitioned to investigate the above evidence complicity of the Court, the Virginia State Bar, VSBDB, and Office of Attorney General, to violate Art. VI, §§ 1, 5, & 7 of the VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, & 3935, and the 5th, 7th, & 14th Amends. to the U.S. Const.,[12] and, to take action to stop the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to obtain accountability and damages for violation of VA Const., VA Code, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and VA Code §§ 18.2‑499/500.[13]

Respectfully submitted,

         Isidoro Rodríguez 

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227,  Vienna, Virginia 22180; (571) 477-5350/E-mail  business@isidororodriguez.com

[1] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction, states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[2] Article VI, § 5, states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[3] Article VI, § 7, states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[4] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added)

[5] Va. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has. . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
  2. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . [it] shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond….

[6] This was done by the General Assembly to assist the Judicial Branch subsequent to Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), which held that “[t]he powers to . . . make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of [Virginia] must be conferred by statute,” although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney only in that particular court (Emphases added).  See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.

[7]  This evidence was uncovered during my past 14 years of litigation to obtain: first, damages for the retaliatory criminal/civil business conspiracy of Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al. in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499, 500, evidenced by the filing of two fraudulent VSBDB complaints filing law suits to enforce my statutory property rights in a choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to treasure trove confirmed valued at $18 Billion USD, and my rights as a father under VA Code and Treaty (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml); and second, to stop the usurping of the General Assembly’s power to choose judges and establish lower courts under Art VI of the VA Const. and VA Code—as well as stop the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the VSBDB issuing a void ab initio order disbarring me in 2006 for litigating to enforce my statutory rights (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

[8] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any act or order, said act or order is void ab initio—therefore not lawful and not subject stare decisis/res judicata or enforcement because said act or order is a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352 (1803).

[9] The motive for these illegal acts was to systematically deprive citizens of an independent legal profession, access to an impartial court, and civil jury trial to bar liability for criminal and tortious acts of government attorneys, employees, and judges.

[10] It is a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority,” thus there is neither “impunity” nor absolute immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, judicial authority and jurisdiction.

[11] These final void ab initio orders have aided and abetted the business conspiracy to deprive me of my law office, profession, reputation, right to employment, property, and rights as a father.  The evidence is that I was disbarred from federal practice in retaliation for my successfully challenging the U.S. Department of Justice under the control of Eric Holder during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations: See also Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (I argued and won before the U.S. Supreme Court against Holder, DOJ, and the USCA 4th Cir.’s surreal argument that a DEA agent was within his scope of employment when driving drunk and having sex); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. the First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.)” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (I challenged Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order under War Power Act as a prohibited bill of attainder); and, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., et al. v. Nat’l Ctr. For Missing & Exploited Children, et al., 03-cv-00120 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 2003) (I challenge the violation of the “zone or war exception to The Hague Convention Children (See http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf).

[12] I resort to filing this Petition with each member of the General Assembly, because my elected representatives Sen. Richard L. Saslaw (Dem.), and Del. Marcus B. Simon (Dem.), failed to act pursuant to the doctrine of separation of power to protect me from the above unlawful acts and malfeasance. (See My address to NOVA representatives respectively 2009 and 20010, Fairfax County Judicial Center (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ), and (http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5).

[13] In addition to this Petition seeking protection as a citizens of Virginia and the United States pursuant to the U.S./Virginia Constitutions, VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, I have filed complaints with the United Nations and with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (P-926-16), Memorandums of Law, and as exhibits the Void Ab Initio Court Orders, pursuant to my fundamental rights under Treaty to challenge the surreal void ab initio orders granting “impunity” and absolute immunity to government attorneys, employees, and judges for unlawful acts (See  http://www.isidororodriguez.com) requested, electronic PDF copy will be sent).

https://static.change.org/product/embeds/v1/change-embeds.js“>Petitiion can be signed at Change.org

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