The benchmark of my challenge to the grant of “impunity” and absolute immunity to the Washington D.C./Virginia oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges is President Theodore Roosevelt’s observation that, “[n]o man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it.”
In that context, given the clear restrictions, prohibitions, and limitations of the VA Const. cited below on the Supreme Court of Virginia:
First, query, under judicial authority did the Supreme Court of Virginia have to promulgate court rules to create a centralized attorney discipline system under the Court’s control, create the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (“VSBDB”) as a “court, and appoint VSBDB members as “judges?”
Second, query, under what judicial authority and jurisdiction did the Federal Courts have to enjoin and grant “impunity” for unlawful acts of systematically deny access to an impartial court and trial by jury for violation of the below provisions of the VA Const.?
VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish. (Emphasis added)
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules…, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added)
Constitution of Virginia Article VI, § 7. Selection . . . of judges. The justice of the Supreme Court of shall be chosen by a vote of the . . . General Assembly. . .. The judge of all other courts of record shall be chosen by the . . . General Assembly . . .. (Emphasis added)
VIRGINIA CODE SECTIONS INVOLVED
VA Code § 54.1‑3909. The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations: . . . Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and attorneys.
The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations:
Defining the practice of law.
Prescribing procedures for the limited practice of law by third-year law students.
Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys including the practice of law or patent law through professional law corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships, and a code of judicial ethics.
Prescribing procedures for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys.
VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. ‑‑‑Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. In no case, shall an attorney who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner. (Emphasis added)
The VA Const. and U.S. Const. confirmed that all government power was derived from the consent of the govern—”We the People,” and mandate the separation of power to serve as “distribution grids, apportioning authority…,” to protect the rights of citizens.  D. Arthur Kelsey, The Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate review & Stare Decisis, Virginia State Bar, Virginia Lawyer October 2004, 13.
In that context, echoing James Madison writing in Federalist No. 47, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the violation of the limitation and prohibitions defining the separation of power would create a “despotic government.” Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (1787). Consequently, both Founding Fathers understood that the clear lessons from history show that,
Once certain checks and balances are destroyed, and once certain institutions have been intimidated, the pressure that can turn an open society into a closed one-turn into direct assaults; at that point events tend to occur very rapidly, and a point comes at which there is no easy turning back to the way it used to be. Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to a Young Patriot, p. 14, Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, 2007.
Regarding the need for constitutional checks on the Judicial Branch, Patrick Henry wrote,
“Power is the great evil with which we are contending. We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary? If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.”
It is safe to argue that these constitutional draftsmen openly advocated a deep distrust of the motive of individuals in government generally, and the Judicial Branch specifically. The key to protection of the rights of citizens was “federalism” and the separation of power between and among entities in government thereby fractures power in innumerable ways to assure independent review of any violation of the law. To this end, VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirmed no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”
- VA General Assembly Established a Decentralized Attorney Disciplinary System
VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7  diffused the power of the Virginia Judicial Branch by restricting the authority to create courts and appoint judges exclusively to the Virginia General Assembly, thereby limiting the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within the Judicial Branch inconsistent with the VA Const. and VA Code. To this end, VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915 strictly and clearly prohibited the Supreme Court of Virginia jurisdiction and authority to promulgate court rules in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights (in short, the courts cannot enact legislation).
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia, held that the power to either suspend or revoke an attorney’s license in all of Virginia, must be “conferred by statute,” Legal Club of Lynchburg v. A.H. Light, 13249, 430, 119 S.E. 55 (1923), citing Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 619 (1835). Thus, the General Assembly enacted the Acts of Assembly 1932. p. 139, to establish a decentralized attorney disciplinary system-specifically, not under the control of the Supreme Court of Virginia. But, rather the General Assembly gave to each county court of appeals the jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and gave statewide effect to the disciplining of an attorney before that particular court.
Pursuant to VA Const. VI § 5, the General Assembly’s decentralized attorney disciplinary system, the Supreme Court of Virginia was gives authority only to promulgate rules establishing an integrated Virginia State Bar (VSB), specifically enacting VA Code § 54-1-3915 to prohibit the Court from the promulgation of court rules in conflict with both substantive rights and statutory rights of an attorney (in short, the courts cannot enact legislation). To this end the VSB was given only the limited powers of investigating complaints against attorneys, to be exercised by a Council and Investigating Committee in each county. The function of the VSB Investigating Committee was comparable to that of a grand jury, as a fact-finding board. It had no power to suspend, reprimand, or disbar an attorney. Only after the issuance of a rule against an attorney, filed with the county clerk’s office of the county court having jurisdiction, was,
the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the case in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule . . .. (Emphasis added)
In Campbell v. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.B.2d 883 (1942), the constitutionality of the decentralized attorney disciplinary system was upheld, by holding that the General Assembly merely intended to give the county courts the general jurisdiction to hear and determine disbarment proceedings and did not intend to delegate to the tribunal any legislative powers. However, pursuant to the clear wording of VA Code §54.1-3935, the General Assembly specifically denied any power to the Supreme Court of Virginia to discipline attorneys statewide, by mandating that any Supreme Court of Virginia disciplinary action was to be referred to a specifically selected three-judge panel from the City of Richmond. Appeal from the judgment of the three-judge county court was a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Also, the attorney who had been disbarred had the right to apply to the Governor for reinstatement, if at the time of application for such relief, “there is no other adequate remedy for obtaining it at law.” See VA Code of 1950, 12-45.
Subsequently, VA. Code § 54.1‑3935, was enacted by the General Assembly to re-confirm the decentralized attorney disciplinary system’s use of the jurisdiction of each County Court of Appeals, and circuit courts to discipline an attorney. VA Code §54.1-3935(B), again re-confirmed that Supreme Court of Virginia has no power to discipline attorneys statewide, by requiring it to use a three-judge panel formed in the City of Richmond–The statute specifically denied the Supreme Court of Virginia the power to discipline an attorney directly. Under VA. Code § 54.1‑3915, limited the delegated authority to the Supreme Court of Virginia under VA. Code § 54.1‑3909, by prohibiting the Court from prescribing, adopting, promulgating, and amending rules and regulations of unprofessional conduct, that would be inconsistent with rights under either VA Const. and/or VA Code. Thus, it is incontrovertible that the General Assembly repeatedly rejected creating any centralized attorney disciplinary system under the direct control of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
2.Constitutional Limitations and Prohibitions on the Supreme Court of Virginia
VA Const. VI §§ 1, and 7 diffused the power of the Judicial Branch in Virginia to limit the risk of creating dangerous nodes of power within it. VA Const. VI § 5, and VA Code § 54-1-3915. Specifically, prohibits the Supreme Court of Virginia from the promulgation of court rules in conflict with both substantive and statutory rights of attorneys.
To enforce this control on the Supreme Court of Virginia both the U.S. Const. and VA Const., confirm that there exists no “impunity” or immunity of the absolute right of citizens to access to an impartial court and civil jury trial for malfeasance. See Ames E. Pfander, Federal Courts, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).
3.Malfeasance of the Supreme Court of Virginia by affirming the VSBDB the Void Ab Initio Order disbarring Mr. Rodriguez.
The United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1877), established the benchmark as to the challenge to any void ab initio order. There the court stated,
“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. . .. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution‑‑that is, by the law of its creation‑‑to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added).
Consistent with this the Supreme Court of Virginia, held that “[a] void judgment is one that has been . . . entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987) (Emphasis added), see also Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402 (2007); Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51‑52(2001); Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925).
This is because all void ab initio orders or judgments issued without jurisdictional authority are invalid at the moment of issuance, are to be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which their effect is sought to be given.
This Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine mandates that when an entity does not have the statutory, constitutional authority, legal power, or jurisdiction to render any order, said order is void ab initio it is a complete nullity from its issuance and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, at any time, or in any manner. All void ab initio order may be attacked in any court at any time, “directly or collaterally.” All void ab initio orders have none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, thus, neither can the doctrine of stare decisis nor res judicata can be applied to give validity to a void order, not subject to becoming valid by the use of either stare decisis or res judicata. Because “[i]t has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. … It is not entitled to enforcement … All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur. Judgments.” 44 and 45.
Thus, Mr. Rodriguez has provided evidence of the ongoing repeated violations of fundamental rights by the Federal Court by their use of the VSBDB void ab initio order, as well as the denial to him of his fundamental right to challenge the various federal court disbarments based upon their use of stare decisis and res judicata to give effect to and not enjoin the VSBDB void ab initio order.
In short, the validity of the VSBDB void ab initio disbarment order, as well as those of the Federal Courts (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, and 4a thru m), are unlawful because of their failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial court of with subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also, Restatements, Judgments 4(b). The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extends to the judicial branch, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.
Because, the Virginia Supreme Court, “cannot act beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void [ab initio], and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).
Finally, it is a fundamental doctrine of law under the U.S. Const. VA Const., and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, that because Mr. Rodriguez is affected by a personal judgment of the VSBDB and Federal Court’s void ab initio orders, he must have his day in an impartial court, and an opportunity to be heard by a civil jury trial, on the evidence of the business conspiracy and malfeasance. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.
4. Court Orders issued in Violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine
The Federal Courts have issued void ab initio orders by use of VSBDB void order sitting as a “kangaroo court” illegally created by court rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia in violation of Article VI of the VA Const., thus, all of the courts had a duty to, “vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972); see also Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974). The affirmance of the VSBDB void ab initio order, based on stare decisis and res judicata not only fails to create any binding decision but equally important is prima facie evidence of the ongoing extent and nature of the business conspiracy. Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed. 370.
The orders issued the Hon. Judge Gibney (Exhibit 2a), denied Mr. Rodriguez of his right to a jury trial of the business conspiracy and malfeasance in violation of the U.S. Const., VA Const., and Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine. All of these void ab initio orders exceeded the court’s jurisdiction and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed. 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed. 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L ed. 608. This is because, “[i]f a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.). 
In summary, the evidence confirms that by cronyism, obfuscation and legal sophistry there has been a cover-up to conceal the disobedience to the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Const., the limitations and prohibitions on the courts under Article VI §§ 1, 5, and 7 of the Constitution of the VA Const., the restricts under VA Code §§ 54.1‑3909, 3915, 3932, and 3935, the violation of the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine, Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article V, XIV, XVII, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, & XXVI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and Articles 7, 8, 10, & 12 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, by the Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy of government attorneys, employees, and judges.
In furtherance of this business conspiracy to injure Mr. Rodriuez international pro hoc vice law practice, reputation, profession, right to property and employment, the Hon. Judge Gibney issue an order surreally granting “impunity” and absolute immunity from accountability for unlawful civil and criminal acts in violation of VA Code §§ 18.2-499, 500 by affirming and using the VSBDB void ab initio order (Exhibit #3) (http://www.vsb.org/docs/Final_Order_Rodr_11-28-06.pdf), to conceal the promulgation and use of illegal Supreme Court of Virginia Court Rules establishing the VSBDB as a “kangaroo court,” and appointing VSBDB members as “judges” in violation of the VA. Const. and VA Code.
But, while every breach of the public trust is a matter of concern, few can be more grievous than those committed by our judiciary. If the Government and courts in the United States are allowed to be lawbreakers, “it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy,” Olmstead v. the United States, 277 U.S. 438, 451 (1928). Thus, the Commission must act pursuant to Articles 7, 8, 10, and 17 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, to assure that Mr. Rodriguez be permitted to secure access to a trial by jury so to have accountability and damages for injury to his business, reputation, profession, right to employment, property rights, and statutory benefits.
A government attorney, employee, and judge are all bound by honor and their oath to uphold and defend their respective Constitutions and citizens. The basic tenet is that government is not to be used for personal enrichment and the extending of benefits to the corrupt. Government and the Judicial Branch are to work to ensure that public officials are using their office to further the public interest and not to enrich themselves or others. A United States Court is a public institution, and it has a duty to promote respect for the law.
If the vaunted rule of law can be disregarded by the tyranny of irritated ministers and judges which is evidenced by the acts against Mr. Rodriguez’s fundamental rights, then the United States is being permitted to have a policy and practice of “impunity” by denying accountability for the unlawfully disbarring Mr. Rodriguez by the courts and then the courts declaring them absolutely immune from suit for malfeasance. Neither the United States nor all the other members of the United Nations can long survive the unbridled tyranny of a judiciary in collusion with government attorneys, employees, and judges when they place themselves above and beyond the law.
 Federalist No. 47 p 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”
 More than 229 years ago Mr. James Madison in Federalist No. 48, Feb. 1, 1788, first addressed the concern that, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Thus, forecasting unlawful acts outside the scope of employment, jurisdiction and judicial authority the Washington D.C./Virginia Oligarchy by disregarding the limitation and prohibitions of the U.S. Const., VA Const., VA Code, and U.S. Const., and the Void Ab Initio Order Doctrine.
 Article VI, § 1. Judicial power; jurisdiction. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish. (Emphasis added)
 Article VI, § 7. Selection and qualification of judges–The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly . . .. The judges of all other courts of record shall be chosen by . . . members elected to each house of the General Assembly. . .. (Emphasis added)
 Article VI, § 5. Rules of practice and procedure. — The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules governing the course of appeals and the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly….
 VA Code § 54.1‑3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys which are inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it promulgate any rule or regulation or method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys. . .. (Emphasis added)
 As stated by another Virginia attorney. Chief Justice Marshall, “[We judge] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 404 (1816) (Emphasis added).
The Court held that although in a proper case a court does have inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney practicing only in that particular court, for a court to have, “[t]he powers to go further and make suspension or revocation of license effective in all other court of the Commonwealth [this] must be conferred by statute.” (Emphases added).
 See When Has the Supreme Court of Appeals Original Jurisdiction of Disbarment Proceedings? R.H.C. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jan. 1924), pp. 246‑248; see also David Oscar Williams, Jr., The Disciplining of Attorneys in Virginia 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 3 (1954) http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss1/2.
 Federalist 47, p. 109, states that, “[the VA Const.], declares, . . . ‘that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise powers properly belonging to the other. . ..”
 As Virginia Circuit Judge the Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, wrote, “The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to write laws that the legislature failed to enact, or to repeal those that violate no recognizable constitutional principle, or to amend laws that are reasonably adequate but nonetheless can be improved upon. As Thomas Jefferson put it, a judiciary that pushes beyond these limits would place us all under the “despotism of an oligarchy” —one flatly at odds with the democratic principles of our republic.” VSB Journal, Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, Law & Politics: The Imperative of Judicial Self‑Restraint, (2004). at p.5.
 VA Code §§ 18.2‑481 and 482, confirm that there is no judicial immunity for acts outside of authority or jurisdiction by making it a Class 2 felony for, “[r]esisting the execution of the laws under color of authority.”
 “A judgment which is void . . . is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448].
 The United States Supreme Court has observed in, United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961): “[A] democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”
 The famed 19th-century orator Daniel Webster rightly noted, “[t]here can be no office in which the sense of responsibility is more necessary than in that of a judge; especially of those judges who pass, in the last resort, on the lives, liberty, and property of every man. The judiciary power, on the other hand, acts directly on individuals. The injured may suffer without sympathy or the hope of redress. The last hope of the innocent, under accusation and in distress, is in the integrity of his judges. If this fail, all fails, and there is no remedy on this side the bar of Heaven.” Daniel Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1851), Vol. III, pp. 6‑7.