• AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION TO THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD
  • Challenging on going violations of VA Const. and VA Code during 10 min. argument to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia and Panel: Isidoro Rodriguez vs. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (No 191136).
  • EMAIL 03/21/2021-TO GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF SECURING JUDICIAL BRANCH ACCOUNTABLITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS TO VIOLATE U.S. REPUBLIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
  • ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT HIS BEING THE 2019 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY SENATE DISTRICT 035 SEAT
    • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PETITION FOR APPEAL, RECORD NO. ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner Pro Per, v. The General Assembly of Virginia, The Office of the Governor of Virginia, The Supreme Court of Virginia, The Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, The Virginia State Bar, and The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Defendants-Respondents.
  • MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF LITIGATION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998
  • Motion For Preliminary/Permanent Injunction Of Va Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) And Va Code § 8.01-223.2 (2017), Filed in Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, SCOTUS Docket No. 20-25
  • MOTION TO ENPANEL A SPECIAL GRAND JURY FOR VIOLATION OF VA CODE §§ 18.2 481 & 482 AND VA CODE § 18.2 499, TO “[RESIST] THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY”
  • NOTICE OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW BY ENACTMENT OF EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION IN 2017 TO RETROACTIVELY ADAPT UNCONSTITUTIONAL SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA RULES ISSUED IN 1998
  • ORAL ARGUMENT TO SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PANEL FREDERICKSBURG, VA August 22, 2019 ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ v. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., NO. 190579
  • Petition for Congressional Investigation of Government Attorneys, Employees, and Justices/Judges Self-proclaimed Impunity and Absolute Immunity from Accountability for Misprision of Felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 241 & 242 and VA Code §§ 18.2 481 & 482.
    • PRESS RELEASE: SUIT AGAINST GOV’T ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION
  • Petition for Oversight Investigation of Government Employees, including Attorneys, Judges, and Justices for their Misprision of Felony and their Self-proclaimed Impunity and Absolute Immunity from Accountability.
  • PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

Systemic Denial of Access to an Impartial Court and Trial by Jury by the Virigina and Federal Judical Branches for Act Outside their Judicial Authority

~ Separation of power, Judicial accountability for unlawful acts, treason, malfeasance, Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine

Systemic Denial of Access to an Impartial Court and Trial by Jury by the Virigina and Federal Judical Branches for Act Outside their Judicial Authority

Category Archives: Impunity in violation of the Common Law

REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF INTEREST IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, NO. 20-25

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Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Federal Criminal Complaint for Misprison of a Felony, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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July 20, 2020

Attorney General of the United States The Hon. William Barr,

Solicitor General Noel Francisco, and,

Assistant United States Attorney for The Eastern District of Virginia G. Zachary Terwilliger

Greetings:

In the interest of the United States, I request under 28 USC § 517 (2014) that each of you file a Statement of Interest for SCOTUS to grant the enclosed Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on July 15, 2020, Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, No. 20-25.  I underscore that this section states,

“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.”  (Emphasis added)

Therefore, the request for Statement of Interest is made pursuant to the federal government’s interest, right and duty to secure compliance by the courts of the Commonwealth of Virignia with the mandates of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, the limitation on them pursuant to the Constitution of Virginia and Virigna Code (see 2009 Petitoin to NOVA members of General Assemvly). Under Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) at 176 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall defined the Void Ab Initio Doctrine, holding that,

“to what purpose are [the Court’s] powers limited, and to what purpose are those limitation in writing [on the Court], if these limitations may, at any time, be passed over and ignored by [the Court who is] intended to be restrained, controlled and limited?” (Emphasis added)

Consequently, this request for a Statement of Interest under 28 USC. § 517 (2014) is supported by Attorney General John Ashcroft observation that,

“it is in the federal government’s interest to have effective and fair state courts, lest litigants turn to federal courts to resolve matters properly within state court responsibilities.” November 2, 2003, Department of Justice Evaluation of the State Judicial Institute’s Effectiveness to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. (Emphasis added)

In this contest of “the federal government’s interest to have effective and fair state courts,” this request is sent to each of you based on the federal interest of not permitting the government and courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia to systemically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury of government undertakings outside the scope of legal authorty and scope of employment in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the separation of power under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, and 7 of the Constitution of Virginia (VA Const.”), and the prohibitions under VA Code § 54-1-3915 & 54.1 3935 (See Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court).

Thus, this request is under Art. Four, § 4, Cl. 1 of the United States Constitution which makes it a federal interest to ensure that “justice is applied fairly,” by guaranting that the three branches of the government of the Commonwealth of Viringia provide a “Republican Form of Government” assuring access to an impartial court and a common law trial by jury to obtain accountability for government undertakings outside the scope of legal authorioty and scope of employment. See also Martin v. City of Boise, No. 09-cv-540-REB (D. Idaho September 28, 2015), ECF No. 276, 2015 WL 5708586. Statement of Interest at 5 note 23).

In this context of securing accountability, the request is supported by the holding in Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), which I argued and won before the Supreme Court of the United States. There in 1995 Solicitor General Drew Days filed an amicus brief and argued with me before the Court to support the granting of the Writ of Certioari. The Court issued the Writ reversing the USCA for the 4th Circuit and the US Dist Ct for ED VA, to reject then Attorney General Eric Holder and DOJ’s surreal argument and policy that there was absolute immunity even for the DEA agent’s acts while DWI and having sex in the moving vehical. Thus, the Court rejected Eric Holder’s knee jurk policy of absolute immunity from accountability for acts outside of scope of employement by ordering remand to an impartial court court to hold an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the evidence.

Similarly, here the request for a Satement of Interest in support of the attach Petition for Writ of Certioari is to obtain impartial judicial review by reversal of the the summary dismissal below of the Writ of Mandmaus and Prohibition evidencing a policy by the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia (see page i, ii, and iii of the attach Petition), to deprive the Citizens of the Commonwealth of an independent legal profession by not stopping the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) from operating as a “kangroo court” issuing void ab initio orders under unconstitutional court rules.

Compounding this defiance of the VA Const., and VA Code, is the record of a Class 2 felony to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority” in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2 481 & 482 and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500, by the VSBDB concerting to “combine, assocate, agree, [and] mutually undertake” a business conspiracy with Washington DC Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al to deprive the undersign of his business and profession by the VSBDB void ab initio order to disbar the undersign for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights, and rights as a father (see 2003 Request for investigation of collusion by DOJ and the courts to violate “zone of war” exception under Treaty ) (see page 8 of the attached Appendix) (See  Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., US Dist. Ct. ED VA 12 cv 663 JAB (April 12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No 13-1638 (Nov. 2013); See also Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, Washington Post, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct App. N. 07-5334, injunction denied SC. Ct No. 07A601, cert. denied US Sup Ct 08-411(2008) (See Request in 2014 to US Attorneys for EDVA and DC, as well as FBI for the Investigation, Arrest, Indictment, and Prosecution for Eric Holder et a., misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S. §§ 4 & 241/242, 26 U.S.C. § 7214, and VA Code §§ 18.2 499/500.).

To answer any questions, have your staff contact me at (1.571.477.5350). Respectfully, Isidoro Rodriguez cc:   President Donald J. Trump, The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20500

Filed July 13, 2020–IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, on Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Virginia

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Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.  Whether the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution (“U.S. Const.”), the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, and the integrity and independence of the Commonwealth’s judicial system under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const), and VA Code § 54.1-3915 & § 54.1-3935A (1950 to 2017), has been violated by the denial of the Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition
confirming the pattern and practice since 2006:

First, of the systemic denial of access to an impartial court so to not hold the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board’s (“VSBDB”) accountable for usurping judicial authority and jurisdiction to disbar Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine?;

Second, of the systemic denial of access to a statutory jury trial under VA Code § 18.2-499 & 500 so to not hold the VSBDB accountable for participating, cooperating and assisting the business conspiracy of Washington D.C. Attorneys/Lobbyist Eric Holder et al. to injure Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez reputation and profession by the issuance of a void ab initio order?; and,

Third, of the systemic denial of access to a common-law jury trial so to not hold the VSBDB et al. accountable for malfeasance for the void ab initio order, as well as for lobbying to violate VA Const.’s amending procedures, to violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and to violate the prohibition on enacting special legislation granting the VSBDB immunity for a business conspiracy?

LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS WHICH HAVE SYSTEMICALLY DENIED ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT TO RECIPROCALLY ENFORCE THE VSBDB VOID AD INITIO ORDER..

1. Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., S. Ct. VA No. 190579 (September 2, 2019); Fairfax County Circuit Court Case No. 2018-16227 (February 12, 2019).

2. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., US Dist. Ct. ED VA 12-cv-663-JAB (April 12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No 13-1638 (Nov. 2013), cert. denied 2014.

3. In the matter of Isidoro Rodriguez, US Sup. Ct. Docket No. D-02466 (May 26, 2010), cert. denied.

4. Isidoro and Irene Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, US Tax Court Docket No. 10691-09, cert. denied; and, Isidoro Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, US Tax Court Docket No. 11855-12, cert. denied 2014.

5. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jack Harbeston, and Eric Holder et al., US Dist. Ct. WD Wash. No. 11-cv-1601 (JCC).

6. Irene Rodriguez and Isidoro Rodriguez v. Douglas Shulman, et al., D.C. Cir. Ct. No. 11-cv-1183(JEB).

7. In re Isidoro Rodriguez, U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, ML No. 2307 (December 14, 2011).

8. Isidoro Rodriguez v. US Tax Court, D.C. Cir. No. 10-1016, cert. denied, US Sup. Ct. No. 10-1066 (Closed, March 21, 2011).

9. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia Employment Commission, US Sup Ct. Docket No. 09-954 (Cert. Denied March 19, 2010), S. Ct. VA Record No. 092494, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 0291-09-4.

10. Isidoro Rodriguez v. US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, (D.C. Cir. No. 08-7134) cert. denied No. 09-237 (November 2, 2009).

11. In the matter of Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., (4th Cir. No. 06-9518), cert. denied No. 08-942 (March 20, 2009), injunction denied (March 24, 2009).

12. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Standing Committee on Attorney Discipline, (3rd Cir. No 08-8037), cert. denied No. 08-1121 (Closed, May 18, 2009).

13. Isidoro Rodriguez v. US Court of Appeals for the 2nd  Circuit, (2nd Cir. No 08-90089); cert. denied No. 08-942 (Closed, July 31, 2009).

14. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct App. N. 07-5334, injunction denied SC Ct. No. 07A601, cert. denied US Sup Ct. 08-411(Closed, 2008).

15. In re Isidoro Rodriguez, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. D. VA, Docket No. 1:08-mc-00022, May 28, 2008.

16. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia et al., (S. Ct. No. 07-419, November 2, 2007); and Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia, (Va. Sup. Ct No. 07-0283), cert denied Nos. 07-A142 and 07A370 (2007).

17. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Devis and VA State Bar, VA Sup Ct. No. 06052, cert. denied US Sup Ct. Nos. 06A619/06-875 (Closed, October 2006).

18. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Pereira, 163 F. Appx. 227 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 954 (2006).

19. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Guy Vander Jagt, et al., Sup. Ct. of Va. No 040941/040942, cert. denied, No. 04-867 (Feb. 28, 2005).

20. Isidoro Rodriguez v. HFP Inc., et al., 77 F. Appx. 663 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 903 (2004).

21. Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children et al., D.C. No. 03-120(RWR); D.C. Cir. No. 03-5092, cert. denied USSC No. 03-301 (2006).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. When Federal Question Raised.

Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) raised the federal questions in the Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition and its amendment at page 1 thru 15, filed on November 28, 2018, and on February 19, 2019 with the Fairfax Ct. Cir. Ct.  They were raised again in the Petition for Appeal to the S. Ct. VA on August 28, 2019, and during oral argument on February 21, 2020. The courts below never addressed the challenge to  the systemic denial of access to an impartial court, as well as the denial of the right to due process and equal protection of the laws in violation of the Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

b. Material Facts.

In 2003 Washington, D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and Washington, D.C. Lobbyist Jack Harbeston (“Holder et al.”) violated VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 (App-23) by entering Virginia to “combine, associate, agree, and mutually” did file two VSBDB bar complaints to injure Rodriguez’s federal civil litigation practice, reputation, profession, right to employment and statutory property rights.

The two bar complaints state they were filed:

First, for Rodriguez litigating to enforce a statutory Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on treasure trove under VA Code § 54.1-3932 (1950) (App-10). See Isidoro Rodriguez v. HFP Inc., et al., 77 F. Appx. 663 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 903 (2004); Isidoro Rodriguez v. Guy Vander Jagt, et al., Sup. Ct. of Va. No 040941/040942, cert. denied, No. 04-867 (Feb. 28, 2005); Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995); Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.) v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000); Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997); and,

Second, for Rodriguez litigating to enforce the rights of a father under Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Oct. 1980, T.I.A.A. No 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (App-7 and App-17) (“Treaty”), VA Code, and Joint Custody Agreement to protect his US citizen Son from being forced from Virginia in 2002 to a “zone of war” in the Republic of Colombia (App-17), Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children et al, D.C. No. 03-120(RWR); D.C. Cir. No. 03-5092, cert. denied USSC No. 03-301 (2006).

At the outset, Rodriguez challenged the judicial authority and jurisdiction of the VSBDB (See http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml). In response, in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 (App-23) the VSBDB did “combine, associate, agree, and mutually” participated in the business conspiracy by issuing in 2006 a void ab initio order to injure Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights.

Subsequently, as part of the business conspiracy Rodriguez was disbarred from federal practice from 2006 to 2010 by the summary reciprocal enforcement of the VSBDB void ab initio order in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine under Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), by the Office of the Clerk the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, DC and Federal Circuit, the U.S. Dist. Court for the ED VA, and U.S. Tax Court (page I, ii, iii).

Also, as part of the business conspiracy in 2006 Rodriguez was deprived of his property by: (a) the Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Tax Court’s reciprocal enforcement of the VSBDB void ab initio order to declare “frivolous” and then to strike Rodriguez’s litigation expenses-to thereby assess “taxes greater then allowed by law,” See Isidoro and Irene Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, US Tax Court Docket No. 10691-09, cert. denied; and, Isidoro Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, US Tax Court Docket No. 11855-12, cert. denied 2014; and, (b) by the Virginia Employment Commission reciprocal enforcement of the VSBDB void ab initio order to deny Rodriguez unemployment compensation benefits.

Based on this additional evidence of the systemic denial of access to an impartial court to assist the business conspiracy and violation of the Void Ab Initio Order, Rodriguez filed litigation under VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 (App-23). Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jack Harbeston, and Eric Holder et al., US Dist. Ct. WD Wash. No. 11-cv-1601 (JCC) (2011).  See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct App. N. 07-5334, injunction denied SC Ct. No. 07A601, cert. denied US Sup Ct 08-411(Closed, 2008).

After the repeated summary dismissal’s refusing to stop the business conspiracy and the reciprocal enforcement of the VSBDB void ab initio order, Rodriguez in 2012 file under VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 (App-23), as well as under Bivens and RICO, see Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., US Dist. Ct. ED VA 12-cv-663-JAB (April 12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No 13-1638 (Nov. 2013), cert. denied 2014.

But there too, the Hon. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. did summarily dismissed to again deny access to an impartial court: (1) by not disqualifying himself because the Judge’s wife was a member of the Defendant VSBDB; (2) by granting absolute immunity, by granting summary dismissal, and by granting a nationwide Federal prefiling injunction of any future litigation for violation of the VA Const, VA Code; and, (3) by holding a lack of jurisdiction in Virginia to enforce VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 (App-23)– despite the evidence that Holder et al. entered Virginia to file the two fraudulent VSBDB bar complaints. See also  Isidoro Rodriguez v. Devis and VA State Bar, VA Sup Ct. No. 06052, cert. denied US Sup Ct. Nos. 06A619/06-875 (Closed, October 2006); Isidoro Rodriguez v. Pereira, 163 F. Appx. 227 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 954 (2006).

Based on this additional evidence of the business conspiray and systemic denial of access to an impartial court,  Rodriguez did petition for redress of the grievances prior to the opening each January from 2010 to 2019 of the General Assembly for the VSBDB violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine (See 2010 Petition to VA General Assembly).

After receiving no response to the petitions for grievances fo six years, Rodriguez filed on May 15, 2016, a Complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, No. P-926-16 / MC-367-16, for violation of the right to due process and equal protection of the laws under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the absolute grant of immunity to government attorneys and judges. (See also January 2017 United Nations Complaint).

In response to these complaints, the VSBDB et al. used the cronyism and political influence in the legal profession of Virginia to surreptitiously lobby the General Assembly after 2017: (a) in violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws, to enact a retroactive amendment adopting the 1998 unconstitutional S. Ct. VA Court Rules Part 6, § IV, ¶13 creating the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court” and permitting the S. Ct. VA to appoint VSBDB members as judges (App-26); and, (b) in violation of the prohibition under Art. IV § 14, ¶3(18) VA Const. (See VA Code § 8.01-223.2 (2017) (App-22) to enact special legislation granting the VSBDB immunity for the business conspiracies (See VA Code § 8.01-223.2 (2017) (App-22) (see also General Assembly 2019 HB 2111, introduced on January 5, 2019, four (4) days after Rodriguez petitioned the Fairfax County members of the General Assembly).

Based on this evidence, Rodriguez filed below the Complaint for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to compel the VSBDB to either explain under what it acts as a “court” or to enjoin it usurping judicial authority (Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Circuit Court, Case No. CL 2018-16433).  See also Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Case No. CL 2018-16227).

In written and oral responses the VSBDB in obfuscated and failed to cite any  authority under VA Const., or VA Code for their sitting as a “court” and acting as “judges.”  But rather, the VSBDB obtusely assert in violation of the prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const. and VA Code § 54.1-3915 (1950 to present), that the delegation of rule making authority under VA Code § 54.1-3909 (1950) gave to the S. Ct. VA the power to issue court rules giving the VSBDB judicial authority and jurisdiction to create the VSBDB as a “court,” and to appoint VSBDB members as judges.

Furthermore, the VSBDB arrogantly defied the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by arguing that Rodriguez lacked standing to challenge the VSBDB 2006 Void Ad Initio Order. Without addressing this evidence of the systemic denial of access to an impartial court to violate the U.S. and VA Const., as well as VA Code, the Fairfax County Circuit Court issued a summary prefiling injunction order (App-2) and a summary dismissal order of the Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition (App-4) on June 28, 2019.  The Petition for Appeal was refused by the S. Ct. VA on March 2, 2020 (App-1).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

There has been repeated violation of the First, Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by Fairfax County Circuit Court’s systemic denial of access to an impartial court and trial by a jury: (1) so to not hold the VSBDB accountable for a void ab initio order usurping judicial power to assist Holder et al’s business conspiracy; (2) to not enjoin an ex post facto amendment (App-26); and, to not enjoin special legislation granting immunity (App-22).

I.  THE SYSTEMIC DENIAL OF ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT.

A. Violations of the 5th and 14th Amendment to US Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the systemic denial of access to an impartial court. 

The Complaint for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition Court is founded upon records (page i, ii, and iii) evidencing the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the systemic denial of access to an impartial court, the systemic denial to a statutory, and the systemic denial to a common law jury trial, so to not hold the VSBDB accountable for usurping of jurisdiction and judicial authority by the issuance in 2006 of the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order (App- 6) to further Holder et al.’ s business conspiracy.

This evidence of the willful violation of the limitations and prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA., and VA Code VA Code § 54.1-3935A (1950-2017), is confirmed by the VSBDB argument that under VA Code § 54.1-3909 (1950) delegation of rule making authority the S. Ct. VA had the power to issue rules establishing the VSBDB as a “court” and for the S. Ct VA to appoint VSBDB members as judges with jurisdiction to discipline an attorney.

Furthermore, VSBDB argument confirms the willful violation of the controlling 1923 precedent under Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 VA 249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835), that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” although in a proper case a court does have inherent judicial power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court. To repeat, for a court to have,

“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).

Based on this holding the 1932 Acts of Assembly p. 139 (codified at VA Code § 54.1-3935A (1950-2017)), was enacted to assist the judicial branch by establishing a decentralized attorney disciplinary system to give by statute the exclusive judicial authority and jurisdiction to discipline attorneys to the ninety-five (95) County Circuit Court and eleven (11) Court of Appeals (App-25). When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954)  Furthermore, under Art. VI § 5 VA Const. (App-21), and VA Code § 54.1 3915 (2050) (App-24) the S. Ct. VA was specifically prohibited from promulgating any court rules inconsistent with this decentralized attorney disciplinary system.VA Code § 54.1-3934 (1950) Legislative History to  1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1-3935A (1998) .

Under VA Code § 54.1-3935C (1950-2017) the Virginia State Bar and by extension the VSBDB, was established only as,

“an administrative agency of the [S. Ct. VA] for the purpose of investigating and reporting [to the Circuit Court] violations of rules and regulations adopted by the court under this article.”

Therefore, the evidence confirms that no statute was ever enacted prior to the 2017 ex post facto legislation that amended VA Code § 54.1-3935 (1950-2017) to retroactively adopt the unconstitutional S. Ct. Va rules creating the VSBDB and vesting it with judicial power and jurisdiction as a “court”.

Consequently, benchmark of this action and all the past litigation (pages i, ii, and iii), has been to enforce the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine under English common law as helin The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (KB 1613) that was incorporated as a cornerstone of United States jurisprudence by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803).  There it was held that,

“[c]ourts are constituted by constitutional authority and they cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. if they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. they are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”  (Emphasis added)

This Court reconfirmed the Void Order Doctrine by holding that due process mandated that State court must assure the right of access to an impartial judicial branch based on the constitutional obligation on the courts to decide matters presented by litigants, because:

“With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction, which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US 264, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).

Regarding the mandate under the 5th and 14th Amendments, this Court held in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325, 326 (1937), that the right to due process includes those fundamental liberties that are “implicit” in the concept of ordered liberty, such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.”  To this end,

“[t]he Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested State tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”  Marshal v. Jern Co, 446 US 238, 242 (1980).

Therefore to assure that nether a judge nor court are permitted to act outside of their jurisdiction and judicial authority the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine is incorporation into 5th & 14th Amendments guarantee due process by confirming that any State proceedings that is outside of constitutional or statutory judicial authority or jurisdiction is void ab initio and actionable.

The Court recognized that there is a requirement on both State and Federal court to have access to an impartial court to assure effective vindication of a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief:

(a) for violation of the First Amendment’s Right to Petition Clause, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 513 (1972);

(b) for violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,  Murray v. Giarratano, 492 US 1, 11 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion); Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 US 305, 335 (1985); and,

(c) for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 US 551, 557 (1987).

In accordance withprecedents this Court’s holding in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 US 403, 412-418 (2002), that to assert a claim of denial of access to an impartial court the claim must be first made in an underlying cause of action, the Complaint for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition was filed in the Fairfax County Circuit Court against the VSBDB:

(a) to obtain judicial review of the VSBDB usurping judicial power and jurisdiction in violation of Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1-3915 & § 54.1-3935A (1950-2017), to assist Holder et al.’s business conspiracy by issuance of a Void Ab Initio Order;

b. to obtain judicial review of the violation of the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.;

c. to obtain judicial review of the violation of the mandate of separation of power between the General Assembly, and the S. Ct. VA and the Executive Branch by the ex post facto amendment to retroactively expand the power of the S. Ct VA. by adopting of the 1998 unconstitutional court rules creating the VSBDB and appointing VSBDB members as judges; and,

d. to obtain judicial review of the violation of the prohibition on enacting special legislation to grant immunity to the VSBDB as a private association.

This mandate of assuring access to an impartial State court is an integral part of due process restriction on the Judicial Branch.  As Patrick Henry observed in 1777,

Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny. (Emphasis added).

Consequently, the right to due process, and the right to equal protection of the laws mandate that when an individual or entity has neither constitutional authority, nor statutory authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio, and is a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner and cannot be reciprocally enforced by any governmental entity or court by either stare decisis or res judicata.    Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51-52 (2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, (1987).

Therefore, because the VSBDB has neither constitutional authority, nor statutory authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any valid order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (App-9), the VSBDB 2006 void ab initio order is a complete nullity from its issuance it may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time or in any manner. In that context, the systemic denial of access to an impartial Virginia and Federal court (page i, ii, iii), is a violation of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.  But the VSBDB void ab initio order issued as a “kangaroo court” was repeatedly reciprocal enforced by the abuse of the judicially created abstention doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.  See Daniels v. Thomas, 225 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 486-487 (1983); and, Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (March 7, 2011).

The VSBDB has willfully defied the 5th and 14th Amend., and the prohibitions under the VA Const., and VA Code, to assist Holder et al.’s business conspiracy, which was compounded by unlawful acts by government attorneys in the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

This must be rejected by the Court, because as prophetically observed by Adam Smith,

“[w]hen the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security.” The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. I., Of the Expense of Justice, pp 200.

B. Systemic denial of the right to a jury trial of the evidence of malfeasance.

The Fourteenth Amendment, mandates, “the duty of every State to provide, in the administration of justice, for the redress of private wrongs.”  Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 US 512, 521 (1885).

To this end both the Seventh Amendment and Art. I § 11 VA Const. guarantee the right to a common-law trial for malfeasance. As early as The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (KB 1613), it was determined that the jury trial was one of the most important safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive governmental policies.

In this context, Thomas Jefferson observed in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789, that,

“I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its Constitution.”

Later, In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955) (Black, J.), the Court held,

“[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. This Court has confirmed that all doubts should be resolved in favor of jury trials considering the strong federal policy favoring such trials and right under the Constitution.  Simler v. Conner, 372 US 221, 83 S.Ct. 609, 9 L.Ed2d 691 (1967).

See also, Grafton Partners LP v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 36 Cal 4th 944, 116 P.3d 479 (2005) (court finding a violation of the right to a jury trial under California Constitution-similar to VA Const. Art. I Section 11).

This common law right to a trial by a jury of the evidence of wrongdoing by acts outside the scope of authority was also confirmed in the 1995 case argued and won by Rodriguez against Eric Holder et al,’s policy of granting absolute impunity to government employees and judges for acts for outside of legal authority.  Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 US 417, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed. 2d 375 (1995) (4th Cir USCA reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing before a jury to determine if the government employee acts DUI while having sex were within or outside the scope of employment).

The common law right to a trial by jury is augmented by the statutory right to a jury trial for a business conspiracy under VA Code §§ 499 & 500.  The existence of a business conspiracy is a jury question of facts-not for the court.  As explained in Commercial Business Systems v. BellSouth, 249 Va. 239 at 267-68 (1995), statutory conspiracy claim,

is a matter for determination by a jury. whether a conspiracy caused the alleged damaged ordinarily is a question for a jury. Ordinarily it is the function of a jury to determine whether and to what extent a plaintiff has been damaged. (Emphasis added)

The record below confirms the systemic denial of access to a trial by jury by the summary denial of motions filed under 7th Amendment U.S. Const., Art I § 11 VA Const., VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 and the common law, Rodriguez has been denied of his right due process and equal protection of the laws.  Therefore,  this Court must exercise its supervisory authority to assure access to an impartial jury trial to enforce the prohibitions and limitations under both VA Const., and VA Code.

As observed by Attorney General John Ashcroft,

“it is in the federal government’s interest to have effective and fair state courts, lest litigants turn to federal courts to resolve matters properly within state court responsibilities.” November 2, 2003, Department of Justice Evaluation of the State Judicial Institutes’s Effectiveness to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.  (Emphasis added)

II.  VIOLATION OF ART. XII § 1 AND ART. 1 § 9 VA CONST. BY THE EX POST FACTO AMENDMENT ADOPTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES.

A.  Denial of the 1st Amend Right to Petition for Grievances.

Under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. only the Citizens of Virginia can amend the Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., to expand the power of the S. Ct VA.  to permit the S. Ct. VA  to create the VSBDB as a court and to appoint VSBDB as judges.

This legislative power granted by the Citizens to the General Assembly can neither be delegated nor modified without the Citizens ratifying an amendment to the VA Const.

Also, under Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 of the US Const. and Art. 1 § 9 VA Const., the VSBDB is prohibited from lobbying the General Assembly to enact an ex post facto law in 2017 to adopt the 1998 court rules to have retroactive effect.

In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1816), Chief Justice John Marshall defined an ex post facto law, as

“one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.”

Therefore, an ex post facto law has an impact on past transactions. See Ex parte Garland, 71 US (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867); See also McCoy v. State Highway Department of South Carolina, 169 SE 174, 169 SC 436 (1954). In Calder v. Bull, 3 US ( 3 Dall.) 386, 390, 397 (1798), this court determined that the ex post facto clause only prohibited the passage of criminal or penal measures that had a retroactive effect.  But, too this court held that attorney discipline proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and subject to the prohibition under the ex post facto clause, Ex parte Garland, 71 US (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1867) (companion case to Ex parte Garland, supra.). In both decisions, the court confirmed that an attorney has certain procedural and substantive rights to ensure due process and equal protection of the laws. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 US (4 Wall.) 277 (1806); In Re Ruffalo, 390 US 544, 550-51, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117,121-23 (1968); see also Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210, 212 (Miss. 1987); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 345 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 1975).

This right to due process is mandated because attorney discipline proceedings are highly penal character.  However, in violation of the above VA Const. restrictions, and Rodriguez’s right under the First Amendment and Art. I VA Const. to petition for grievances (See 2009 Presentatoin to Fairfax County member of General Assembly ):

first, the VSBDB lobbied for the enacting in 2017 of the ex post facto amendment of VA Code § 54.1-3935A (1950 to 2017) (App-25) to retroactively adopt in violation of Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., Art. 1 § 9 VA Const., and Art. XII § 1 of the VA Const. the 1998 unconstitutional court rules establishing the VSBDB as a “court” and to appoint VSBDB members as judges (VA Code § 54.1-3935 (2017)) (App-26), and,

second, the VSBDB lobbied for the enacting in 2017/2019 in violation of Act. IV § 14, &3(18) VA Const. special legislation aimed to grant immunity to the VSBDB as a private association VA Code § 8.01-223.2 (2017) and 2019 HB 2111.

Thus the Amended Complaint for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition was properly filed based this evidence that VA Code § 54.1-3935 (2017) was enacted to conceal the ongoing violations of VA Const and VA Code by retroactively

“[c]onform[ing] the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” (App- 28)

to the unconstitutional 1998 Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 establishing the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court” and to permit the S. Ct. VA to appoint VSBDB as “judge” with jurisdiction and judicial authority to discipline an attorney. Under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., the General Assembly was and is without power to circumvent the limitations and prohibitions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const.

Thus the 2017 ex post facto amendment is highly penal since it obfuscates and seeks to deprives Rodriguez of his right of action challenging the business conspiracy and the violation of Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

III.  VIOLATION OF ART. IV § 14, ¶3 (18) VA CONST. PROHIBITION ON ENACTING SPECIAL LEGISLATION TO GRANT IMMUNITY.

Under Art. IV, § 14 ¶ 3 (18) VA Const., the General Assembly is prohibited from  enacting any special, or private law,

“[g]ranting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive . . .  immunity”.

The VSBDB is not a court, nor a state agency nor a corporation. It is an administrative agency of the S. Ct. VA within the unincorporated professional organization of the Virginia State Bar.  Neither governmental or judicial immunity applies to them, thus they are not clothed with immunity.

Therefore, therefore courts below have denied access to an impartial court by not holding the VSBDB accountable for lobbying for the special legislation [VA Code § 8,01-223.2 (2017) (App-22) and General Assembly 2019 HB 2111], granting immunity for the business conspiracy.

CONCLUSION

The evidence confirm the denial of the Complaint for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition as an integral part of the systemic denial of access to an impartial court:

(a) to not hold the VSBDB accountable for the void ab initio order to assist Holder et al.’s business conspiracy;

(b) to not hold the VSBDB accountable for lobbying to violate the amending procedure under Art. XII §1 VA Const.;

(c) to not hold the VSBDB accountable for lobbying to violate the prohibition of ex post facto law under Art. I, 10, cl. 1 U.S. Const., and Art. I § 9 VA Const.;

(d) to not hold the VSBDB accountable for lobbying to violate the separation of power under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., to retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to the 1998 unconstitutional VA  S. Ct. Rules Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13; and,

(e) to not hold the VSBDB accountable for lobbying for special legislation to not be held accountable for assisting and furthering the business conspiracy in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500 by Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder et al.

For the above reasons, the petition must be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
By:_________________________

Isidoro Rodriguez

Former Member of the Bar

2671 Avenir Place, Apt 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180Telephone: 571.477.5350

Argument to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia et al, in Isidoro Rodriguez vs. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (No 191136). Isidoro Rodriguez vs. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (No 191136).

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February 11, 2020, at 1420 hrs. in lieu of filing a Reply Brief:

            GOOD AFTERNOON. I REQUEST PERMISSION FOR MY COURT REPORTER (IT WAS GRANTED).

            MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. 

            I AM ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ.  I ARGUE TO SEEK REVERSAL, AND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD ENJOINING THEIR SITTING AS A KANGAROO COURT BASED ON THE ISSUANCE OF A VOID AB INITIO ORDER.  THE VOID ORDER WAS ISSUED AS THE LINCHPIN OF A PROHIBITED STATUTORY BUSINESS CONSPIRACY BY WASHINGTON D.C. LOBBYIST/ATTORNEY ERIC HOLDER ET AL.   TO DAMAGE MY BUSINESS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPUTATION, PROFESSION AND RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT BY REVOKING MY LAW LICENSE IN RETALIATION FOR LITIGATING TO ENFORCE MY STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHT IN A CHOATE ATTORNEYS LIEN AND RIGHTS OF A FATHER TO PROTECT MY U.S. CITIZEN SON FROM BEING TAKEN FROM A “ZONE OF WAR” IN FY 2000 IN THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA.  THIS IN VIOLATION OF MY RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS UNDER ART. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA CONST., AS WELL AS VA CODE § 54.1-3935 (1950 TO 2017). (SEE Complaint against the Offices of the United States Attorney for the E.D. of Virginia and District of Columbia, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Refusing to Investigate/Charge Eric Holder et al. for a Business Conspiracy in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499, 500, by acts of Malfeasance During the Obama Administration in Violations of Art. VI of the VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

            THUS, THE BENCHMARK FOR THE WRIT ARE THE CONTROLLING PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT FROM 1835 TO 2007 MANDATING THAT PURSUANT TO ART. VI VA CONST. THE JUDICIAL POWER TO REVOKE A VIRGINIA LAW LICENSE WITH STATEWIDE EFFECT CAN ONLY BE BY STATUTE THAT WAS ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.  THUS, NO COURT CAN ISSUE COURT RULES IT POWER TO DISBAR AN ATTORNEY WITH STATEWIDE EFFECT INCONSISTENT WITH RIGHT UNDER VA CODE.  SEE EX PARTE FISHER, 6 LEIGH (33 VA.) 619 (1835) 624-25 (1835), LEGAL CLUB OF LYNCHBURG V. A.H. LIGHT, 137 VA. 249 AT 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), AND IN RE: JOHATHAN A. MOSELEY, SUP CT. VA NO 061237 (2007).  THUS, THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS BASED ON THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE UNDER VIRGINIA CONST., VA CODE, AND CASE LAW,[1]   AS MARBURY V. MADISON, 1 CRUNCH 137, 140 (1803), STATES,

“[C]OURTS ARE CONSTITUTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND THEY CANNOT ACT BEYOND THE POWER DELEGATED TO THEM. IF THEY ACT BEYOND THAT AUTHORITY, AND CERTAINLY IN CONTRAVENTION OF IT, THEIR JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS ARE REGARDED AS NULLITIES. THEY ARE NOT JUST VOIDABLE, BUT SIMPLY VOID, AND THIS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL.”

            ALL OF THE ABOVE COMMAND THAT WHEN AN ENTITY CREATED BY COURT RULES SUCH AS THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD HAS NEITHER CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, NOR STATUTORY AUTHORITY, NOR INHERENT LEGAL POWER, NOR JURISDICTION TO RENDER ANY ORDER.  THUS THE 2006 ORDER VOID AB INITIO IS A COMPLETE NULLITY FROM THE DATE OF ITS ISSUANCE AND MAY BE IMPEACHED DIRECTLY OR COLLATERALLY AT ANY TIME, OR IN ANY MANNER.  THIS PARTICULARLY BASED ON THE SYSTEMIC DENIAL OF ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT AND COMMON LAW JURY TRIAL TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE OF MALFEASANCE.

            THEREFORE, THE WRIT SEEKS,

  • TO ENFORCE THE PROHIBITIONS AND MANDATES OF SEPARATION OF POWER UNDER I § 5 VA CONST.;[2]
  • THE WRIT SEEKS TO ENFORCE THE RESTRICTION UNDER ART. VI §§ 1[3], 5[4] & 7[5] VA CONST. WHEREIN THE CITIZENS GAVE ONLY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE POWER TO IMPART JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND TO APPOINT JUDGES.
  • THE WRIT SEEKS TO ENFORCE VA CODE § 54.1-3915[6] & § 54.1-3935 (1950-2009),[7] ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSISTENT WITH THE VA CONST. RESTRICTIONS TO ESTABLISH A STATEWIDE DECENTRALIZE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM IN EACH IN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF VIRGINIA, IN TANDEM WITH THE BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS POWER UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3934.[8]
  • THE WRIT SEEKS TO ENFORCE PROHIBITIONS OF 1 § 9 AND ART. XII § 1 OF THE VA CONST.,[9] TO ENJOIN THE EX POST FACTO AMENDMENT OF VA CODE § 54.1-3935 TO ADOPT RETROACTIVELY IN 2017 THE 1998 COURT RULES THAT BESTOWED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY ON THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD AND APPOINTED THEM AS JUDGES.
  • THE WRIT SEEKS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATION UNDER VA CODE §§ 18.2-499 & 500[10] FOR A RETALIATORY BUSINESS CONSPIRACY TO REVOKE MY LAW LICENSE FOR LITIGATING TO ENFORCE MY STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A CHOATE VA CODE ATTORNEYS LIEN ON A CLIENT’S CONTRACT CLAIM TO TREASURE TROVE VALUED AT $18 BILLION DOLLARS AND LITIGATING TO ENFORCE MY RIGHTS AS A FATHER UNDER JOINT CUSTODY AGREEMENT/VA CODE TO PROTECT MY U.S. CITIZEN SON FROM BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST HIS WILL IN 2000 TO A “WAR ZONE” IN THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA.  THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD ISSUED THE 2006 VOID AB INITIO ORDER TO DAMAGE MY BUSINESS, REPUTATION, PROFESSION, EMPLOYMENT, AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO 2006 FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.

            THE GOVERNMENT SURREALLY NEITHER DENIES NOR CHALLENGES THE ABOVE EVIDENCE OF THEIR WILLFUL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE BUSINESS CONSPIRACY BY WASHINGTON D.C. LOBBYIST/ATTORNEY ERIC HOLDER ET AL.

            RATHER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MANDAMUS ACTION BELOW OPPOSES THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT BASED ONLY ON THE DELEGATION OF COURT RULEMAKING AUTHORITY UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3909, AND ARGUING LACK OF STANDING DESPITE THE CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, VA CONST AND VA CODE.

            THIS IN AND OF ITSELF IS A CONFIRMATION OF THE WILLFUL CHARACTER OF THE VIOLATION OF THE VA CONST. AND VA CODE, AS WELL AS THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION BY VIOLATION OF THE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM ESTABLISHED UNDER THE 1950 VA CODE BY COURT RULES THAT UNLAWFULLY BESTOWED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE APPOINTING OF ITS MEMBERS AS JUDGES TO DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS.

            FINALLY, THE WRIT IS SOUGHT BASED ON THE RECORD OF A SYSTEMIC DENIAL OF ACCESS TO AN IMPARTIAL COURT AND COMMON LAW TRIAL BY JURY TO ENFORCE THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS UNDER VA CONST. AND VA CODE.  THE LITIGATION RECORD FROM 2004 TO THE PRESENT PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF THIS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, INCLUDING :

            FIRST, U.S. DIST. CT. HON JUDGE GIBNEY (EDVA) FAILURE TO RECUSE HIMSELF BASED ON THE FACT THAT HIS WIFE IS A MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD, AND ISSUING IN 2013 A SUMMARY ORDER GRANTING IMPUNITY, PRIOR RESTRAINING, AND ISSUING A NATIONWIDE INJUNCTION DEPRIVING ME OF ACCESS TO ANY FEDERAL COURT SO FOR THE VIOLATIONS OF VA CONST AND VA CODE AND BUSINESS CONSPIRACY.

            SECOND, IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REDRESS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (HTTP://T.CO/SLV7PZ3ZD5), FROM 2017 TO 2019:  (A) THERE WAS ENACTED AN EX POST FACTO AMENDMENT TO VA CODE § 54.1-3934 TO ADOPT RETROACTIVELY THE 1998 COURT RULES; AND, (B) THERE WAS ENACTED VA CODE § 8.01-223.2 AS SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN VIOLATION OF ART. IV § 14, ¶3(18), TO GRANT IMMUNITY TO THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD FROM ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE BUSINESS CONSPIRACY (SEE ALSO 2019 HB 2111).

Isidoro Rodriguez

Rodriguez and Rodriguez

World Trade Center Barranquilla

Cale 76 No. 54-11, Suite 313

Barranquilla, Colombia S.A.

(571)477-5350

      [1] SEE, COLLINS V. SHEPHERD, 274 VA. 390, 402 (2007); SINGH V. MOONEY, 261 VA. 48, 51‑52(2001); BARNES V. AM. FERTILIZER CO., 144 VA. 692, 705 (1925); ROOK V. ROOK, 233 VA. 92, 95 (1987).

    [2] ARTICLE I § 5 VA CONST. “THAT THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD BE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT; AND THAT THE MEMBERS THEREOF MAY BE RESTRAINED FROM OPPRESSION, . . ..”

                         ART. VI § 1 VA CONST., STATES IN RELEVANT PART THAT JUDICIAL POWER SHALL BE VESTED, IN “COURTS OF ORIGINAL OR APPELLATE JURISDICTION SUBORDINATE TO THE SUPREME COURT AS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY FROM TIME TO TIME ESTABLISH.”

      [4] ART. VI § 5 VA CONST., STATES THAT ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE RULES, “SUCH RULES SHALL NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL LAW” ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

                [5] ART. VI § 7 VA CONST., STATES IN RELEVANT PART THAT JUSTICES OF, “ALL OTHER COURTS OF RECORD SHALL BE CHOSEN BY . . .  THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. . ..

[6] VA. Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.

[7] VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2007). Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has. . . violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
  2. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time, the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court.

    [8] VA Code § 54.1-3934. Revocation of license by Board.  The Board of Bar Examiners may, for good cause, revoke any license issued by it at any time before there has been a qualification under it in any of the courts of this Commonwealth.  Code 1950, § 54-72; 1988, c. 765.

    [9] ARTICLE XII § 1 VA CONST. AMENDMENT, STATES, THAT ANY AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION ARE TO BE REFERRED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THEN IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SUBMIT SUCH PROPOSED AMENDMENT OR AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENS FOR APPROVAL.

    [10] VA Code § 18.2-499. Combinations to injure others in their reputation, trade, business or profession; rights of employees.         A. Any two or more persons who combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of (i) willfully and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever or (ii) willfully and maliciously compelling another to do or perform any act against his will, or preventing or hindering another from doing or performing any lawful act, shall be jointly and severally guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Such punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief recoverable under § 18.2-500. 

Any person who attempts to procure the participation, cooperation, agreement or other assistance of any one or more persons to enter into any combination, association, agreement, mutual understanding or concert prohibited in subsection A of this section shall be guilty of a violation of this section and subject to the same penalties set out in subsection A.

            VA Code § 18.2-500. Same; civil relief; damages and counsel fees; injunctions. — (a) Any person who shall be injured in his reputation, trade, business or profession by reason of a violation of § 18.2-499, may sue therefor and recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable fee to plaintiff’s counsel; and without limiting the generality of the term, “damages” shall include loss of profits. . .. 

PETITION FOR STATEMENT OF INTEREST-BASED ON ACTS OUTSIDE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

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September 1, 2019

President Donald J. Trump

Attorney General of the United States the Hon. William Barr        

U.S. Attorney John H. Durham

Re:   PETITION FOR STATEMENT OF INTEREST-BASED ON ACTS OUTSIDE OF    LEGAL AUTHORITY AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Greetings,

      The Inspector General’s finding confirms two issues: first, both President Trump and his campaign were the targets of government attorneys and employees acts outside of legal authority or scope of employment; and, second, despite the Federal Tort Claims Act, current government policies that were established by Eric Holder et al., during the Clinton and Obama Administrations –makes it difficult, if not impossibility, to obtain accountability.

      But, to enforce Constitutional and statutory limitations and prohibitions to there must be a procedure to secure accountability against government attorneys and employees for their willful and negligent acts.

      Therefore, I filed my May 20, 2019 Petition for a Statement of Interest and Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia in Isidoro Rodriguez V. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 190579 (see my presentation to the panel on July 22, 2019 (Exhibit 1)).  I also submit this letter as an additional Petition for a Statement of Interest and Amicus Brief in Petition for Appeal, Isidoro Rodriguez V. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, No______ filed July 28, 2019 (Exhibit 2).

      These Petitions for a Statement of Interest are filed because it is clear that the Common Law and the statutory mandates under the Virginia Tort Claims Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act have been willfully violated by the Judicial Branch granting “impunity” and absolute immunity to government attorneys for willful acts outside of legal authority and scope of employment. (See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (4/12/2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No 13-1638 (Nov. 2013) (the Ho. Judge Gibney issued against me a nationwide Federal injunction against any actions challenging the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., VA Code).  Judge Gibney violated the limitations and prohibitions under the Constitutions of Virginia and the United States in defiance of the holding in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 140 (1803).  This is evidence of the use of political influence and cronyism in retaliation against me for being an independent federal litigator by the systemic denial of access to an impartial judiciary.  I note that Thomas Jefferson warned 225 years ago,

“[t]he germ of destruction of our nation is in the power of the judiciary, an irresponsible body – working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall render powerless the checks of one branch over the other and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.”

      This underscores James Madison warning that,

“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  The Federalist Papers, No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788

      Consequently, I renew my request for a Statement of Interest is filed in the above-cited actions before the Supreme Court of Virginia.  This based on my prevailing arguments in Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (U.S. Supreme Court reversed/remanded for an evidentiary hearing before an independent jury under the Common Law and 7th Amend. U.S. Const. to decide the issue of alleged acts outside the scope of employment).

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

Isidoro Rodriguez v. Viringia State Bar Disciplinary Board, VA Supreme Court Petition for Appeal 08/28/2019, for Violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine under VA Const. and Va Code.

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Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law

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   ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

  1. The Circuit Court erred in granting a Demurrer based on Rodriguez’s lack of standing to obtain a Writ to the VSBDB for their Common Law Conspiracy and Statutory Business Conspiracy under VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500, to damage Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, statutory property right in defiance of the mandates of separation of power and due process under the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, Art. I § 5, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 and Art. XII §1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.), and in willful disobediance of the liitations and prohibitions under VA Code § 54.1‑3915 & § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009), as alleged in the Verified Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, and Exhibits A thru V.

These errors were preserved in the June 28, 2019, transcript at page 6, 7, 12, 13, 14 and 15, and the objections to the Circuit Court’s Order of June 28, 2019 the dismissing the Petition.

  1. The Circuit Court erred in granting a Demurrer based on holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to prohibit the Common Law Conspiracy and Statutory Business Conspiracy in violation VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500, by the VSBDB issuing a Void Ab Initio Order in defiance of the restrictions under Art. I § 5 VA Const., Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and VA Code §§ 54.1‑3915 & § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009), as alleged in the Verified Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition and Exhibits A thru V.

These errors were preserved in the June 28, 2019, transcript on page 13, 14, 15 and 16, and the objection to the Circuit Court’s Order of June 28, 2019 dismissing Petitioner’s Petition.

  1. The Circuit Court erred in enjoining Rodriguez in the Fairfax County Circuit Court and summarily dismissing Rodriguez’s motion to enjoin the VSBDB’s Common Law Conspiracy and Statutory Business Conspiracy per VA Code § 18.2-500, as alleged in Rodriguez’s Verified Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, Motion and Brief.

This error was preserved in the June 28, 2019 transcript at pages 18 and 19, as well as objected to on the Circuit Court Orders of June 28, 2019.

NATURE OF THE CASE/MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

            On November 19, 2018, and April 4, 2019, Rodriguez filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County a Verified Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition with Exhibits A thru V (“Plaintiff’s Ex.” Trial Court Record), for an order to the VSBDB to either:

            (a) advise under what authority did it in 2006 revoke Rodriguez’s license for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights in a choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien under VA Code § 54.1-3932 (2017), and statutory rights as a Father (Plaintiff’ s Ex. D Trial Court Record); or,

            (b) vacate the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order and direct to stop violations of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, Art VI VA Const, and VA Code § § 54.1-3915 & 54.1-3935.

            On November 28, 2018, the VSBDB refused to accept service by the Sheriff. On December 26, 2018, Rodriguez filed a Verified Motion for Publication based upon the VSBDB refusal of service or the VSBDB not naming an agent for service.

            On January 2, 2019, the Circuit Court issued an Order of Publication. The Washington Times filed a Notarized Affidavit confirming publication on January 10, 17, 24, and 31, 2019. On February 8, 2019, Rodriguez filed a motion for Default Judgement.

            On February 21, 2019, the VSBDB filed its opposition to the Writ. The VSBDB filed Demurrers on April 23, and June 13, 2019. In both pleadings and at oral argument on June 28, 2019, the VSBDB admitted it was not a “court,” and its members were not “judges”, but that the VSBDB interpreted VA Code § 54.1-3909 and § 54.1-3910(1950-2017) to authorize it as a “parallel” administrative agency to a “court” with the power to revoke Rodriguez’s license for his litigating to enforce his statutory rights  (Transcript page 2 second ¶,and page 8, Plaintiff’s Ex. D Trial Court Record).

            Based on the VSBDB admitted circumventing the limitation and prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1-3915 and & § 54.1-3935(1950-2016), on June 10, 2019, Rodriguez per VA Code § 18.2‑500 filed a Motion to Enjoin the VSBDB.

            However, before the VSBDB filed any opposition to Rodriguez’s motion, on June 28, 2019, the Circuit Court granted the VSBDB demurrer, summarily denied Rodriguez’s motion, and enjoined Rodriguez from filing any future actions in Fairfax Circuit Court.   Rodriguez noted specific objections under the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const, and VA Code.  On July 16, 2019, a Notices of Appeal and Notice of the Transcript were filed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

            Based on the open express distrust of the drafters of the VA Const. regarding the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Judicial Branch expressly,[1] the Citizens mandated the separation of power between the General Assembly and the Supreme Court of Virginia by ratifying Art. I § 5 VA Const.[2]

            To this end under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. the Citizens granted only to the General Assembly the power to grant judicial authority,[3] to establish lower courts,[4] and to appoint judges.[5]

            To assure those restrictions be maintained the Citizens ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const., reserved to themselves the authority to amend these constitutional limitations, prohibitions, and restrictions.

            Consistent with these restrictions the General Assembly passed in 1932 the Act of the General Assembly p. 139 (“Act of 1932”) (codified as VA Code § 54.1-3915 (2017) § 54.1-3935(1950-2016) to establish in each County a decentralized attorney disciplinary system to be administered by courts.

            Disregarding the Act of 1932, Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Lawyer Eric Holder and Jack Harbeston (“Eric Holder et al.”) in 2003 filed two complaints with the VSBDB against Rodriguez for his litigating: (a) to enforce his statutory Choate Virginia Attorneys’ Lien under VA Code § 54.1-3932 on a Sea Search Armada contract claim to Treasure Trove valued at USD 18 Billion on the sunken Spanish 1707 Galleon San Jose; and, (b) to enforce his rights as a Father under VA Code and Joint Custody Agreement.

            Rodriguez challenged the VSBDB subject matter jurisdiction for noncompliance with the Act of 1932, and because Eric Holder et al.’s VSBDB complaints were the linchpin of a Common Law Conspiracy and Statutory Business Conspiracy VA Code 18.2-499 & 500 to damage Rodriguez’s international litigation practice, reputation, profession, statutory property rights.[6]

            Disregarding these objections, on November 27, 2006, the VSBDB issued a Void Ab Initio Order revoking Rodriguez’s license for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D and G Trial Court Record).[7]

            Rodriguez filed civil tort actions for damages based on the VSBDB void order in both Virginia and Federal Courts violating the Common Law, Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., VA Code 18.2-499 & 500, and Virginia Tort Claims Act VA Code ‘ 8.01-195.  But, Rodriguez was systematically denied access to an impartial common law trial and court to challenge the VSBDB void order violation of the Act of 1932 and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine (Plaintiff’s Ex. G Trial Court Record), use to assess taxes in 2006 higher than permitted by striking litigation expenses (Plaintiff’s Ex. Qi and Qii Trial Court Record), and use in 2006 to deny Rodriguez unemployment compensation benefits (Ri, Rii, T, and U).

            But, Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial common law jury trial and the court to secure accountability for the VSBDB void ad initio order and Business Conspiracy.(Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (4/12/2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No 13-1638 (Nov. 2013) (nationwide Federal pretrial injunction of actions for violation of the VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine);[8] (Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct. App. N. 07-5334, injunction denied SC Ct. No. 07A601, cert. denied US Sup Ct. 08-411(2008); and (Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Hassell et al., Fairfax Cir. Ct. No. CL-2007-15396, VA S. Ct. No. 081146, cert. denied 08-574 (2008)) (Complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16)); (Petition with the United Nations Committee on Human Rights for grant of “impunity”); (Petitions to the General Assembly, Plaintiff’s Exhibit D,  G I Trial Court Record)   http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

            In response, Rodriguez filed petitions of grievances for the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Codewith his NOVA representatives to the General Assembly (See http://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5). But, rather than investigating and taking corrective action in accordance with the Act of 1932:

             O On January 9, 2017, in violation of Art. XII § 1 VA Const. amending procedures and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. separation of power and due process, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to ex post facto retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under the Act of 1932] for disciplining of attorneys” to the 1998 rules issued by the Supreme Court of Virginia; and,

            O On January 9, 2019, House Bill No 2111 was introduced as Special Legislation in violation of Art. IV §14 ¶4(18) VA Const., by seeing to give immunity to the VSBDB from civil liability for the Business Conspiracy.

            The VSBDB admitted: first, to it being neither a “court” nor its members “judges” in apparent “conflict” with the mandates of VA CODE §§ 54.3915 (2017) & 54.1 3935 (1950-2016), and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine; and, second, to interpreting VA CODE §§ 54.3909 & 54.1 3910 (2017) to  establish it as a “parallel” centralized attorney disciplinary administrative agency in conflict with the limitations and prohibitions under ART. I §§ 5 & 9 VA Const., ART. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA CONST., & ART. XII § 1 VA CONST. (VSBDB Brief in Support of Demurrer June 12, 2019, at page 2 second ¶ and oral argument) (See Brief in Opposition May 28, 2019, page 1, 11; See also Isidoro Rodriguez v. The General Assembly of Virginia, et al., VA Sup Ct Record No. 190579, Response in Opposition to the Petition at page 2 second full paragraph; Transcript of 02/21/2019 hearing pages 33 and 34, Fairfax Ct Cir Ct No 2018-16227, Responsive Pleading to Petition, page 5, (December 18, 2018).

            On June 28, 2019, disregarding the above evidence, the Circuit Court granted a demurrer, etc.

                                              AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT            

I.       THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DEMURRER HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ (“RODRIGUEZ”) LACKED STANDING FOR A WRIT TO THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD (“VSBDB”) FOR VIOLATION OF THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, VA CONST. AND VA CODE. (Assignment of Error No. 1)

A. The Standard of Review Is De Novo.

            “The legal question presented by a circuit court’s decision to sustain a demurrer requires the application of a de novo standard of review.” Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 284 Va. 102, 106, 726 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2012) (citing Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County., 266 Va. 550, 544, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003)). “On appeal, a plaintiff attacking a trial court’s judgment sustaining a demurrer need only show that the court erred, not that the plaintiff would have prevailed on the merits of the case.” Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006).

Rodriguez has Standing for a Writ

            The General Assembly responded to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249, 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) (“[t]he power . . . make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added),[9] by enacting the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“Act of 1932”) (codified as VA Code §§ 54.1-3915 (2017) & 54.1‑3935 (1950-2016)[10], under its exclusive power to grant judicial authority, establish courts, and appoint judges by establishing a County court decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system. The General Assembly explicitly denied the Supreme Court of Virginia any power to directly discipline attorneys by requiring it to appoint a three-judge panel from the Court of Appeals, City of Richmond.

            Finally, under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1 3915 (1950-2017)[11]-the Supreme Court of Virginia was prohibited from promulgating court rules or regulations in “conflict” with VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2016).

            Under the Common Law, Sir Edward Coke stated “an action would lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order,” because,

[W]hen a Court has. . . no [judicial authority or] jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [not before a person who a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process.  Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), (Emphasis added); see also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.

            Regarding the Rodriguez standing for a Writ, consistent with this Virginia recognizes two tort claims for civil conspiracy – one under the common law and the second under statutory Business Conspiracy statute found in VA Code §¶ 18.2-499 & 18.2-500 of the criminal chapter of the Virginia Code – since the violation of § 18.2-499 is a class 1 misdemeanor.  VA Code § 18.2-500 (a) & (b) statutory Business Conspiracy statute provides for the specific remedy of mandatory three-fold damages, cost of suit, reasonable attorney’s fees, and an injunction.

            Thus, as early as 1888, the case of Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 VA. 927, 934, 6 S.E. 620, 624 (1988) recognized the viability of a claim for “a conspiracy or combination to injure a person in his trade or occupation is indictable.”  In 1933, Werth v. Fire Companies’ Adjustment Bureau, 160 Va. 845, 854, 171 S.E. 255, 258-59, cert. denied, 260 U.S. 659 (1933) (citation omitted), acknowledged the ability for a plaintiff to sue atcommon law for civil conspiracy in noting that:

A conspiracy consists of an unlawful combination of two or more persons to do that which is contrary to law or to do that which is wrongful and harmful towards another person.  It may be punished criminally by indictment, or civilly by an action on the case in the nature of conspiracy if damage has been occasioned to the person against whom it is directed. It may also consist of any unlawful combination to carry out an object not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. The essential elements, whether of a criminal or actionable conspiracy, are, in my opinion, the same, though to sustain an action special damages must be proved.

            Consistent with this Virginia’s Business Conspiracy statute-VA Code §¶ 18.2-499 & 18.2-500 was enacted.

            Turning to the evidence this action was filed because the VSBDB void ab initio order  was issued in furtherance of Eric Holder et al.’s Business Conspiracy in violation of VA Code § 18.2.499 & 550 to damage Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession, and property rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D Trial Court Record). Also, the action was filed because the VSBDB void order was used in 2006 to assessed taxes greater than permitted by law and to deny unemployment compensation benefits.  Finally, the action was filed for violation of the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.

Under, Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016), Rodriguez has standing because of these “sufficient interest” based upon the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine and “the parties will be actual adversaries.” Id., 788 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984)).  Rodriguez needs only “demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” to assure a court, “that the issues will be fully and fairly developed.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001).

The standard is easily satisfied given the extensive record of Rodriguez challenges to the VSBDB void order issued to aid and abet Holder et al. Common law and statutory Business Conspiracy by violating the separation of power under Art. I § 5 & 9 VA Const., and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & VA Const. (Plaintiff’s Ex. G and V Trial Court Record).

The injury and damage to Rodriguez are “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 460, and both concrete and particularized to Rodriguez given the systematic denial of access to and impartial court and Common Law jury trial to challenge the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order.

Therefore, the Circuit Court erred to holding the Rodriguez lack standing by failing to comply with the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine given the particularized damages by the VSBDB Void Ab Initio Order violating Art. I §§ 5 &9 VA Const. and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const.  Rodriguez has standing and stated a cause of action where relief to challenge and attacked at any time, Adirectly or collaterally@ can be granted both as an attorney and as a citizen of Virginia injured by the VSBDB void ab initio order. Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, (1987).

II.        THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DEMURRER BY HOLDING THAT THE COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR A WRIT TO THE VSBDB FOR A BUSINESS CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, VA CONST. AND VA CODE. (Assignment of Error No. 2)

            It is a fundamental doctrine of due process under the common law, Art. I & VI of VA Const. VA Code § 54.1‑3935, and the 14th Amend to U.S. Const., that Rodriguez as the party adversely affected and damaged by the VSBDB void ab initio ordermust have his day before a validly constitutionally created impartial court and common law jury trial. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 140 (1803); Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 6 S Ct 1194 (1886).

This right to a Common Law trial by jury is guaranteed by the VA Const. and the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution. It gives subject matter jurisdiction to the Circuit Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus for acts outside the scope of employment and legal authority.  See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995).

            Under the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine first discussed in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 140 (1803),

            “[c]ourts are constituted by authority, and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”

            This is consistent with the twin doctrines of separation of power and due process within both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United States republican system of government.

            In sum, an entity such as the VSBDB, having neither constitutional authority, nor legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any act or order, the 2006 VSBDB void order is void ab initio—as not lawful, not subject to stare decisis/res judicata, and not enforceable being a complete nullity from its issuance, and is to be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See also, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, (1987).

            Virginia Civil procedures the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction under VA Code §8.01-195.3, to hold judge or government attorney accountable for tort outside of the scope of employment or judicial authority or jurisdiction (relief from tort liability apply only to actions within “official capacity” and “acting legally within the scope of their employment,” Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. at 229 and 230, 22 S.E.2d at 12 and 13 (1942).

            Similarly, under the Business Conspiracy statute, the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction to grant equitable relief to enjoin a criminal enterprise outside of legal authority.  Thus, under Christopher V. Harbury (01-394) 536 U.S. 403 (2002), 233 F.3d 596 (reversed and remanded), Rodriguez must have access to an impartial Circuit Court and common law trial by jury to challenge the VSBDB void order.

            Therefore, the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Writ to secure accountability and removal of VSBDB for acts outside of their jurisdiction and legal authority.  This is logical since to enforce the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine a void order can be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner by Rodriguez.  As explained in Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390 (2007),

            An order that is void ab initio is a complete nullity that may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.  (quoting Singh v. Mooney, supra.) Furthermore “[a]n order is void ab initio rather than merely voidable, if ‘the character of the judgment was not such as the court had the power to render, or because the mode of procedure employed by the court was such as it might not lawfully adopt'” (quoting Evans v. Smyth‑Wythe Airport Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 73(1998); Morgan v. Russia and Triangle Assocs., L.L.C., 270 Va. 21, 26‑27, (2005).

See also Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95 (1987).

            As explained in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877),

Since the adoption of the [VA Const.] and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of void judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added)

            Thus, the Circuit Court committed reversible error by willfully obfuscating and refusing to comply with the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine under VA Const. and VA Code.

III.        THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING AN INJUNCTION AGAINST RODRIGUEZ AND DISMISSING RODRIGUEZ’S MOTION UNDER VA CODE §§ 18.2-500 TO ENJOIN THE VSBDB’S BUSINESS CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE, VA CONST. AND VA CODE. (ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3)

            Consistent with the intent of VA Code §§ 18.2-499 & 500, this Court in Gelber v. Glock, Record No. 160500 at p. 38, (June 22, 2017), confirmed that liability for civil liability is to spread “liability to persons other than the primary tortfeasor” once there is as here evidentiary proof that the underlying tort was committed by borrowing from Illinois law, to hold that “[t]he function of the conspiracy claim is to extend liability in tort beyond the active wrongdoers to those who have merely planned, assisted or encouraged the wrongdoer’s acts.” Id. at 38.  Almy v. Grisham, 273 VA. 68, 80, 639 S.E. 2d. 182, 188, (2007). 

            VA Code § 18.2-500 (a) & (b) provides for the specific remedy of mandatory three-fold damages, cost of suit, reasonable attorney’s fees, and an injunction.   

            Here the evidence is indisputable.  In 2006 the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order as the linchpin to Eric Holder et al. Common Law and statutory Business Conspiracy.  The VSBDB void order was also used in 2006 to deprive Rodriguez of his right: (a) not to be taxed higher than permitted by the Internal Revenue Code; and, not to be denied benefits unemployment benefits by the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const. and VA Code.

            The VSBDB void order has damaged Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession, and property rights establishing the existence of the elements of both a Common Law Conspiracy and statutory Business Conspiracy by “concerted action, legal malice, and casually related injury . . . set[ting] forth core facts to support the claim.” Kayes v. Keyser, 72 Va. Cir. 549, 552 (City of Charlottesville 2007) (quoting Atlantic Futon v. Tempur-Pedic, Inc., 67 Va. Cir. 269, 271 (City of Charlottesville 2005)); see also M-Cam v. D’Agostino, Civil Action No. 3:05cv6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45289, at **7-8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2005) (plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants combined to effect a “preconceived plan and unity of design and purpose, for the common design is the essence of the conspiracy”). (Emphasis added)

            Under VA Code §§ 18.2-500(b), Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction and the duty to protect Rodriguez from the VSBDB void ab initio order issued as part of a Eric Holder et al.’s Business Conspiracy. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877); See also Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)(“a void judgment is no judgment at all and is without legal effect”) (Emphases added).  The validity of the VSBDB void order is at issue, it can be attacked in any court as exceeding legal authority under Art. VI VA Const. and the Act of 1932.  See Rose v. Homely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S. Ct 343, 61 Led 608.

            Consequently, the Circuit Court erred in issuing a prefiling injunction preventing Rodriguez from seeking redress and erred in dismissing Rodriguez’s motion for the immediate issuance of an injunction under VA Code § 18.2-500(b),[12] to enjoin the VSBDB void ab initio order depriving Rodriguez of procedural and substantive right to due process and equal protection of the laws. In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 (1968); see also Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210, 212 (Miss. 1987); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 345 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 1975); See Commercial Bus. Sys. Inc. v. BellSouth Serv. Inc., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995) (citing Middlesboro Coca-Cola v. Campbell, 179 Va. 693, 702, 20 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1942)).

                                                                CONCLUSION                                               

         The VSBDB void ab initio order and record of the Fairfax Courty Circuit Court’s systemic denial of access to an impartial judiciary by defying the limitaiton and prohibitions under the VA Cosnt. and VA Code confirms the wrongdoing by government attorneys and judges, as well as the Virginia Bar Association.  The Virginia Judicial Branch has permitted a Common Law and Statutory Business Conspiracy to damage Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession, and statutory property rights.

This evidence of retaliation against Rodriguez for being an independent advocate by the use of political influence and structural cronyism underscores the dangers warned by James Madison, that,

“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  The Federalist Papers, No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788

          The record evokes the regrettable history of the sorry acts of German judges, lawyers and law school’s in the 1930’s violating the rights of citizens under the German Constitution–which was a crucial part in aiding both the rise of the National Socialist Party and the in human acts under German law, because,

the murder of the six million Jews and other persecuted minorities was done completely within the framework of German law.” Professor Michael Bazyler, The Legacy of the Holocaust and Lessons for Today: Research for a New Textbook Holocaust, Genocide, and the Law.

            Thus, this Court must grant review, and remand to enjoin the VSBDB void order.

Dated: August 28, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

(571) 477-5350; E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com


      [1] Patrick Henry wrote, “[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny. (Emphasis added)

            [2] Article I § 5 VA Const. “That the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate and distinct; and that the members thereof may be restrained from oppression, . . ..”

            [3] Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested . . . [in] courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.

            [4] Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly. (Emphasis Added)

[5] Article VI, § 7.  Selection . . . of judges.  The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . ..  The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . ..

      [6] Eric Holder retaliated against Rodriguez for: Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (reverse and remand for a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury of the acts outside the scope of employment by negligently DWI and having sex); See also Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empeados de Distribuidores de Drogas (Coopservir Ltda.” v. Newcomb, et al., D.C. Cir. No 99-5190, S Ct. No 99-1893 (2000) (challenge to Clinton’s Bill of Attainder); see also Lopez v. First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) and Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, 2nd Cir. No. 93-6019 and 96-6145 (1996) (violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Right to Financial Privacy (1978).

      [7] The VSBDB void ab initio order was affirmed. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia, (Va. Sup. Ct No. 07-0283, VSB Docket Nos. 04-052-0794 and 04-052-1044), cert denied Nos. 07-A142 and 07A370 (2007).  See also Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia et al., (S. Ct. No. 07-419, November 2, 2007).

            [8] The action against Jack Harbeston was summarily dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction–despite entering Virginia to conspire with Eric Holder to the VSBDB bar complaint (Footnote 3 and 4).

      [9] When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

      [10] VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2007). Procedure for revocation of license. “A. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit Court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has…violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. . ..” (Emphasis added)

            [11] VA. Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations.‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article [§ 54.1‑3909 & § 54.1‑3910], the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. (Emphasis added)

            [12] The “extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction is appropriate in the instant case given the extensive record of willful oppression under color of law, obstruction of justice, and systematic denial access to a common law trial by jury to consider the evidence of a violation of Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., VA Code and the Void Ab Initio Order  Doctrine. ��� �

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA PETITION FOR APPEAL, RECORD NO. ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner Pro Per, v. The General Assembly of Virginia, The Office of the Governor of Virginia, The Supreme Court of Virginia, The Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, The Virginia State Bar, and The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Defendants-Respondents.

06 Monday May 2019

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, DEnial of right to civil trial by jury, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Federal Criminal Complaint for Misprison of a Felony, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Violation of the Doctrine of Federalism

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Accountability, Limitation under VA Const., Misprison of a felony by violation of right to due process, separation of power

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The Circuit Court erred under VA Code § 1-200 (2005) in violation of the Common Law exception to Sovereign Immunity for acts outside the sphere of legislative authority, scope judicial authority, and scope of employment by the defiance of the separation of power under Art. I §§ 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.), the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., and the prohibition on ex post facto laws under Art. I § 9 VA Const., by enacting VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to retroactively adopt the 1998 court rules issued in violation of VA Code § 54.1 3915 (1950-2017), VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1950-2009), and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as alleged in Petitioner’s Complaint.

These errors were preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court denying Petitioner’s motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

2. The Circuit Court erred by a grave injustice in not impaneling a Special Grand Jury to investigate and report on the evidence of Class 2 & 6 Felony under VA Code §§18.2-481 & 482 to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority” and misdemeanor business conspiracy under VA Code 18.2-499 & 500, as alleged in Petitioner’s Complaint.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint.

3. The Circuit Court erred in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the use of Res Judicata to dismiss the Complaint.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Orders of the Circuit Court denying motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

4. The Circuit Court erred in granting Respondent’s Demure based on a misnomer, lack of standing and failure to state a claim.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Order of the Circuit Court denying motions on January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019 and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

5. The Circuit Court erred in holding that the General Assembly cannot be served under court-ordered publication VA Code §§ 8.01-316(b) & 318.

This error was preserved at pages 17, 20, 21,22, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 of the February 21. 2019 transcript, as well as in the signed and objected to Order of the Circuit Court denying the motion on February 22, 2019, and Order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint on February 21, 2019.

NATURE OF THE CASE/MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On November 14, 2018, Plaintiff-Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgement seeking equitable and monetary relief under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq., against Respondents, including entities created under Art. IV § 1 & 14, Art. V § 1, and Ar, VI § 1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”) respectively the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“General Assembly”), Office of the Governor of Virginia (“Office of the Governor”) and the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”), as well as the the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, the Virginia State Bar, and the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (”VSBDB”).

Rodriguez provided evidence (Plaintiff’s Ex A through V filed with the Complaint and thereafter Supplemental filings), establishing that from 2003 to the present Respondents during the administrations of Governors Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Bob McDonnell, Terry McAuliffe, and Ralph Northam, acted outside the sphere of their legitimate legislative activity, the scope of judicial authority, and employment to unlawfully expand the power of the Court by violating: (a) the separation power under Art. I § 5 VA Const. and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const.; (b) the amending procedures under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.; (c) the prohibition under Art. I § 9 VA Const on the enactment of ex post facto legislation; and, (d) the right to due process under Art. I §§ 11 & 15 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, by a  business conspiracy and Class 2 & 6 felony VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

In response to Rodriguez’s petitions to the General Assembly for an investigation, and complaints to the OAS and the UN for the surreal grant of “impunity” for acts outside fo legal authority (www.isidororodriguez.com), Respondents in 2017 enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to expand the power of the Court by retroactively “conform[ing] the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6, issued in 1998 that created a “parallel” centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control, establishment of the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys and appointing VSBDB members as judges.  The motive for violation of Art. I § 5 VA Const. and VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017) restrictions on the Court was to defy the rights of all citizens of the independent decentralized legal profession established in 1932 under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1950-2009).

All other the Respondents were serviced by the Sheriff on November 28, 2018, but the General Assembly refused to accept service. On December 26, 2018, Rodriguez filed an affidavit under oath that the General Assembly refused to accept service by the Sheriff at the General Assembly Building, Richmond, VA, declined to name an agent for service, and refused all U.S. postal service mail.  On January 2, 2019, the Circuit Court issued an Order of Publication by the Washington Times on January 10, 17, 24, and 31, 2019.  On January 31, 2019, the newspaper filed a Notarized Affidavit of Publication.  Rodriguez filed on February 8, 2019, a motion for Default Judgement against the General Assembly for failure to appear as Ordered.

On January 4, February 1, 8, and 22, 2019, the Circuit Court denied all of Rodriguez’s motions for (1) an injunction of the VSBDB 2006 Void Ab Initio Order unlawfully revoking Rodriguez’s license to practice law for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights and rights as a father; (2) a Writ Quo Warrento against Respondents; (3) an injunction of ex post facto VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017); (4) for a Special Grand Jury; and, (5) for Default against the General Assembly for failure to answer/appear pursuant to court-ordered publication.

On February 21, 2019, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Respondents’ Plea to Dismiss based on Sovereign Immunity, Res Judicata and Demurrer.  The Circuit Court dismissed Rodriguez’s Complaint, over specific objections. Rodriguez filed on March 12, 2019, a Notice of Appeal and Notice of Filing of the Transcript.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Citizens ratified Art. I § 5 VA Const., to mandate the separation of power between the General Assembly, the Office of the Governor, and the Court.

Based on the open distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court expressly of the drafters of the VA Const., the Citizens ratified Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., to give only to the General Assembly the power to enact statutes giving judicial authority, establishing lower courts, and appointing judges.  Also, the Citizens ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const., to reserve to themselves the power to amend the constitutional restrictions on the Court.

In 1932 in response to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249, at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) (“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added), the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”) (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009), was passed to maintain the separation of power and restrictions on the Court by establishing a decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system authorizing the judicial power to discipline attorneys only to County Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal, and explicitly denying the Court power to discipline attorneys directly (VA Code § 54.1‑3934, giving only to the Board of Bar Examiners power to revoke an attorney’s license).

To assure the Court’s compliance with the decentralized attorney disciplinary system, Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1 3915 (1950-2017) prohibited the Court from promulgating court rules or regulations inconsistent with VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009). See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

However, in defiance of the prohibitions on the Court, the Respondents used legal sophistry to interpret VA Code § 54.1‑3909 & 3910 to issue Rule Part 6, ( IV to establish a “parallel” centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control by issuing court rules in 1998 to give judicial authority the VSBDB as a “lower court” to discipline attorneys, and to appoint VSBDB members as “judges.” (Respondents Admissions and the Circuit Court order, Transcript of 02/21/2019 hearing pages 33 and 34).

Shortly after that, in retaliation for Rodriguez’s litigations during the Clinton/Bush Administrations Washington D.C./Virginia Lobbyist/Lawyer Oligarchy under the stewardship of Eric Holder undertook a business conspiracy in violation of VA Code 18.2-499 & 500 to damage Rodriguez’s Federal pro hoc vice litigation practice, reputation, profession and property rights.  Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and Mr. Jack Harbeston (former Managing Partner of Rodriguez’s clients Sea Search Armada and Armada Company (“SSA”) dissolved in 2002) filed in 2003 two fraudulent VSBDB bar complaints against Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights: (a) in a Choate Virginia Attorneys’ Lien under VA Code § 54.1-3932 on SSA’s contract claim to 50% of the Treasure Trove (USD 18 Billion) on the sunken Spanish 1707 Galleon San Jose; and, (b) as a father pursuant to Treaty, VA Code, and Joint Custody Agreement (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

On November 27, 2006, the VSBDB issued a Void Ab Initio Order usurping judicial authority to revoke Rodriguez’s license for litigating to enforce statutory rights. This Court affirmed in violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia, (Va. Sup. Ct No. 07-0283, VSB Docket Nos. 04-052-0794 and 04-052-1044), cert denied Nos. 07-A142 and 07A370 (2007).  See also Isidoro Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of Virginia et al., (S. Ct. No. 07-419, November 2, 2007).

Rodriguez filed two administrative claims in 2007 under the common law and Virginia Tort Claims Act VA Code ( 8.01-195 challenging the VSBDB void ab initio order, and filed civil actions seeking damages.

But Respondents systematically denied access to an impartial common law jury trial and courts to deny challenges the VSBDB void ad initio order and to enforce Rodriguez’s Choate Attorney’s Lien.  In violation of their judicial authority, the courts assume away the Common Law exception to the claim of either sovereign immunity, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine bar to the use of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or stare decisis. See Isidoro Rodriguez v. Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., et al., No. 081146 (2008); Fairfax Cir Ct. No CL-2007-1796) (void order holding the VSBDB absolute immune for violation of the VA Const. and VA Code); see Plaintiff’s Ex. G1 filed with the Complaint listing the use of the VSBDB void ab initio order; see also, Isidoro Rodriguez v. John/Jane Doe of the VSBDB et al., (2013) EDVA No. 3:12-cv-00663 (the Hon. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney surreally issued an unpublished nationwide void order granting “impunity” by enjoining and prior restraining the filing future federal litigation challenging the violations of due process, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, VA Const., and VA Code).

In response to Rodriguez’s complaints to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS (P-926-16), and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the General Assembly on January 9, 2017, enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1 3935 (2017) to expand the power of the Court by retroactively “conform[ing] the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1 3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to the unlawful Court’s rule.

In response Rodriguez’s January 5, 2019 petition, in violation of Art. IV §14 ¶4(18) House Bill No 2111 was introduced on January 9, 2019, as Special Legislation to give immunity from accountability to government attorneys and judges from civil liability for their business conspiracy since 2003 (Supplemental Filing on February 21, 2019).

AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN VIOLATING THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTION TO THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. (Assignment of Error No. 1)
  2. The Standard of Review Is De Novo.

“The legal question presented by a circuit court’s decision to sustain a demurrer requires the application of a de novo standard of review.” Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 284 Va. 102, 106, 726 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2012) (citing Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Spotsylvania County, 266 Va. 550, 544, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003)). “On appeal, a plaintiff attacking a trial court’s judgment sustaining a demurrer need only show that the court erred, not that the plaintiff would have prevailed on the merits of the case.” Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006).

  1. UNDER THE COMMON LAW THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS VIOLATING THE VA CONST., VA CODE, AND THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE.

At the outset, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 1-200 (2005), to mandate that the,

“The Common Law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA. Code § 1-10; 2005. (Emphasis added)

Thus, the English Common Law controls all judicial decisions, except when the General Assembly specifically enacted legislation to change the Common Law rule.

Regarding the defense of Sovereign Immunity, Common Law only permitted its use when a defendant was acting within the legal authority.  This is consistent with the Magna Carta which held officials and judges accountable for acts outside of their legal authority and jurisdiction.  As explained by Sir Edward Coke, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41,

[W]hen a Court has. . . has no [judicial authority or] jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [not before a person who a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . . (Emphasis added)

The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), held that an action for equitable relief and damages would lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of a criminal enterprise outside of legal authority, and the facts were to be decided by a common law trial by jury. Thus, the Common Law provided for accountability and removal of officials and judges for acts outside of their jurisdiction and judicial authority, 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141.

The Common Law did not permit the defense of Sovereign Immunity to allow the aiding and abetting of unlawful acts outside of governmental functions.

Regarding the Common Law and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 140 (1803), held that,

“[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.”

Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order as a lower court-it is a void ab initio order as a complete nullity from the date of its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95 (1987).

Consistent with the Common Law, VA Code §8.01-195.3, to permit the holding of a judge or government attorney accountable with no immunity from tort suit for acts outside of the scope of employment or judicial authority or jurisdiction (relief from tort liability apply only to actions within “official capacity”).  In Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. at 229 and 230, 22 S.E.2d at 12 and 13 (1942), the court held that sovereign immunity applies only when government entities, officials, or employees were “acting legally within the scope of their employment.”  Thus, Respondents cannot claim Sovereign Immunity for:

(A) Acts outside the scope of employment, Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Rodriguez argued/won before the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse to USCA 4th Cir., to obtain the holding that there was a right to a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury on the alleged acts of government employees acts outside the scope of employment); See also Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988).

(B) Grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994);

(c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); or,

(4) Acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996).

Rodriguez under the Common Law is only required to prove that Respondents have acted outside the scope of legislative authority, judicial authority, or employment in violation of the VA Const, and VA Code.  Therefore the Circuit Court erred because there is no absolute immunity from equitable and injunctive relief for the acts in violation of the limitations and prohibitions under Art. I § 5 & 9 VA Const., Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., and, Art. XII § 1 VA Const.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN NOT EMPANELING A SPECIAL GRAND JURY TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON THE EVIDENCE OF WILLFUL ACTS OUTSIDE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY. (Assignment of Error No. 2)

The record confirms that neither courts nor prosecutors have investigated Rodriguez’s criminal complaint (Plaintiff’s Ex. K filed with the Complaint).  But, as explained in U.S. v. Udzuela, 671 F.2d 995 (1982, Ill.),

Strictly speaking, the grand jury is a constitutional fixture in its own right, belonging to neither the executive nor the judicial branch, see United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied; United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C.Cir.1973); In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1956) (Emphasis added)

The Handbook for Virginia Grand Juries-City of Charlesville, explains that under the Common Law the Special Grand Jury serves as a quality control device on government, or more appropriately, serves as a (watchdog( against the wrongdoing. See Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (Developed the issues that led to the Declaration of Independence).

Under VA Code § 19.2-211, a Special Grand Jury is allowed to investigate wrongdoing and crimes, but not to indict.  Vihko v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 413 (VA.C. App 1990) (the evidence gathered by the Special Grand Jury is presented to the regular grand jury, which may indict).

Here the evidence is that both the Respondents and the Circuit Court have misinterpreted VA Code § 54.1‑3909 & 3910, to circumvent the prohibitions under Art. VI § 5 VA Const., and  VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017) violate the 1932 Act’s decentralized attorney discipline system under VA Code § 54.1‑3935A (1950-2009).

This evidence confirms the ongoing violations of the VA Const., and VA Code, by the Class 2 & 6 felony VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 & 482 to, “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority,” and business conspiracy in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-499 & 500.

Under Va. Code §19.2-191 and § 19.2-206, a Special Grand Jury may be convened by the circuit court at any time upon the court’s own motion to investigate and report any condition which involves or tends to promote criminal activity.  Furthermore, the 2007 ed. of the Handbook for Virginia Grand Jurors at page 16, published by Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, states that ([a]ny Citizen . . . may ask the Circuit Court of a county to convene a Special Grand Jury. (  Therefore, a Circuit judge may impanel a Special Grand Jury to investigate a crime and malfeasance upon the request of a citizen of Virginia.  See 70-71 Va. AG 106A; See also 156 ALR 330.

Finally, under VA Code §§ 8.01-186 and 8.01-188 the Circuit Court was given the power to grant further relief “whenever necessary and proper,” this includes the ability to impanel a Jury or logically a Special Grand Jury–to investigate the Respondents violations of the Common Law, VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ad Initio Doctrine.  Thus, the Circuit Court erred in permitting the Special Grand Jury to be captured by the Respondents.

III. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY VIOLATING THE VOID AB INITIO ORDER DOCTRINE RESTRICTION BY ITS USE OF RES JUDICATA.  (Assignment of Error No. 3)

 

It is a fundamental doctrine of due process under the common law, the VA. Const. VA Code, and the U.S. Const., that Rodriguez as the party affected must have his day before a validly constitutionally created impartial court and had an opportunity to a common law trial by a jury of the business conspiracy outside legal authority. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 6 S Ct 1194 (1886).

But, the VSBDB and this Court have not issued a valid judgment by their violations of the VA Const., and VA Code limitations, prohibitions and protections of due process. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 (1876).  See also Restatements, Judgments 4(b).

In violation of the mandates of separation of power and due process under Marbury v. Madison, supra., Art. I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const., and Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., VA Code § 54.1‑3915 (1950-2017), and VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1950-2009) in 2006 the VSBDB issued an unlawful Void Ab Initio Order revoking Rodriguez’s license as an attorney for litigating to enforce his statutory rights.  Compounding this illegal act, this Court issued a void order affirming. However, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), holds that,

Since the adoption of the [VA Const.] and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of void judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added)

But the record confirms this was never done (Plaintiff’s Exhibit G1).      All of the courts issued void order outside of their jurisdiction and constitutional authority in violation of the common law exception to the claim of sovereign immunity and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine to grant government employees and judges “impunity” for violations of the VA Const., and VA Code.  Court records confirm that all of the dismissals were for lack of venue “without prejudice,” or specifically “declined to rule on [Respondents] plea of res judicata,” or and did not address the allegations of a business conspiracy. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Editor-in-Chief, Legal Times, et al., DC Dist. Ct. No 07-cv-0975 (PF), DC Ct. App. N. 07-5334enied US Sup Ct. 08-411(2008); see also,  injunction denied SC Ct. No. 07A601, cert. Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Hon. Hassell et al., Fairfax Circuit Court No. CL-2007-15396, VA S. Ct. No. 081146, cert. denied 08-574 (2008). See petitions for redress to the General Assembly (Plaintiff’s Exhibit D and I), Complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and a Petition with the United Nations Committee on Human Rights for the grant of “impunity” (see  http://www.isidororodriguez.com).

As explained in Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390 (2007) that held,

(An order that is void ab initio is a complete nullity that may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. ( (quoting Singh v. Mooney, supra.) Furthermore “[a]n order is void ab initio rather than merely voidable, if ‘the character of the judgment was not such as the court had the power to render, or because the mode of procedure employed by the court was such as it might not lawfully adopt'” (quoting Evans v. Smyth‑Wythe Airport Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 73(1998); Morgan v. Russia and Triangle Assocs., L.L.C., 270 Va. 21, 26‑27 (2005).

The Circuit Court violated the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine and the Common Law by its use of res judicata.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DEMURE BASED ON LACK OF STANDING, MISNOMER, AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. (Assignment of Error No. 4)
  2. Rodriguez has Standing

The Complaint is filed based upon the willful violation of the limitations and prohibitions under Art. I §§ 5, 11 & 15 VA Const, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., Art. XII § 1 VA Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, as well as the particularized damage to Rodriguez’s business, reputation, profession and property rights.

Since 2003 Rodriguez was deprived of his fundamental right to his pro hoc vice law practice, reputation, profession, and property right in his Choate Virginia statutory Attorney’s Lien based the use of unconstitutional Court’s rules.  Since January 2017 the General Assembly enacted ex post facto VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to retroactively “conform” the statute to the unlawful court rules.

Thus, Rodriguez has standing as a citizen of Virginia and as an attorney injured by the VSBDB void ab initio order under the holding in Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016), where this Court held that citizens have standing if there is “sufficient interest” and “the parties will be actual adversaries.” Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984)).

To claim standing Rodriguez need only “demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” to assure a court, “that the issues will be fully and fairly developed.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001).

That standard is easily satisfied given the litigation record (Plaintiff’s Ex. G1 filed with the Complaint) and the evidence of the business conspiracy by the violation of legally protected interest mandated by the amending procedure under Art. XII § 1 VA Const., before the separation of power under Art. I § 5 & 9, and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const, can be altered between the General Assembly and the Supreme of Virginia.

Also, these injuries are “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 460, and both concrete and particularized to Rodriguez given the systematic denial of access to Common Law trial by a jury of the evidence of the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine in any Federal court based on the Hon J. Gibbons surreal nationwide prior restraint and injunction.  See Damian Stinnie et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 US Dist. Ct W.D. VA, Charlottesville (December 21, 2018) (Supplemental Authority filed with the Circuit Court on December 26, 2018).

  1. Misnomer

The Circuit Court dismisses based on “misnomer,” holding that Respondents could not be sued as entities in their respective constitutional titles, but rather must be sued as individuals. (Transcript page 32).

The VA Const., specifically name and empower the General Assembly (not the House of Delegates and Senate), the Governor, and the Court as constitutional entities under Art. I § 5, VI, ( 1, 5, and 7, and Art. XII § 1 VA Const.  Thus, the Circuit Court erred because:

First, the restrictions and the mandate of separation of power under Art. I § 5 VA Const. and Art. § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. and logic is that the constitutional entities name, not in the individual’s designation of an office holder from 2003 to the present, are to be held accountable for constitutional violations.

The New York Court of Appeals held in Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1144 (N.Y. 1996), that the entity, as well as the individual, are liable so to deter deprivations of state constitutional rights because no government can sustain itself when the law immunizes official violations of substantive rules leaving victims without any realistic remedy. As constitutional officers, the acts will be a violation of the oath of their respective duties of the office, and grounds for removal from office.  As explained in Clea v. Mayor and City Council of Maryland, 541 A.2d 1303 at 1314 (Md. 1988):

“To accord immunity to the responsible government officials, and leave an individual remediless when his constitutional rights are violated, would be inconsistent with the purpose of the constitutional provisions.”

Second, the evidence is that since 2003 it has been the constitutional entities, not just the individual that held office during the administrations of Governors Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Bob McDonnell, Terry McAuliffe, and Ralph Northam – who have been involved in the business conspiracy to systemically violate the VA Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

Third, logic dictates that the action for the violation of the VA Const. and VA Code, be against the constitutional entities not restricted to the individual office holders.

Thus, the Circuit Court erred.

  1. Rodriguez has Stated a Cause of Action

The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine holds that Rodriguez has a right to challenge and attacked in any court at any time, (directly or collaterally.( Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987). Thus, Rodriguez has stated a cause of action where relief is to be granted.

  1. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE SERVED UNDER VA CODE §§ 8.01-316(B) & 318 BY COURT-ORDERED PUBLICATION. (ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5)

The General Assembly refused to answer or otherwise defend below-despite repeated notice by Circuit Court order of publication under VA Code § 8.01-318.

Under VA Code § 8.01-317 upon receipt of proof of publication” by the affidavit from the Washington Times on January 31, 2019, the clerk of court must enter a default against the Defaulted General Assembly before or on February 21, 2019. Once the clerk enters default, the Court must take as true the factual allegations in the Complaint for Declaratory Judgement. AME Fin. Corp. v. Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392-93 (2011).  There is no exception to Chapter 8, Process requirements.

In Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that as a constitutional entity a state legislature has the standing to sue, and logically be sued.  Thus, subject to service of process under VA Code by the Sheriff or by publication.

Thus, the Circuit Court erred in ordering that the General Assembly cannot be served by publication.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant review to correct the errors of the Circuit Court.

Dated: May 2, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez, Pro Per, Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227, Vienna, Virginia 22180, (571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

 

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ’S COMMENT (SPEAKER #31) AT THE PUBLIC FORUM ON JAN. 5, 2019 AT 0900hrs. TO THE NOVA GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS PRIOR TO THE 2019 SESSION

07 Monday Jan 2019

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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(The hearing was televised live on Fairfax County Television Channel 16 (Channel 1016 in HD on Cox; Channel 16 on Verizon or Comcast), and can also be viewed online through the Channel 16 stream.)

            Good Morning, I am Isidoro Rodriguez.  More than 55 years ago I took the oath to defend our constitutional system under our Republic against all enemies “foreign and domestic.”  That oath never expires.  Thus, I appear before you today not to ask for funds or any government largest, but demand that each of you abide by the oath you took for your office as a member of the General Assembly.

            In that context, my comment prior to all of you prior to the 2019 Session of the General Assembly of Virginia is to bring to the attention of each of you and the citizens of Virginia that each of you who were in office in February 2017 enacted an ex post facto VA Code § 54.1-3935 (2017) in violation of the mandate of separation or power by surreally “conform[ing] the statutory procedure” established in 1931 under VA Code § 54.1-3935 (1950) of a decentralized attorney discipline system to retroactively adopt unconstitutional 1998 Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) creating a centralized attorney discipline system to do away with independent attorneys.

            The evidence is that in February 2017 each of you, and in particular my representatives Senator Richard L. Saslaw and Delegate Marcus B. Simon-acted outside the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” by violating your oath of office, violating the prohibition under Art. I § 9 VA Const. against ex-post facto law, violating the mandate of separation of power between the General Assembly and the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”) under Art. I § 5 VA Const., violating Art. VI § 1, 5, and 7 VA Const., and violating the amending procedure under XII § 1 VA Const.

            In summary:

            First, each of you refused to investigate my past petitions as to the Court’s the violation of the delegated rulemaking authority (See presentations to NOVA members of the General Assembly, https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ) (See also http://www.isidororodriguez.com complaint for the assertion of “impunity” for violation of the U.s. and Virginia constitutions filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (P-926-16), and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights Complaints), but rather each of you who were in office in February 2017 surreally voted to enact an ex post facto law to retroactively “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1952)] for the disciplining of attorneys,” to the 1998 unconstitutional Court’s rules.

            Second, each of you who were in office in February 2017 usurped the exclusive amending power of the citizens of Virginia under XII § 1 VA Const. by enacting the ex post facto law expanding in violation of the mandate of separation of power-the Court’s authority retroactively by adopting the 1998 unconstitutional Court rules: (a) that unlawfully establish a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) that unlawfully created the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (VSBDB”) as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (b) that unlawfully permitted the Court to appoint VSBDB members as lower court judges.

            Thus, irrespective of being Democrat, Republican or Independent, citizens must take action to assure the separation of power and an independent legal profession not controlled by the Court.  Citizens must compel the General Assembly during this 2019 Session to vacate the ex-post facto law (See www.isidororodriguez.com).[1]

            After that, citizens must take action to compel the General Assembly and the Court’s compliance with the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. and VA Code, or if the citizens determine to amend the separation of power established since 1789 under Va Const. between the Legislative and Judicial Branch, citizens can direct the General Assembly to begin the constitutional amending procedures under Art. XII § 1 VA Const.[2]

Date: January 5, 2019

Respectfully,

Isidoro Rodriguez

2671 Avenir Place, Apt 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

Mobile phone No. 571.477.5350

E-mail: busness@isidororodriguez.com

            [1] I note from 2010 thru 2017, each of you refused to inquire into my petitions and comments seeking an investigation of the Court’s defiance of the mandated decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system under Art. IV §§ 1, 5, and 7 VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1‑3915 & § 54.1‑3935 (1952) by the Court’s issuance in 1998 of unconstitutional court rules in “clear absence of all [judicial authority and] jurisdiction” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9jBOJ34sa8&feature=youtu.be).  Thus, I have filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Cir. Ct., Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, 11/14/2018), and a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Cir. Ct., Docket No. CL-2018-0016433, 11/19/2018) to challenge the ex post facto law and seek a binding adjudication of my rights under the common law, VA Const. and VA Code by obtaining accountability for acts outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity by the General Assembly, acts outside scope of employment by the Office of the Governor and Attorney General, and acts outside of judicial authority by the Supreme Court of Virginia et al., by a Class 2 felony VA Code§§ 18.2‑481 & 482 to “[resist] the execution of the laws under color of authority” by their business conspiracy to damage my law practice, reputation, profession, and property rights.

[2] However, I note and stress that it was Patrick Henry in 1988, as well as the other original drafter of the both the VA and U.S. Constitutions who mandated the separation of power, because they observed,

“[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

 

38.901223
-77.265260

NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND PRELIMINARY/ PERMANENT INJUNCTION

28 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Fairfax County Criminal Complaint for misprison of felony to violate VA Const and VA Code, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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            The undersign Plaintiff at this moment provides in support of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq. the following supplemental authority:[1]

The Honorable Senior United States District JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON, Memorandum Opinion, and Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction Order of Injunction Unconstitutional VA Code, in Damian Stinnie, et al., v. Richard D. Holcomb, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Moter Vehicles, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 United State District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division (December 21, 2018).

            Regarding the granting of a Declaratory Judgement and a preliminary injunction in the instant action to enjoin an unconstitutional ex post facto and retroactive provision of the Virginia Code, the opinion and order of the Hon. Senior District Judge Norman K Moon which is on point and relevant in the instant action to be considered by the Circuit Court.  This supplemental authority governs the issuance of an injunction based upon the controlling precedent of the four-part test under Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) and Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013).

            As a benchmark for the Circuit Court of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgemwent and the Motion for Injuction to be heard on January 4, 2019 at 0830, the Hon. Senior Judge Norman K Moon wrote at page 22 of in his Memorandum Opinion:

Other Winter Factors

The remaining factors governing a request for a preliminary injunction—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest—weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. First, where Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being violated, there is a presumption of irreparable harm. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1343 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987)) …. As for the remaining factors, the balancing of the equities and public interest, Fourth Circuit precedent “counsels that ‘a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional. If anything, the system is improved by such an injunction.’” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002)). (Emphasis added)

[1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018.  Affidavit to serve on the by publication filed on 12/19/18.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE ACTION AGAINST THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ET AL., FOR THE EX POST FACTO RETROACTIVE ADOPTING IN 2017 OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES ISSUED IN 1998 BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA.

28 Wednesday Nov 2018

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Impunity in violation of the Common Law, Uncategorized

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              Isidoro Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed in the Fairfax County Circuit Court in November 2018 a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgement under VA Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq.,[1] and filed a verified petition for Writ of Mandamus[2] under VA Code §8.01-644 to seek a binding adjudication of his rights under the common law of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”),[3] under Art. I § 5 & 9, Art VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and Art.XII § 1 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”) and VACode § 54.1‑3935 (1998).

            At the outset, the suit is for the violation of Rodriguez’s right under Virginia common law to hold government attorneys accountable for acts outside the scope of employment and to hold justices/judges accountable for void ab initio orders outside of judicial authority.  The action is filed in the Fairfax Court Court because in 2013 the Hon. U.S. Dist. JudgeJohn A. Gibney, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the U.S.Supreme Court in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (April12, 2013), aff’d 4th Cir USCA No13-1638, cert. Denied (Nov. 2013) systematically denied access to impartial court and a common law jury trial under Art. I § 11VA Const., the 5th, 7th & 14th Amend to the U.S. Const., VA Code § 801-336, and controlling common law precedent,[4] by (a)assuming away violation of the common law to grant absolute immunity from accountability for a business conspiracy to injure Rodriguez’s law practice, reputation, profession, and property right in violation of VA Code § 18.2.499 to grant “impunity”from accountability for violation of Art.VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., and the VoidAb Initio Order Doctrine[5] by the use of the Supreme Court of Virginia (“Court”)unconstitutional court rules issued in 1998 to discipline Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory property rights and rights as a father; and, (b) enjoining Rodriguez from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the UnitedStates involving,

“in any way his disbarment [by the VSBDB void ab initio order] or the allegations leading to his disbarment [by the federal courts based upon the VSBDB void ab initio order]. The Court further enjoins [Rodriguez] from filing any lawsuit in any federal court of the United States against any of the defendants in this case, against any judge or retired judge, against any United States Attorney or member of aUnited States Attorney’s staff, against the Attorney General of Virginia or any past or present member of the Attorney General’s staff, and against the Virginia State Bar or any agents of the Bar. [Rodriguez] is further enjoined from filing any additional pleadings in the instant case, other than pleadings necessary to perfect and present an appeal.  [Rodriguez is further prior restrained from filing any other type of suit in the federal court by ordering that Rodriguez first files a motion] for leave of Court to file suit. . ..”

            Finally, the suit is based upon the subsequent evidence that in 2017 of the General Assembly of Virginia (“General Assembly”) compounded the above violations of the common law, VA Const., and VA Code, by disregarding Rodriguez’s petitions seeking an investigation of the Court’s unconstitutional court rules and Judge Gibney.’s violation of Virginia’s common law precedent of accountability for acts outside the scope of judicial authority and employment (Plaintiff’s Ex. I) (See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Petition (IACHR)(P-926-16 IACHR Petition) and Committee on Human Rights United Nations Complaint) (See also Presentations in January 2010 to NOVA members of the General Assembly https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAkEfjcA5sQ & https://t.co/sLv7pz3zD5), by:

  • Violating the prohibition under Art. I § 1, 5 & 9 VA Const. against enacting ex-post-facto legislation outside “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,”Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951) to retroactively in2017  “conform the statutory procedure [under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009)] for the disciplining of attorneys” to unconstitutional Supreme Court of Virginia Rule Part 6, § § IV, 13-6 issued in 1998 (Plaintiff’sExhibit C) in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradleyv. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v.Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); and,
  • Usurping the power of citizens to amend the VA Const. under Art. XII § 1 VA Const. by violating the citizens’ mandate of separation of power under Art. I § 5, and Art. VI § 1, 5 & 7 VA Const., by retroactively changing the decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system established since 1932 under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Ex. A) to expand the Court’s power by by revising VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017)(Plaintiff’s Ex. J) to unlawfully delegate legislative authority by adopting unconstitutional Court Rule Part 6, § IV, 13-6 issued after 1998 established by court rules: (a) a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control; (b) the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a lower court with judicial authority to discipline attorneys; and, (c) VSBDB members asjudges.
  1. THE VIOLATION OF ART. I §§ 5 & 9, ART. VI § 1, 5, & 7, AND ART. XII § 1 VA CONST., BY THE EX POST FACTO DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE COURT.
  1. Decentralize Statewide Attorney Disciplinary System established by the 1932 Act.

            The original constitutional draftsmen of the VA Const. and U.S. Const. openly distrusted the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Court specifically.  As Patrick Henry observed,

“[p]ower is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between threebranches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse ofpower. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If wefail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually liveunder judicial tyranny.” (Emphasis added)

            Thus, under Art. I § 5 VA Const.[6] the citizens of Virginia mandated the separation of power to create a“distribution grids, apportioning authority,” as a constitutional check on the three branches of government.[7]  Separation of power is necessary because as Thomas Jefferson wrote, history has shown, “the violation of the limitation and prohibitions under the VA Const. which define the separation of power would create a despotic government.”  Notes on the State of Virginia 196 1787).  Echoing this James Madison wrote that the U.S. Constitution, consistent with the VAConst. required the separation of power, because

 “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” (Emphasis added).

The Federalist Papers
No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103

            Consequently, to eliminate the risk of the Court creating a dangerous node of power,[8] the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI §§ 1,[9]and 7[10] VA Const. to authorize only the General Assembly to enact legislation giving judicial power, establishing “lower courts,” and appointing “judges” The citizens of Virginia ratified Art. VI § 5[11]VA Const. to prohibit the Court from issuing rules either inconsistent with statutory rights, i.e. VA Code §§ 54-1-3935(A) (1998), or exceeding the scope of the rulemaking authority delegated to the Court by the General Assembly (the Court cannot issue rules to enact legislation), See VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 (2017).[12]  Finally, the citizens of Virginia ratified Art. XII § 1 VA Const. to restrict to themselves the authority to amend these limitations and prohibitions on the Court.[13]

            Under the holding of Ex Parte Fisher,6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835) 624-25 (1835), under Art. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7 VA Const. the judicial power to revoke a license to practice law is governed by statute, not court rules.  See In re: Johathan A. Moseley, Sup Ct. VA No 061237 (2007).

            Thus, in response to the holding in Ex Parte Fisher, supra., and, Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 137 Va. 249 at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing the General Assembly enacted in 1932 the Acts of Assembly p. 139 (“1932 Act”), to establish a decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system to give statewide effect to a lower court’s discipline of an attorney. The 1932 Act only delegated judicial authority only to each County circuit court to discipline attorneys. See When Has the Supreme Court of AppealsOriginal Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings, R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246-248; and David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia,2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954).

            The 1932 Act limited the delegated authority to the Court to prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct. However, under Art. VI § 5 VA Const, the 1932 Act prohibited the Court from issuing rules inconsistent with rights under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1932-2009) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A).  With this limited delegated authority, the Court formed the Virginia State Bar with the only the limited power of investigating complaints against attorneys to be exercised in each county by a Council and Investigating Committee. The function of the Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury fact-finding and had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney.  Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney by a Circuit Court, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction was the disciplining of an attorney given statewide effect. See Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942) (The constitutionality of the decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system upheld because the 1932 Act did not delegate any legislative powers).

            For more than eighty-nine (89) years from 1932 until 2017 there was no significant amendment to the 1932 Act’s decentralized statewide attorney disciplinary system, see VA Code 54.1-3935 (1932 thru 2009). During these 89 years, the General Assembly neither enacted any statute establishing under the control of the Court the VSBDB as a lower court with judicial power nor appointed VSBDB members as lower court judges with the power to discipline attorneys.  It is important to underscore that the legislative history of the 1998 amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) confirms that the entire General Assembly accepted and ratified the Senate bill which did not delegate any new rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B2), but specifically rejected the House bill expanding rulemaking power to the Court (Plaintiff’sExhibit B3), because the General Assembly cannot delegate this power to legislate judicial authority, create lower court, and appoint judges.

  • The VSBDB void ab initio order.

            The U.S. Supreme Court established the benchmark on the right of Rodriguez to challenge the VSBDB void ab initio order, holding that,

 [s]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . . . To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon thesubject‑matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877)

            Thus, Rodriguez has sought answered the question during the past fifteen years of litigation:

UNDER WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE VA CONST. DID THE COURT HAVE TO ISSUE COURT RULES IN 1998 TO GIVE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, TO CREATE THE VSBDB AS A LOWER COURT TO DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS, AND TO APPOINT VSBDB MEMBERS AS JUDGES?

            As discussed above in response to the holding in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light,137 Va. 249, at 250, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.)619 (1835) (“[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other courts of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute,” (Emphases added), and the restriction under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. granting power only to the General Assembly to give judicial authority, create “court”and appoint “judges,” the General Assembly enacted the 1932 Act (codified as VA Code § 54.1‑3935(1950), to establish a decentralize statewide attorney disciplinary system by authorizing judicial power to discipline attorneys only to County Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal.  Therefore, because the VSBDB as an entity created by Court rules, it is obvious that based on the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine the VSBDB does not have any constitutional and statutory judicial authority, judicial power, or jurisdiction to render any valid order to discipline an attorney in Virginia.  The VSBDB order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.  Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390,402, (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v.Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).

            The 2006 VSBDB void ab initio order disbarring Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights (Plaintiff’s Ex. D) was invalid at the moment of issuance.  Furthermore, the VSBDB void ab initio order under the common law may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally” because it has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. not subject t stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It is not entitled to enforcement. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.” 30A Am Jur. Judgments 44, 45; see also Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

  • The General Assembly cannot delegate its legislative power given to them by the citizens under Art. I § 5 and Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const. to the Court to give judicial authority, to establish lower courts, and to appoint lower court judges.

            Separation of power is the benchmark of the constitutional prohibition on the General Assembly’s power to delegate legislative authority to the Court.  The “delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the [Court] in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 349, 389 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1990). See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 34 Va. App. 273, 276, 540 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2001) (noting legislative delegation does not permit adoption of inconsistent rules or regulations).

            As explained in Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. at 253, 

It must be remembered that “revisors of statutes are presumed not to change the law if the language which they use fairly admits of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statutes; and it is a well-settled rule that in the revision of statutes neither an alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the latter statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former act, excepting where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear.” 36 Cyc. 1067-8; Harrison & Byrd v. Wissler, 98 Va. 597, 600-601, 36 S.E.982; Keister’s Adm’r v. Keister’s Exor’s, 123 Va.157, 174, 96 S.E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439.

            Thus, the evidence confirms that the General Assembly violated the mandate of separation of power by enacting in 2017  ex-post fact legislation adopting the 1998 unconstitutional Court rules violating the restrictions under Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7 VA Const., to retroactively delegate authority to the Court unbounded discretion in adopting rules in defiance of the specifically defined power that the citizens restricted only to the full General Assembly (i.e., give judicial powers,  to create “lower courts” and appoint “judges”), as well as to adopting unconstitutional Court rules dealing with broad legislative policies to create a centralized statewide attorney disciplinary system.

             But, the constitutional limits on the Court’s judicial authority and jurisdiction can neither be circumvented by enacting in 2017 an ex-post facto legislative amendment to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (1998) by changing VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2017) to retroactively adopt Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6, nor circumvented by delegation to retroactively “[c]onform the statutory procedure for the disciplining of attorneys” to Court Rule Part 6, §IV, 13-6.

            The general language of retroactive delegating authority to the Court found in VA Code § 54.1-3935(2017) (Plaintiff’s Exhibit J) is insufficient and unconstitutional. Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378,381, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994), because “the General Assembly can not delegate its legislative power accompanied only by such a broad statement of general policy. . .. [D]elegations of authority are adequately limited [only] where the terms or phrases employed have a well-understood meaning and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the administrator.” Id. at 381-82, 448 S.E.2d at 624 (citations omitted), and correspondingly said regulations must have “definite standards to guide . . . the exercise of the power.” Ames, 239 Va.at 349, 389 S.E.2d at 705.

            As explained in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967) the purpose of sovereign immunity,

“is not for the protection As explained of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ . . .

            Here the record confirms that not imposing accountably for acts outside the scope of employment and outside the jurisdiction or judicial authority doesn’t contribute to principled and fearless decision making but rather to “intimidation.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967) (citations omitted).[14]  Seldom has there been evidence of collusion to violate the limitations and prohibitions under the VA Const. and VA Code, by criminal misprision of a felony and a business conspiracy to injure an attorney for litigating to enforce statutory rights and the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and a common law jury trial by the abuse of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.[15]

            II. THERE IS NO IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS.

            A right without a remedy is no right at all.  Consequently, under the common law dating back to 1613, there is no absolute judicial and ministerial immunity for acts outside of jurisdiction, and action for equitable relief and damages will lie for the conspiracy to issue and enforce a void order as part of an illegal enterprise, The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027(K.B. 1613).[16]  See also4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 140 at 141, discussing various English common law cases that provided for accountability and removal of judges for misbehavior and acts outside of the jurisdiction and judicial authority. 

         Therefore, consistent with the common law at the time of the ratifying of the VA Const., sovereign immunity does not invalidate all claims; it only makes a defendant immune from suit and the relief to which the immunity applies.[17]  Under the common law, notwithstanding the holding in Messina v. Burden,228 Va. 301, 307 (1984), where the Court declared that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still “alive and well” in the Commonwealth,[18] it is important that citizens of Virginia have a proper way of enforcing the limitation and prohibitions, as well as their constitutional rights against the government, including the Court. [19]  Under the Common law, citizens can bring a civil suit for declarative and equitable relief in Virginia against the government or government officials for acts outside the scope of employment,legislative authority, and judicial authority in violation of the VA Const.[20]

            Consistent with the common law the Court in Fox v. Deese,234 Va. 412, 423-24 (1987), reversed the decision of the trial court’s grant of sovereign immunity from the tort claims by underscoring that acommon law trial by jury required because,[21]

 [t]he tort counts not only allege that these defendants committed intentional torts, but that they were acting outside the scope of their employment as well. Resolution of these allegations requires an evidentiary hearing.  The defendants are not immune if the evidence establishes that (1) they committed intentional torts, irrespective of whether they acted within or without the scope of their employment, Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372_73(1967), or (2) they acted outside the scope of their employment, see Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 311, 321 S.E.2d657, 662 (1984).

            Under the common law sovereign immunity does not protect government actors when either in their individual and/or official capacities, they commit an intentional torts or commit acts outside of the scope of their employment, or enact ex-post-facto legislation outside the ‘the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341U.S. 367 at 376 (1951), or judicial act in”clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S.355-357; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

            Under the common law, when the action seeks to restrain or compel state officials to perform their duties under the VA Const. and VA Code the action for declaratory judgment is not against the state for purposes of sovereign immunity-but for acts outside the scope of employment, legislative functions, jurisdiction, or judicial authority. [22]  Under the common law in both England and Virginia as one of the colonies, it was in ordinary courts in either civil or criminal trials -before a jury trial-which determined whether government officers, including judges, were to be held accountable for misbehavior.  Prakash and Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L. J. 72 at 74 (2006);  See, e.g., R.V. Gaskin, (1799) 1001 Eng. Rep. 1349 (K.B.) (reinstating a parish-clerk upon his demand that his employer shows cause for firing him); James Bragg’s Case (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278-81 (K.B.)(reinstating a Burgess for lack of cause to remove him).

            At common law, absolute immunity is given judges only when they did not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351. Pp. 435 U. S. 355-357 (1871); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349at 357 (1978); Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 142 (1885).  Judges are liable when they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”  Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986) (quoting Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131,142 (1885).  Pursuant to Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844(1980), and, Den Zeller v. Rankin,101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981), whenever a judge acts where he does not have jurisdiction to affirm and use a void ab initio order, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).  In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger wrote, “If [judges] break the law, they can be prosecuted.” Also, Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion agreed, that, “. . . judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .” supra. at 141-142.  Also, in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Court held: 

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity.  The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.

            There the U.S. Supreme Court held in action against a State court judge, that under common law a state court judge who acts without jurisdiction, or acts in violation of Constitutional, or acts in violation of statutory prohibitions expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost. A Virginia judge is immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and was not performing any act prohibited expressly by constitution and statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980).  SeeAmes E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’sPower to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

            Consequently, at common law, absolute immunity from civil liability is given to legislators only when they are engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” and have not “exceeded the bounds of legislative power” by the usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the citizens under clearly stated constitutional limitations and prohibitions. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 376 (1951); See Art. IV, § 9 VA Const. or judicial to immunity in violation; and, Virginia: Hening’s Stats. at Large, Vol. 9, p. 127, because,

[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.  United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (Emphasis added).  See also, Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

            Regarding quasi-judicial immunity for VA government attorneys and the VSBDB, it extends: (1) only if they are performing judicial functions, (2) only if acting within their jurisdiction; and (3) only if acting in good faith.  “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311at 321, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003) (the court explicitly declined to grant blanket immunity to non-prosecutorial conduct, stating, “We do not decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute immunity.”)   See Hueston v. Kizer,2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 280, 36-37 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2008) (court denied absolute immunity).

            Therefore, under the common law if a prosecutor’s involvement is not done as a prosecutor but done outside the scope of his employment in his individual capacity, then he would not have any immunity, and if the prosecutor’s role was one of investigator or administrator he again may not be entitled to absolute immunity.  The claim of immunity is a factual determination for a trial by jury under the common law.

Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 

Olmstad v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928).

            Conclusion

            In defiance of the common law limitation on the use of sovereign immunity Rodriguez has been systematically denied access to an impartial court and common law jury trial to challenge the Court’s unconstitutional court rules andVSBDB void ad initio order. The collusion to “resist the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[23] to obstruct accountability and justice only if adopting the Court’s unlawful court rules is a violation of Art.I §§ 5 & 9, VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, XII § 1 VA Const. and VA Code §§ 18.2‑481and 482.  There has been a retroactive ex-post facto change to VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (2009) to adopt the unconstitutional rules to delegate to the Court power to give judicial authority, crate the VSBDB as a lower court, and to appoint VSBDBmembers lower court judges.

            Based upon the above, the Circuit Court must hold those accountable for the willful defiance of the limitation and prohibitions under Art. I §§ 5 & 9, Art. VI §§ 1, 5, & 7, Art. XII § 1 VA Const., VA Code §§ 54.1-3915 & 3935 (1932 to 2009) based upon the record of the systematic denial of access to an impartial court and common law jury trial. Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodríguez

Residence:  2671 Avenir Place, Apt. 2227

Vienna, Virginia 22180

(571) 477-5350/E-mail: business@isidororodriguez.com


            [1] Isidoro Rodriguez v. General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016227, filed November 14, 2018.

                        [2] Isidoro Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Fairfax County Circuit Court, Docket No. CL-2018-0016433, filed November 19, 2018.

            [3] VA Code § 1-200, states “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.  VA. Code § 1-10; 2005.

                [4] See Katia Gutierrez de Martínez v. Lamagno and DEA, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (1995) (Rehnquist dissenting) (Rodriguez argued and won a common law action before the U.S. Supreme Court that held there was a right to an evidentiary hearing before a jury of the acts of government employees outside the scope of employment (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

                [5] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine was first discussed in U.S. jurisprudence in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch 137, 140 (1803), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not just voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Thus, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity has neither constitutional authority, nor inherent legal power, nor jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio as a complete nullity from its issuance, and may be impeached directly or collaterally at any time, or in any manner. See, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

                [6] Art. I § 5 VA Const., states, “[t]hat the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate and distinct; . . ..”  Federalist 47, “[the VA Const.] . . . declares, ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..” Id p 109.

                [7] D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, p. 13.

                [8] “Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.”  Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

[9] Art. VI § 1 VA Const., states in relevant part that judicial power in Virginia shall be vested in the Court, and, “in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.” (Emphasis added)

[10] Art. VI § 7 VA Const., states in relevant part that justices of the Court, and, “all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . .  the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)

[11] Art. VI § 5 VA Const., states in relevant part that the Court shall have the authority to make rules, “but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law” enacted by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added).

[12] VA Code § 54.1‑3915, states in relevant part that the Court shall not issue rules that, “are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” (Emphasis added) (Plaintiff’s Ex. B7)

                [13] Later history confirmed that the violation of separation of power was required prior to undertaking the overthrow of a Constitutional government, i.e. Nuremberg trials documented the NAZI’s efforts to dismantle the legal framework under fundamental constitution principles of the, “separation of judicial powers, of executive powers and legislative powers.” 6 Trial of the Major War Criminal Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946.  534-35 (Testimony of Van der Essen 4 Feb 1946).

                [14] As James Madison stated in REPORT OF 1799, VIRGINIA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, “The resolution supposes [the delegation of] dangerous powers, . . . beyond the grant of the Constitution; . . .. However true, . . . that the judicial department, is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve. (Emphasis added)

[15] Chief Justice Marshall wrote Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816), “We [judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. (Emphasis added)

[16] Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable, “when a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .  Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038‑41. (Emphasis added)

                [17] Although the language of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity, the Supreme Court held that when Sec. 1871 was enacted Congress intended to incorporate then-existing common law immunities to excuse individual state and local officials from liability for damages caused by their violations of the federal constitution. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

                [18] “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden).  “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000); City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2004).

                [19] At common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply for: (A) acts outside the scope of employment, Burnam v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (E.D. Va. 1988); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-25, 362 S.E.2d 699, 706 (1987); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Crabbe v. School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968); Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942); Deeds v. DiMercurio, 30 Va. Cir. 532 (Albemarle County, 1991); (B) grossly negligent conduct, McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994); Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 452 S.E.2d 854 (1995); Meagher v. Johnson, 239 Va. 380, 389 S.E.2d 310 (1990); Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 310, 321 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1984); Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 (1987); Bowers v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 245, 253, 302 S.E.2d 511 (1983); James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980); (c) intentional torts, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d (1996); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 362 S.E.2d 699 (1987); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967); Agyeman v. Pierce, 26 Va. Cir. 140 (Richmond 1991.; or (4) acts characterized as bad faith, Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 468 S.E.2d 882 (1996); Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 457 S.E.2d 42 (1995) (immunity lost by showing of malice in a slander action); Harlow v. Clatterbuck. 230 Va. 490, 339 S.E.2d 181 (1986).

                [20] Consistent with the common law, which the laws of Virginia are grounded, the General Assembly enacted the English Rule in Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3), to hold that a judge or government attorney had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction.  See also Robert Craig Waters, “Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983” 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and nn. 29-30).

[21] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added) See Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (Rodriguez argued and won before the United States Supreme Court to reverse the USCA for the 4th Circuit, to order a common law evidentiary hearing before a jury for acts outside the scope of employment).

                [22] Pennsylvania Academy of Chiropractic Physicians v. Com., Dept of State, Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, 129 Pa. Commw. 12, 564 A.2d 551 (1989) (under the common laws the defense of sovereign immunity inapplicable where petitioner sought declaration which would result in restraining state officials”), Franks v. Tucker, 132 Ill. App. 3d 455, 476 N.E.2d 1315 (1st Dist. 1985) (where suit brought under the common law against state officials seeks to compel them to perform their duty, it is not action against state).

Supplement to Petition P-926-16, and Request for Precautionary Measures to the United States pursuant to Articles 25 and 36.3 A/B, of the IACHR Rules of Procedure to Halt Serious and Urgent Irreparable Harm to the fundamental rights of Citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, by the Systematic Denying of Access to an Impartial Court and Civil Trial by Jury in Violation of the Limitations and Prohibitions of Art. IV Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, VA Code, the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend to the U.S. Constitution and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.

30 Tuesday May 2017

Posted by Isidoro Rodriguez in Accountability for violation of Separation of Power, Denial of access to impartial court, Impunity in violation of the Common Law

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In support of IACHR Petition P-926-16, which has been “under study” for more than 12 months since May 15, 2016 , this is a supplement and urgently request for the Commission to call on the United States to adopt precautionary measures to stop the irreparable harm to all citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia by the concealing promulgation and use of Illegal Supreme Court of Virginia Court Rules.

Evidence has established a pattern and practice by the Virginia and Federal Executive/Judicial Branches during the Obama Administration, to conceal since 2008 the promulgation and use of illegal Supreme Court of Virginia Rules issued in violations of the restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions of Article VI, §§ 1,[1] 5,[2] and 7[3] of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia (“VA Const.”), VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909,[4] 54.1‑3915,[5] and VA Code § 54.1‑3935,[6] the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine,[7] and the 5th,[8] 7th[9] and 14th[10] Amendments to the United States Constitution (“U.S. Const.”).  Thus, precautionary measures are urgently needed because:

First, in violation of the common law, VA. Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, the Federal and Virginia Executive/Judicial Branches have unilaterally declared themselves unaccountable for acts outside of jurisdiction and scope of employment and absolutely immune from suit-thereby placing themselves above the law for the illegal acts evidenced herein including a business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2‑499,[11] to damage the right of pro hac vice attorneys to conduct interstate commerce.[12]

Second, the evidence establishes irrefutable proof of violation of VA. Const., VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by the Supreme Court of Virginia, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court, as well as the United States Courts of Appeals (“USCA”) for the 2nd, 4th, 11th, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, United States Tax Court, Court of Appeals of Virginia, and Fairfax Court Circuit Court, as well as the Internal Revenue Service, by use of illegal court rules creating an unauthorized centralized attorney disciplinary system under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.[13] Thus, there colluding in to permit the punishing of an attorney for aggressively litigating to enforce his statutory rights (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), places a “chilling effect” on all other attorneys to act independent on behalf of the citizens of Virginia, It provides indisputable evidence that all attorneys will be subject to bar disciplinary proceedings and punishment for no other act than justifiably questioning/impugning judicial jurisdiction and reputation, including the “suspension from the practice of law,”[14] marking, “for many if not most attorneys the gravesite of their careers.”[15]  See The Official End of Judicial Accountability Through Federal Rights Litigation: Ashcroft v.Iqbal [129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009)], From the Selected Works of Zena D. Crenshaw-Logal, National Judicial Conduct and Disability Law Project, Inc., Summer 2011.

Third, monetary damages will neither make whole, nor protect, nor secure the fundamental rights of the citizens of Virginia from irreparable harm by the malfeasance of the systematic denying access to an impartial and trial by jury by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court to conceal and not permitting challenges to the unlawful rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Fourth, the Federal Judicial Branch has promulgated court rules depriving not only citizens of Virginia, but citizens of all the United States of their fundamental right pursuant to the holding in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277 (1985), to retain independent pro hac vice attorneys willing to stop alleged judicial misconduct in a particular jurisdiction.

I.  Beneficiaries

 The beneficiaries of this request for precautionary measures are the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, by compelling compliance with the cited provision of VA Const., VA Code, U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, pursuant to “federalism,”[16]

II.  Facts

To assure citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia of access to an impartial court and the independence attorneys to protect their statutory rights, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935, to guarantee the limitations and prohibitions on the Judicial Branch under Article VI, §§ 1, 5, and 7 of the VA Const.  Therefore, the General Assembly established a horizontal decentralized attorney disciplinary system, that was mandated not to be under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia, but rather under the control of each county court of appeals.  This objective was underscored by the General Assembly enacting VA Code §§ 54.1‑3915, and 54.1‑3909, denying the Supreme Court of Virginia authority to promulgate court rules in violation of the statutory horizontal decentralized attorney disciplinary system.

Writing for the majority in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277 (1985), Associate Justice Lewis Franklin Powell (himself a well-known Virginia litigator), wrote that the right to a pro hac vice practice of law is a “fundamental right,” because it is important to have independent pro hac vice litigators, “bringing claims that would be too unpopular for resident lawyers to bring.” (Emphasis added).  The majority of the United States Supreme Court confirmed the principle of the need to have an independent attorney class, rejecting emphatically the dissent of Chief Justice/Circuit Justice of the USCA 4th/D.C. Cir., Justice William H. Rehnquist.

Pursuant to Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, supra., in 1987 Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez established as a sole practitioner a unique pro hac vice civil litigation practice in Virginia and the Republic of Colombia.  In 1995 the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed to the media the uniqueness of Mr. Rodriquez’s pro hac vice law office after he argued and won, Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (action by nonresident Hispanic for the negligent acts of the U.S. government employee action outside the scope of employment).  The Clerk states it was “the only instance in recent memory that a lawyer with an address outside the United States has argued a case before the Court.” Tony Mauro, Legal Times, “Testing the Limits of Sovereign Immunity” (1995).[17]

Mr. Rodriguez’s unique pro hac vice practice in various jurisdictions specialized in representing nonresident U.S./Colombian Hispanic citizens in claims too unpopular or politically dangerous for U.S. resident lawyers to bring against the United States Department of Justice under the direction of Mr. Eric Holder during the Clinton Administration: i.e. from the USCA 2nd Cir.,  Organization JD Ltda. v. Assist U.S. Attorney Arthur P. Hui and DOJ, No. 93‑6019 and 96‑6145 (DOJ’s attorneys can be held accountable for unauthorized interception of nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens’ fund transfers in violation of the Electronic Communications Act (“ECPA”); from the USCA 11th Cir., Lopez v. the First Union, 129 F3rd. 1186 (997) (DOJ and the banks can be held accountable for unlawful access to nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens account information and interception of wire communications); and, from the USCA D.C. Cir., Cooperative Multiactive de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas Coopservir Ltda. v. Newcomb, et al., No 99‑5190, S Ct. No 99‑1893 (challenging President Clinton’s issuance of an Executive Order bill of attainder against nonresident Hispanic U.S./Colombian citizens and businesses).

The evidence confirms in response Mr. Rodriguez’s pro hac vice practice the Supreme Court of Virginia established under its control a “vertical” centralized attorney discipline system by promulgating and using court rules usurping the exclusive legislative power and authority of the General Assembly of Virginia to establish “courts” and appoint judges.  By these unlawful court rules the Supreme Court of Virginia did away with the exclusive control by each County to discipline an attorney, by inventing the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (hereinafter the “VSBDB”) as a “kangaroo court” and appointed VSBDB members as “judges” with authority and jurisdiction to discipline attorneys. In relevant past, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia Part 6, § IV, 13-6, established the VSBDB to hear, “serious cases of lawyer misconduct.  The twenty-member board appointed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is composed of sixteen attorneys and four lay members. The board issues written (sic.) opinions following its hearings.”

Subsequently, based on the evidence of government political policy to deprive fathers of their parental rights,[18] and of a business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, in violation of Va Code § 18.2‑499, to damage Mr. Rodriguez’s pro hac vice practice for his litigating against government policy, two suits were filed: Isidoro Rodriguez and Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. Editor In Chief, Legal Times, Individually and In his Corporate Capacity, et al., No. 08-411, 129 S.Ct. 639 (2008), and, Rodriguez, and Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, et al., U.S. S. Ct Docket No. 05-1059, filed February 20, 2006).  However, in violation of New Hampshire v Piper, supra, the district court denied access to an impartial court by denying Mr. Rodriguez’s motion to appear pro hac vice to represent his son, as well as denied to represent Mr. Rodriguez’s son, his law partner who was a member of the D.C. bar.[19]

In response to the evidence of being deprived of their fundamental father/son right as U.S. citizens, Mr. Rodriguez filed a petition with the U.S. Congress for an investigation of the record of collusion of the Office of the United States Department of Justice with the Judicial Branch (http://www.liamsdad.org/others/isidoro.shtml).

In retaliation for Mr. Rodriguez’s litigation and petition to Congress, Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder in 2003 compounded the business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, in violation of Va Code § 18.2‑499, by colluding with Washington D.C. Lobbyists Mr. Jack Harbeston et al., to simultaneously file two surreal complaints with the VSBDB against Mr. Rodriguez for his litigating to enforce his statutory rights:[20] first, under VA Code § 54.1-3932,[21] to protect his property right in a Choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on a client’s claim to sunken treasure trove aboard the 1707 Galleon San Jose, sunk off the coast of the Republic of Colombia (NPR report’s  on  Pres. of the Republic of Colombia confirming Dec. 2, 2015, of finding treasure trove valued at $18 Billion USD); and, second, under a joint custody agreement, VA Code, and the Hague Convention, to enforce his rights as a father to protect his son from being forced from Virginia to a “zone of war” in the Republic of Colombia.

Based upon the illegal court rules the VSBDB issued a void ab initio order on November 27, 2006, (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), surreally assumes away various motions under Art VI of the VA Const. and VA Code § 54.1‑3935, challenging the VSBDB authority and jurisdiction to function as a court, to disbar Mr. Rodriguez for litigating to enforce his statutory rights. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Art. VI of the VA Const., the VA Code, and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine affirmed the VSBDB void order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez.

From 2006 to 2014 the record evidence repeated violations of the VA Const., the VA Code, the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, 5th, 7th and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 2(1) of the OAS Charter and Articles V, XIV, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI of the American Declaration, by government attorneys in the Obama Administration in a business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, with the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuit, the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the Virginia Supreme Court, the Fairfax County Circuit Court, and the District of Columbia Bar Association, to deny access to an impartial court by abusing the judicially created doctrine of stare decisis to affirm the void ab initio order of the VSBDB to disbar Mr. Rodriguez from federal practice, and deprive him of this interstate/international pro hac vice law business, reputation, profession, the right to property, and the right to employment as an independent federal litigator.

In this context in May 2013, the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., summarily dismissed Mr. Rodriquez’s complaint and demand for a jury trial of the evidence of the above ongoing business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, and malfeasance, and issued a prior restraint enjoining Rodriguez from filing future suits against government attorneys and employees, including judges, for violation of 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. VA Const. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 54-1-3935, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB (aff’d USCA for the 4th Cir., and cert. denied by the US Supreme Court).

The above-cited record confirms the denying to citizens of Virginia equal protection under the U.S. Const. 5th and 14th Amend., VA. Cont. and VA Code, and the Void Order Doctrine, by the Federal and Virginia Executive and Judicial Branch’s business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, to block accountability for covert and/or overt judicial acts to use illegal court rules, perpetrated in a conspiracy with private individual and government official acting  outside the scope of employment during the Obama Administration under the direction of Washington D.C. Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder, in the offices of the U.S. Attorney General Tax Division, U.S. Attorneys in the E.D. of Virginia, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, the U.S. Attorney for W.D. of Washington, the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Virginia Office of Employment Services.[22]

III. This Situation Merits the Granting of Precautionary Measures

The Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission allow for precautionary measures in “serious and urgent situations presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons….”[23]

i.  Depriving citizens of Virginia of the independent attorneys by Willful Violation of the Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions of Separation of Power on the Supreme Court of Virginia By Promulgating Illegal Court Rules.

 As the key drafter of both the Virginia and United States Constitution, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the violation of the limitation and prohibitions of any constitution defining the separation of power would create a “despotic government.”  Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787).  Also, James Madison as a drafter and supporter of the United States Constitution, explained that, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether one, a few, or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of tyranny.” Federalist No. 47, Washington Square Press, page 103 (Emphasis added).

Another Founding Father, Patrick Henry, made statement often on the need for constitutional checks specifically on the Judicial Branch, writing that,

Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.

Consequently, it is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the judicial branch specifically, because at that time the clear lessons from history, which recent times confirm that,

Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be.  Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to A Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.

Therefore, to protect citizens the VA Const., and U.S. Const., confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern–We the People, and are limited.  Based on these Founding Fathers writings and thoughts, the General Assembly rejected creating any centralized attorney disciplinary system under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

In summary, VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7 diffused the power of the Judicial Branch in Virginia to limit the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within it.  Consistent with the VA Const., the General Assembly mandated that separation of power within the Judicial Branch serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority. . ..” D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, page 13.  To this end, VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 prohibit the Supreme Court of Virginia from the promulgation of court rules which are in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights because courts cannot enact legislation.

As the United States, first Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “[We judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816) (Emphasis added).[24]  Separation of power between and among entities in government fractures power in innumerable ways so to assure independent review and accountability for any violation of either the VA Const. or VA Code.[25]  To enforce this control on the Judicial Branch both the U.S. Const. and VA Const., confirm that there exists no immunity from the absolute right of citizens to access to an impartial court and civil jury trial for malfeasance.[26] See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

ii.  Urgent irreparable harm to the rights of citizens of Virginia by the use of illegal court rules to circumvent and violate the General Assembly’s Decentralize Attorney Disciplinary System established under VA Code §1-3935.

In response to the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia, that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835),[27] the General Assembly enacted the Acts of Assembly 1932. p. 139, to establish a horizontal decentralize attorney disciplinary system.  In furtherance of this objective, the General Assembly gave only to each county court of appeals the jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and gave said orders statewide effect to the disciplining of an attorney before that particular court.[28]  The General Assembly specifically did not provide any power to the Supreme Court of Virginia to discipline an attorney by mandating that any Supreme Court of Virginia disciplinary action was to be referred to a three-judge panel selected from the City of Richmond, VA Code §54.1-3935((B).

Consistent with these restrictions prior to 2000, the Supreme Court of Virginia did promulgate rules establishing an integrated Virginia State Bar (VSB), with only limited powers of investigating complaints against attorneys, to be exercised by a Council and Investigating Committee in each county. The function of the VSB Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury, as a fact-finding board.  It had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney.  Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction, was,

the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the case in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule . . .. (Emphasis added)

The constitutionality of this horizontal decentralized attorney disciplinary system was upheld in Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942).  There, the Court held that the General Assembly merely intended to create the tribunal with general jurisdiction to hear and determine disbarment proceedings and it did not intend to delegate to the tribunal any legislative powers.

Later consistent with the above, VA. Code § 54.1‑3935, was enacted by the General Assembly, which again specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline an attorney directly.[29]  Also, the General Assembly again limited the delegated authority to the Supreme Court of Virginia under VA. Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting under VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, the Court from prescribing, adopting, promulgating, and amending rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct, that would be inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code.

Thus, the General Assembly enacted VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A), to affirm this horizontal decentralized attorney disciplinary system, use of the jurisdiction of each county’s Court of Appeals, and circuit courts to discipline an attorney.  Also, VA Code §54.1-3935(B), again reaffirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond.

iii.  Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by Establishing a Vertical Centralized Attorney Disciplinary System by Illegal Court Rules

To repeat, in flagrant disregard of the General Assembly’s statutory mandated horizontal decentralized attorney disciplinary system established under VA Code § 54.1‑3935 (A) and (B), and in violation of the limitation and prohibitions under VA Const. Article VI, § 1, 5, and 7, and VA Code § 54.1‑3915, the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated illegal Court Rule Part 6, IV, &13, to establish a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the Court’s control.

The Supreme Court of Virginia created the VSBDB as “kangaroo court” and appointing its members as “judges,” with jurisdiction to discipline attorneys.  In short, by creating the VSBDB by unlawful court rules usurping the exclusive constitutional power of the General Assembly, the Supreme Court of Virginia willfully obfuscated the rules of law to assume away the exclusive jurisdiction of each county Court of Appeals and circuit court to discipline attorneys, and the denial of power to the Supreme Court of Virginia by it creating the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court.”

iv.  Malfeasance of the United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, United States District Ct. for the E.D. of Virginia, the United States Tax Court, by Violating the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine by use of stare decisis to affirm the VSBDB void ab initio order to disbar Mr. Rodriguez from federal practice and damage his pro hac vice business.

 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the challenge of any void ab initio order in Federal or State Courts.  There the court stated,

“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).

 The courts of Virginia have no authority to disbar an attorney unless the power has been “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835).  It is black letter law that the Virginia Supreme Court, “cannot act beyond the power delegated to them.  If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void [ab initio], and this even prior to reversal.”  Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).[30]

 “A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur Judgments ” 44, 45.  This is because logically and legally a judgment may not be issued which in violation of the limitation and prohibitions of constitutional protections and lack of jurisdiction, thus a void ab initio order cannot be affirmed by the use of either stare decisis or res judicata.

Subsequently, Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402,(2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987), the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity did not have the constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner.

Consequently, a void ab initio order or judgment is invalid at the moment of issuance, it is to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.  Any void ab initio order may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” Any void ab initio order has none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, i.e. stare decisis and res judicata. “It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments ” 44 and 45.  As explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia, “[a] void judgment is one that has been . . . entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987) (Emphasis added).

Finally, it is a fundamental doctrine of law under the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, is that citizens of Virginia, and Mr. Rodriguez, who is affected by a personal judgment of the VSBDB’s void ab initio order (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), must have access to an impartial court, and an opportunity to be heard, on the evidence of the violation of the business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, and malfeasance by a civil jury trial. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law with jurisdiction upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

Thus. citizens of Virginia, and Mr. Rodriguez have a clear right to challenge disbarments based upon illegal court rules and the use of stare decisis and res judicata by the United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals (“USCA”) for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, United States District Ct. for the E.D. of Virginia, the United States Tax Court, and Supreme Court of Virginia, to give effect to the VSBDB void ab initio order.

v.  Ongoing Business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, to Systematically Deny Access to an Impartial Federal Court and Jury Trial of the Violations of the VA Const. and VA Code.

It is a fundamental doctrine of due process and the common law that a party to be affected by any void personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194.  Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in an impartial court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

However, the evidence confirms that the VSBDB issued, and the Federal Courts affirmed, a void ab initio disbarment order against an attorney for litigating to enforce his Virginia statutory rights to property and rights as a father.  The evidence confirms that the Supreme Court of Virginia, and Federal judges, “[resisted] the execution of the laws under color of authority,”[31] to conceal and obfuscate the promulgation of illegal court rules by using stare decisis to affirm and use the VSBDB’s void ab initio order to damage Mr. Rodriguez pro hac vice business. Finally, the evidence confirms a conspiracy to conceal these illegal acts by systematically denying access to an impartial federal court and trial by a jury of the evidence of malfeasance and the business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499,

But, under Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, supra., the common law, under 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. VA Const., VA Code, assure the right of access to an evidentiary hearing before an impartial on the issue of the scope of employment because as pointed out by Thomas Jefferson, the jury trial is the most important safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive governmental policies.  It is, for this reason, precautionary measures must be issued because of the Hon. U.S. Dist. Judge John A. Gibney, Jr., in, Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB, denied all motions demanding a jury trial on the above evidence, summarily dismissing the complaint, and issued a prior restraint enjoining Mr. Rodriguez from filing future suits against government attorneys, employees, and judges for their violation of 5th, 7th, and 14th Amend. U.S. Const. VA Const. VI §§ 1, 5 & 7, and VA Code §§ 54-1-3915 and 54-1-3935, all in violation of the controlling precedent of Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA 515 U.S. 417 (1995).[32]

B.  Seriousness of the Violation of the Right to Access to an Impartial Court

A “serious … situation” “refers to a grave impact that an action or omission can have on a protected right.”[33]  The evidence establishes a pattern and practice to deprive citizens of Virginia access to an impartial court and independent pro hac vice litigators pursuant to New Hampshire v Piper, supra.  Orders that exceed the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed. 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed. 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L ed. 608.

As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno and Drug Enforcement Administration, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), impartial review of the actions of government employees acting outside the scope of employment and jurisdiction is a mainstay of the United States system of justice, because “no man is above the law.”

This is because, “[i]f a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.).  Here the VSBDB is a “kangaroo court” was created illegally by court rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Article VI of the VA Const.  Thus, the VSBDB disbarment order is a void judgment without legal effect. Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)) “a court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).  Thus, the affirmance of the VSBDB void ab initio order, based on stare decisis does not create any binding decision.  Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370.

Finally, the limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to the judicial branch, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.  Therefore, the validity of the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, as well as the above Federal Courts, are defective by their failure to give the constitutionally required due process requirement of having an opportunity to be heard by an impartial court with subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.  See also, Restatements, Judgments 4(b).

However, because of the business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, to deny access to an impartial court, the above rules of law have be violated and the IACHR must request precautionary measures from the United States, so to assure review of the orders issued to affirm and use the VSBDB void ab initio order that have deprived citizens of Virginia of their fundamental right to an impartial court and civil jury trial to obtain accountability for wrongful acts in violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. See Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., v. Jane/John Does of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. VA 12‑cv‑663‑JAB.

C.  Urgency

The Commission may grant precautionary measures in an “urgent situation,” which “refers to risk or threat that is imminent and can materialize, thus requiring immediate preventive or protective action.”[34]

The urgency of the situation is clear because all of the illegal orders affirming and using the VSBDB void ab initio order are forever void,[35] Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and are not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.  This is because “[a] void judgment does not create any binding obligation.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L Ed. 370 (1940); Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861.

Here the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, has been affirmed and used by the United States Supreme Court, United States Courts of Appeals (“USCA”) for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 11th, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, United States District Ct. for the E.D. of Virginia, the United States Tax Court, and Supreme Court of Virginia, without authority or jurisdiction.  Thus, precautionary measures must be issued to protect the rights of the citizens of Virginia and Mr. Rodriguez, to be heard by any impartial court and jury trial on the issue of liability and damages.  Thus, the urgency of the situation is clear.

D.  Irreparable harm

 For the purpose of granting precautionary measures, “irreparable harm” refers to “injury to rights which, due to their nature, would not be susceptible to reparation, restoration or adequate compensation.”[36]

This evidence confirms that the Federal and Virginia courts and executive branch during the Obama Administration willfully abused the judicially created doctrine of stare decisis to summarily dismiss complaints to deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury, thereby depriving a citizen of Virginia the ability to challenge the unlawful Supreme Court of Virginia court unlawful rules.

The record confirms a business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, and malfeasance to violate the exclusive constitutional power of the General Assembly of Virginia (“VA Assembly”), to create courts, appoint judges, and establish pursuant to VA Code §§ 54.1‑3935, and 54.1‑3909, a “horizontal” decentralized attorney disciplinary system in each county of Virginia, and specifically prohibiting this system be under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.  Also, the General Assembly of Virginia guaranteed in enacting VA Code § 54.1‑3915, that pursuant to Art. § 5 VA Const., that attorney could not be disciplined for litigating to enforce their statutory rights.

Precautionary measures must be issued to avoid irreparable harm by the ongoing use of illegal court rules to create a centralized attorney disciplinary system under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.  There is no other way that any citizen of Virginia can be protected from suffering irreparable harm by the systematic denying of access to an impartial court and trial by jury to stop the use of illegal court rules.  As James Madison writing, that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time… ” The Federalist No. 10, p. 79 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

III.  Precautionary Measures Requested

In light of the preceding information, it is respectfully requested that this Commission call on the United States protect the rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, by taking the following action immediately:

a.  Urgently issue the necessary and appropriate precautionary measures by the United States to prevent further irreparable harm to citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia by the use of illegal court rules violating the limitations and prohibitions of Art. IV Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia, VA Code, void ab initio order doctrine, and the U.S. Constitution, by ordering the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia to support the filing of any action seeking damages for any business conspiracy in violation of Va Code § 18.2 499, to deprive a Virginia attorney of his business, profession, reputation, fundamental right to employment as a pro hac vice federal litigator, for litigating to enforce his rights under VA Const. and VA Code.

b.  Grant expedited evaluation in accordance with Article 29 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure;

c.  In accordance with Article 30(7) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, given the serious and urgent nature of the case of violations of fundamental rights of the citizens of Virginia, consider the admissibility and merits of the petition simultaneously; and,

d.  Grant the Request for Precautionary Measure, admit the petition, and, conduct a full hearing, on the alleged violation of the fundamental rights of citizens of Virginia enshrined in Articles I, III, V, VI, XI, XVIII, XXV, and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

Respectfully submitted,

Isidoro Rodriguez

[1] Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish. (Emphasis added).

[2] Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law . . . established by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added)

[3] Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 7.  Selection . . . of judges.  The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . ..  The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . ..

[4] VA. Code § 54.1‑3909. The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations: . . . Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and attorneys.

[5] VA. Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.

[6] Va. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license.

  1. If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person to such court, that any attorney has . . .violated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked.
  2. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time, the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court.
  3. Bar Counsel of the Virginia State Bar shall prosecute the case. . ..
  4. Upon the hearing, if the attorney is found guilty by the court, his license to practice law in this Commonwealth shall be revoked. …

[7] The Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity did not have the constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio–as a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. See Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95(1987).

[8] Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; . . ..”

[9] Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, grantees the right to a trial by jury for alleged malfeasance by any government employee, including judges.

[10] The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, states in relevant part, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”

[11] Va Code § 18.2‑499.  Combination to injure others in their reputation, trade, business or profession: right of employees: (a) Any two or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of wilfully and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever, . . ., shall be jointly and severally guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.  Such punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief recoverable under § 18.2‑500.

[12] “Pro hac vice …The phrase usu. refers to a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice in a particular jurisdiction but who is admitted there temporarily for the purpose of conducting a particular case.” 8th Ed Black’s Law Dictionary.

[13] In undisputable violation of Art. VI of the VA Const., the Rules of The Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § IV, 13-6, established the VSBDB to hear, “serious cases of lawyer misconduct.  The twenty-member board appointed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is composed of sixteen attorneys and four lay members. The board issues written opinions following its hearings.”

[14] Tarkington, Margaret. ―A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court Proceedings‖, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 363 at 391 (2010). (internal footnote omitted).

[15] “Some bankruptcy courts construe costs assessed against an attorney through disciplinary proceedings as a nondischargeable ‘fine, penalty or forfeiture’, thereby fostering a class of lawyers who cannot return to the bar due to indigency.” POPULAR, Inc. (Power Over Poverty Under Laws of America Restored), “Protecting Judicial Whistleblowers in The War on Poverty: A Proposed International Initiative Focusing on The United States,” p 5 (November 2008). Available at http://www.popular4people.org/files/POPULAR_WhitePaper_finalized.pdf See also, In re Logal, 381 BR 706 (Bankr. Court, ND Indiana 2007).

[16] Although the word “Federalism” never appears in the U.S. Constitution, it is one of its most important and innovative concepts established upon the doctrine of E Pluribus Unum: “out of many states, one nation.”   “Federalism” is the unique to the political system of the United States sharing of power between the United States national and state governments constitutions.  This is based on the 13 original states, which existed first with their respective state constitutions, who in turn were empowered by “We the People” to establish the national government by adopting the U.S. Constitution.  Under “Federalism” both state and national constitutions share power pursuant to hardwired grids of separated power of “checks and balances” creating dynamic and consistent tensions on the proper role of the national government versus the states.

[17] Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) (reversed USCA 4th Cir., to hold that a nonresident Hispanic had the right of access to an impartial jury evidentiary hearing of a DEA agent causing a car accident in Barranquilla, Colombia by acts outside “scope of employment,” i.e. driving while under the influence and getting oral sex) (https://www.oyez.org/advocates/isidoro_rodriguez).

[18] Pursuant to a joint custody agreement, VA Code, and The Hague Convention, Mr. Rodriguez had filed suits based on the request by his then 13 -year old U.S. citizen Son, to stay in Virginia and not be forced to a “zone of war” in the Republic of Colombia during a dangerous period for citizens of the United States in 2001-2002.  See generally Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. Amalin Hazbun Escaf, Court of Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 3247-03-4; and, Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2002).

[19] During these actions, it was confirmed that Chief Justice Rehnquist as Circuit Justice for the USCA 4th Cir., and District of Colombia, permitted these district court to promulgate and use of court rules to restrict and deny the right of an attorney to appear via pro hac vice by requiring a client to retain and pay for a local counsel to appear at all hearings and sign pleadings-thereby again placing the attorney under the control of the judge.

[20] Pursuant to Art. VI, § 5 of the VA Const., and VA Code § 54.1 3915, there is a prohibition on the use of court disciplinary rules to deprive an attorney of his statutory rights, i.e. Mr. Rodriguez’s rights as a father and to property interest in his choate Virginia Attorney’s Lien on the treasure trove claimed by SSA.

[21] VA Code 54.1‑3932. Lien for fees. A. Any person having or claiming a right of action sounding . . . liquidated or unliquidated damages on contract, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the same, and the attorney shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security for is fees for any services rendered in relation to the cause of action or claim. When any such contract is made, and written notice of the claim of such lien is given to the opposite party, his attorney or agent, any settlement or adjustment of the cause of action shall be void against the lien so created, except as proof of liability on such cause of action.

[22]The evidence found in the 1981 FBI Report on Mr. Rodriguez’s White House Senior Executive Appointment in the Reagan Administration as Director of Office of Civil Rights, USDA, confirms a pattern and practice since 1978 of government attorneys, employees, and judges in the District of Colombia conspiring to punish Mr. Rodriguez for being an independent attorney serving citizens. See Isidoro Rodriuez v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, 452 A.2d (D.D. 1982) (The court’s ignored the City Administrator Elijah Rodger acting without authority and falsifying evidence to punish Mr. Rodriguez, Acting Legal Counsel/Consultant to the Mayor of the D.C. Gov’t, for refusing to permit the corruption.  Later Mr. Rogers was found guilty of violation of the Social Security Act and served prison time.

[23] IACHR, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (effective Aug. 1, 2013), art. 25.1, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp (last accessed Nov. 29, 2016).

[24] VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirm that there is no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”

[25] Fed. 47 p 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”

[26] As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Thomas Paine in 1789: “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by men, by which the government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” (Emphasis added)

[27] The Supreme Court of Virginia held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, “[t]he power to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).

[28] See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2

[29]Va. Code § 54.1‑3935. Procedure for revocation of license. . ..

  1. If the rule is issued by the Supreme Court . . . the rule shall be returnable to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. At the time, the rule is issued by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice shall designate three circuit court judges to hear and decide the case. . .. In proceedings under this section, the court shall adopt the Rules and Procedures described in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13 of the Rules of Court.

[30] As Virginia Circuit Judge the Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, wrote, “The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to write laws that the legislature failed to enact, or to repeal those that violate no recognizable constitutional principle, or to amend laws that are reasonably adequate but nonetheless can be improved upon. As Thomas Jefferson put it, a judiciary that pushes beyond these limits would place us all under the “despotism of an oligarchy” —one flatly at odds with the democratic principles of our republic.” VSB Journal, Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, Law & Politics: The Imperative of Judicial Self‑Restraint, (2004). at p.5.

[31] Misprision of treason is defined pursuant to VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482.

[32] In Martinez v. Lamagno and DEA, supra., petition Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez argued and won before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reversed/ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue of acts outside the scope of employment before a jury, despite DOJ argument under the stewardship of Eric Holder and the U.S. Ct of Appeals for the 4th Circuit decision to deny accountability.  The Court rejected their surreal argument that a DEA agent would be absolutely immune from suit even when acting outside the of his scope of employment by negligently causing a car accident.  It is important to note that for the first time a court of appeals had to retain and be represented by an outside counsel because the U.S. Solicitor General agreed with Mr. Rodriquez’s petition, see Docket Watch by Tony Mauro, “Testing the Limits of Sovereign Immunity,” Legal Times, Week of March 30, 2995.

[33] Id., art. 25.2a.

[34] IACHR, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (effective Aug. 1, 2013), art. 25.2b, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp (last accessed Nov. 29, 2016).

[35] “A judgment which is void . . . is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.)

[36] Id., art. 25.2c.

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