Unlawful Acts Outside the Scopse of Employment of Gov’t Attorneys in Collusion with Judges’ Outside of Judicial Authoirty Acting During the Obama Administration in Violations of the Common Law, the VA Const., VA Code, the U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the IRC 26 U.S.C. § 7214.

November 27, 2017

President Donald J. Trump                                                                    Attorney General Jeff Sessions

The White House                                                                                 U.S. Department of Justice

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW                                                           950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20500                                                                       Washington, D.C.  20530-0001

Via U.S. Mail and Telefax (202-456-2461)

Re:       Unlawful Acts During the Obama Administration in Violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Virginia Constitutions and Code, the U.S. Constitution, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine[1] by The U.S. Department of Justice-Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the District Court for the E.D. of Virginia.

Dear President Trump and Attorney General Sessions,

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7214 Internal Revenue Code,[2] I write to respectfully request that the U.S. Department of Justice opposes Ms. Lois Lerner’s motion to seal her deposition seeking to avoid accountability for acts of malfeasance outside the scope of employment during the Obama Administration (See http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/11/20/lois-lerner-wants-irs-testimony-sealed-fearing-death-threats.html).

This request is to secure accountability generally and to assist my efforts challenging the retaliatory business conspiracy depriving me of my profession, reputation, right to employment, property and law practice as an independent attorney litigating against Eric Holder et al., during the Obama Administration for violation of the Art. VI of the Virginia Constitution, Va Code, U.S. Constitution, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine [3] (See my United Nations Complaint, and my Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (P-926-16) of the Organization of American States at http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

The evidence confirms that in furtherance of Eric Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy against me the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Art I U.S. Tax Court affirmed the declaring as “frivolous” and summarily striking of my litigation expenses for litigation challenging void orders, and issued a Deficiency Notice without any investigation or audit or other minimal factual predicates.  Thus, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes greater than allowed by law by denying me of my self-employment FY 2006 Schedule C 1040 business deductions for me and my wife (law partner) law office est. since 1987.

During the same period in furtherance of Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy, I was systematically denied access to an impartial court to challenge the retaliatory unlawful disbarment of me as a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeal for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, D.C. and Federal Circuits, the United States District Court for the E.D. of Virginia, and the U.S. Tax Court, by their use of legal sophistry to dishonestly apply the judicially crated doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata in violation of Article VI of the Virginia Constitution, the Void Ab Initio Orders Doctrine. The U.S. Tax Court also refused to comply with the mandate of 26 USC Section 7214.  Finally, in furtherance of Eric Holder et al.’s retaliatory business conspiracy unpublished Void Ab Initio Orders were issued to grant to Holder et al. “impunity” and absolute immunity for unlawful acts by enjoining and issuing a prior restraining on all future suits alleging violations of Art VI of the Virginia Constitution and Code  (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jane Doe et al., Case No. 3:12-cv-00663- the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, E.D. VA Apr. 12, 2013at https://casetext.com/case/rodriguez-v-doe-5), and the Honorable Justices of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 13-1638 at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-13-01638-0.pdf).

The U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Art I U.S. Tax Court, have acted arbitrarily without a rational foundation, excessive and harassment in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7214.  I challenge these unlawful acts during the Obama Administration because these unlawful acts aided and abetted Holder et al. retaliatory business conspiracy against me for my past litigation against “Deep State” of Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges’ violation the Rule of Law.    Based on the above I respectfully request the U.S. Department of Justice file opposition to Ms. Lois Lerner’s motion.

Your servant,


Isidoro Rodriguez

cc:        Gen. John Kelly (Ret.), White House Chief of Staff

                [1] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity does not have either constitutional authority, or legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio—therefore not subject stare decisis/res judicata as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

                [2] Excerpts from 26 USC Section 7214(a) are as follows:

Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States –

  • who is guilty of any . . . (omitted) willful oppression under color of law; or
  • who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law. . . (omitted); or
  • who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; . . ..
  • who makes or signs any fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs any fraudulent certificate, return, or statement; or
  • who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue law by any person, or . . . fails to report, in writing, such knowledge or information to the Secretary; . . ..

shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution.

            [3] I took an oath as a Vietnam Vet more than 52 years ago to defend the Constitution and Republic, “from all enemies, foreign and domestic.”  Surreally, my past 45 years as a federal litigator uncovered “domestic” enemies seeking to violate the limitation and prohibitions under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions so to assume away accountability, See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (I argued and won before the United States Supreme Court against Holder and DOJ’s surreal argument that a DEA agent acting negligently outside of the US was not personally liable for damages causing a car accident while driving drunk and having sex.  The Court reversed and remanded holding that there was to be an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the alleged acts outside scope of employment); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ attorneys for violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1978); Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (I argued and won the right to hold accountable DOJ and financial institution accountable for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); and, Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (A challenge as a prohibited bill of attainder by Pres. Clinton’s Executive Order use of the War Power Act).


Under common law, Article I, Bill of Rights, Section 11 of the VA Const.,[1] and the 7th Amendment to the U.S. Const., it is a fundamental right to a jury trial-not to a judge-which determined whether government officers, including judges, were to be held accountable in either civil or criminal jury trials for misbehavior.

Both the U.S. Const. and VA Const. confirmed an absolute right to civil jury trial of the evidence of malfeasance.[2] See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).[3]

Thus, there never was absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority, but more importantly, the factual issues were to be decided by a jury hearing the evidence, see Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).  Therefore, an action will lie for unlawful malfeasance and the business conspiracy to issue and enforce the void ab initio orders issued as part of an illegal enterprise.

                [1] Article I, Bill of Rights, Section 11. Due process of law; obligation of contracts; taking or damaging of private property; prohibited discrimination; jury trial in civil cases.

That no person shall be deprived of his . . .property without due process of law; that the General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; . . ..

That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. . ..

[2] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)

                [3] See Justice John F. Molloy, The Fraternity: Lawyers and Judges in Collusion, Paragon House (2004).  “When a lawyer puts on a robe and takes the bench, he or she is called a judge. But in reality, when judges look down from the bench they are lawyers looking upon fellow members of their fraternity. In any other area of the free-enterprise system, this would be seen as a conflict of interest.  When a lawyer takes an oath as a judge, it merely enhances the ruling class of lawyers and judges. . .. How can they be expected not to be beholden to those who elevated them to the bench?  When they leave the bench, many return to large and successful law firms that leverage their names and relationships.”


The orders of the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. (USDCT E.D. VA), Hon Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Hon. John G. Roberts Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court/Circuit Judge of the USCT Appeals for the 4th and District of Columbian Circuit (Exhibits 2a, 2aii, 2aiii and 2aiv), and the legal analysis of the Attorney General of Virginia (Exhibits 2av and 2avi) oddly and arrogantly used legal sophistry to misuse stare decisis and res judicata  in violation of the void ab initio order doctrine[1]so to unlawfully grant “impunity” and absolute immunity to all government actors, as well as to Jack Harbeston, for their unlawful business conspiracy and acts outside their scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority in violation of the limitation and prohibitions under Article VI of the VA Const., as well as the restrictions in VA. Code § 54.1‑3915.

“Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article [delegating limited rulemaking authority], the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. . ..”

Thus, this surreal grant of “impunity” and absolute immunity by unpublished “Star Chamber” like opinions by misuse of stare decisis and res judicata are violations of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to systematically deny Mr. Rodriguez of his fundamental right to an impartial court and right to a civil jury trial to secure accountability and damages for acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction, and judicial authority. [2]  This is because dating back to The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), under common law there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of jurisdiction, and an action for damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise.[3]

It is a fundamental doctrine of equal protection of the laws and due process, incorporated into the common law that Mr. Rodriguez as a party affected by various void ab initio orders and personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard, before an impartial court with jurisdiction to hear the matter. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.  This is because every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard before an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

This is also mandated by Article 10 of the United Nations Bill of Rights, wherein it is written that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations . . ..”[4]   It is for this reason that judges were never given either “impunity” or absolute immunity for unlawful acts, particularly for acts outside their jurisdiction and judicial authority.[5]

In response to the legal sophistry and poor legal analysis of both the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General of Virginia (Exhibit 2a, 2av, and 2vi), research confirms that in both England and the colonies, it was in ordinary courts-before a jury trial-which determined whether government officers, including judges, with good behavior tenure, were to be held accountable in either civil or criminal trials for misbehavior.  Prakash and Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L. J. 72 at 74 (2006).

Also, it was Blackstone who first discussed various English statutes that provided for the making accountable and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.  These were not a statutory exception to grants of good-behavior tenure, but consistent with the concept that a judge could be tried in court for unlawful acts outside of their jurisdiction.  See, e.g. R. V. Gaskin, (1799) 1001 Eng. Rep. 1349 (K.B.) (reinstating a parish-clerk upon his demand that his employer shows cause for firing him); James Bragg’s Case (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278-81 (K.B.)(reinstating a Burgess for lack of cause to remove him).

Consistent with common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.  See Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).  Thus, the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General are not only wrong in their misuse of the holding in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 at 360 (1978), but to their analysis provides additional evidence of their unlawful acts in furtherance of the business conspiracy by granting “impunity” and absolute immunity for acts outside of scope or employment, jurisdiction and judicial authority to injure Mr. Rodriguez.[6]

But not only are the federal government entities of limited and prescribed authority and jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution but also federal legislation does not nor can it provide for them any judicial immunity for unlawful acts of malfeasance in violation of their jurisdiction and judicial authority.  Pursuant to Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980), and, Den Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981), whenever a judge acts where he does not have jurisdiction to affirm and use a void ab initio order, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).

Consequently, the evidence confirms that the Hon. Judge Gibney and the Attorney General of Virginia have unlawfully acted to obstruct justice to conceal the unlawful acts by, “[resisting] the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[7] to conceal and obfuscate the unlawful promulgation of illegal court rules in violation of VA Const., and VA Code.  This was part of the conspiracy to systematically deny access to an impartial federal court and trial by a jury of the evidence of malfeasance and the business conspiracy to deprive Mr. Rodriguez of business, reputation, profession, property, and right to employment.[8]

In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berge wrote, “If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Also, Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion agreed, that, “. . . judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”  supra. at 141-142.  Also, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held:

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228]. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies, they must, in such cases, resort.”  (Emphasis added) Ibid.

Therefore, the “impunity” and absolute “judicial immunity” given by the Hon. Judge Gibney, was an act outside his jurisdiction and judicial authority because it violated Article IV of the VA Const. And VA Code, and inconsistent/violation of the holding in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978), which limited absolute judicial immunity for acts with jurisdiction and judicial authority of the court.

Finally, “impunity” and absolute judicial immunity has not even been extended even to State judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, The Court wrote: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same, the Court held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.  But at no time was there to be “impunity” for an unlawful activity  outside of their jurisdiction, such as for the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, U.S./VA Const., and VA Code.[9]

                [1] More than 214 years ago in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 137 (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall first defined for U.S. jurisprudence the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, writing that, “a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”  See also Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, a void order is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.  This is because “[a] void judgment does not create any binding obligation.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L Ed. 370 (1940); and, Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861 (1882), holding that an illegal order is forever void.

                [2] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Mr. Rodriguez argued and won by before the U.S. Supreme Court the holding that there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury on the alleged acts of government employees outside the scope of employment (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

[3] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable,

[W]hen a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .  Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

[4] In investigating and considering the merits of this complaint for the usurping of legislative constitutional authority by the Washington D.C. Oligarchy Federal/Virginia government attorneys, employees, and judge to permit the promulgation of court rules by violation of the limitation and prohibitions under Article VI of the VA Const., as well as the restrictions in VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights must recall that Charter was established in part to respond to the sorry behavior of German and other European judges, lawyers, and law schools assuming away the limitations and prohibitions of their respective constitutions that aided to power Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (“NAZI”) before World War II.  Because, “[b]y the time the gas vans came and the human slaughter factories were built in Auschwitz and the other death camps, the murder of the six million Jews and other persecuted minorities was done completely within the framework of German law.” Yad Vshem, The Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes Remem­brance Authority, 2004.

                [5] “I. COMBATING IMPUNITY: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS, PRINCIPLE 1. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO TAKE. EFFECTIVE ACTION TO COMBAT IMPUNITY, “Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.”  E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, at page 7, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity.

                [6] There the U.S. Supreme Court held in an action against a State court judge, that pursuant to common law a state court judge who acts without jurisdiction, or acts in violation of Constitutional, or acts in violation of statutory prohibitions expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost.  This is because a State judge would be immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and/or was not performing any act expressly prohibited by statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980).  This is exactly what the evidence confirms the Supreme Court of Virginia has done.

[7] Misprision of treason to violate the VA Const., is defined pursuant to VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482.

                [8]  See Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., excellent legal research paper dated April 15, 2016, entitled, Exposing Judges’ Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Wrongdoing: Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting, http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf.  As Dr. Cordero explains in the introduction of his ground-breaking research paper,

“This study analyses official statistics, reports, and statements of the Federal Judiciary showing that its judges are unaccountable and their operation is pervaded by secrecy; consequently, they recklessly do wrong in self-interest and to people’s detriment, which calls for reform. (Emphasis added)

In the last 225 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, only 8 of its judges have been removed from the bench (footnote omitted). They hold all their adjudicative, policy-making, administrative, and disciplinary meetings behind closed doors and never appear before a press conference (cite omitted). They act with impunity. The evidence reveals their motive, means, and opportunity (cite omitted) to engage in financial and non-financial wrongdoing (footnote omitted) by abusing power to deny due process, disregard the law, and decide by reasonless summary orders (footnote omitted). They have hatched a system of wrongdoing so routine, widespread, and coordinated (cite omitted) among themselves and between them and insiders (footnote omitted, e.g., running a bankruptcy fraud scheme (cite omitted), as to have turned wrongdoing into their Judiciary’s institutionalized modus operandi (cite omitted).” (Emphasis added)

                [9] Administrative decisions, although essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:

“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . .. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.  Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.”